

A REPORT OF THE CSIS
NEW DEFENSE APPROACHES
PROJECT

U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020

Primary Author
Nathan Freier

Contributing Authors
Daniel Bilko
Matthew Driscoll
Akhil Iyer
Walter Rugen
Terrence Smith
Matthew Trollinger

Project Director
Maren Leed

October 2011



A REPORT OF THE CSIS
NEW DEFENSE APPROACHES
PROJECT

U.S. Ground Force Capabilities through 2020

Primary Author

Nathan Freier

Contributing Authors

Daniel Bilko

Matthew Driscoll

Akhil Iyer

Walter Rugen

Terrence Smith

Matthew Trollinger

Project Director

Maren Leed

October 2011

About CSIS

At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to decisionmakers in government, international institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world.

Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world's preeminent international policy institutions, with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and economic integration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

Cover photo credit: *left*: U.S. Marines with 2nd Platoon, Lima Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment and Afghan soldiers arrive at their objective, DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez, U.S. Air Force, <http://www.defense.gov/photos/newspphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=12359>; *top right*: U.S. army paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, DoD photo by Airman 1st Class James Richardson, U.S. Air Force, <http://www.defense.gov/Photos/NewsPhoto.aspx?NewsPhotoID=14782>; *middle right*: U.S. Marines with India Company, Battalion Landing Team, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit run on the beach, DoD photo by Cpl. Theodore W. Ritchie, U.S. Marine Corps, <http://www.defense.gov/Photos/newspphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=11859>; *bottom right*: A U.S. Army soldier maintains a security watch while M2A2 Bradley armored vehicles prepare to cross a bridge in Arab Jabour, Iraq, DoD photo by Spc. Angelica Golindano, U.S. Army, <http://www.defense.gov/photos/newspphoto.aspx?newsphotoid=9784>.

© 2011 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

ISBN 978-0-89206-674-2

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200
Fax: (202) 775-3199
Web: www.csis.org



CONTENTS

Acknowledgments	iv
Executive Summary	vi
Introduction	ix
1. Future Ground Force Challenges	1
2. Future Supply of Ground Force Capabilities	11
3. Implications for the Future	15
Appendix A: Operational Types and their Characteristics	19
Appendix B: Key Task Definitions	62
Appendix C: The Supply of Future Ground Force Capabilities	69
Appendix D: Participants in Workshop Discussions	82
Bibliography	85
About the Author	94



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report is the product of the hard work of a number of people both within and outside of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). First and foremost, three of CSIS's visiting military fellows—Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Bilko, U.S. Army National Guard; Colonel Walter Rugen, U.S. Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Trollinger, U.S. Marine Corps—deserve special recognition for their matchless efforts in helping bring this report into fruition. Arriving at CSIS when this project was in its earliest stages, these three proved instrumental to the entire process. This report would not be what it is without the infusion of their insight, experience, research, and writing.

The analysis contained in this report was heavily rooted in two all-day workshops held at CSIS on the issue of the future of ground forces. The authors would like to express their sincerest gratitude to the superb group of individuals who participated, whose names are listed in the appendix. They brought their wide ranging expertise and experiences to bear from backgrounds spanning the defense, military, and intelligence communities, academia, and the private sector. The final report was greatly enhanced by their contributions. A special thank you goes to foreign participants, many of whom traveled great distances to offer their views and inform the analysis.

The authors are also grateful for several CSIS team members who provided their regional expertise in the thoughtful review of our illustrative scenarios: Stephen Johnson, director of the Americas Program, and Jennifer Cooke, director of the Africa Program. They were instrumental in ensuring our scenarios passed the key plausibility test. We would also like to extend our deep and sincere gratitude to Craig Cohen, CSIS vice president for research and programs. As always, Craig's assistance in helping us lift our eyes up from the trees contributed immeasurably to the quality of the final product.

Additionally, the authors would like to thank several key contributors to the development and/or careful review of the report. These included John Berry (U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command), Joseph Rogers (Strategy Division, U.S. Special Operations Command), Colonels Kevin Felix and Mark Elfendahl (U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center), Tony Vanderbeek (Strategy Branch, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Headquarters, Department of Army), Michael Jeffress (National Intelligence Council), and John Bonin (U.S. Army War College).

We are also indebted to the highly experienced and thoughtful group of individuals who joined us for an in-depth discussion of the draft report: the Honorable Norman R. Augustine, General Bryan Douglas Brown (USA, Ret.), the Honorable Rudy deLeon, the Honorable John Hamre, Stephen Kappes, General Gordon Sullivan (USA, Ret.), the Honorable Kim Wincup, and General Anthony C. Zinni (USMC, Ret.). Through their profound knowledge and insight, this group fundamentally changed this paper for the better, and we are eternally grateful for their support.

Finally, the authors would like to thank the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command for providing the financial support that made this report possible. In particular, the authors would like to thank Doug King and Colonel Ray Coia, of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command's Combat Development and Integration, G3/5 Division, not only for helping this effort get off the ground, but for their thoughtful feedback at several stages of the project. Finally, while CSIS could not have completed this work without the many contributions of the above group and others, the final product is ours alone. Any errors in logic or fact remain the sole responsibility of the authors.



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The coming year will bring pivotal decisions that will shape U.S. defense policy for the foreseeable future. Congress will determine how deeply to cut defense relative to alternative strategies to shrink the deficit. With a decade of war behind us, senior civilian and military leaders will enter the next decade determined to shape the U.S. armed forces for the future, seeking ways to leverage fewer resources to best face new challenges.

This political and fiscal environment does not bode well for U.S. ground forces. For the Army and Marine Corps in particular, the last decade has come at significant human, emotional, and fiscal cost. The country is increasingly weary of war and concerned about the national debt. There is little enthusiasm for devoting dwindling resources to large ground forces designed to prevail in the types of military engagements of the past 10 years. At the same time, many believe the era of large-scale conventional wars has passed.

In fact, defense experts inside and outside of government increasingly express the need for a shift in U.S. defense posture focused more heavily against China's rising assertiveness in East Asia, complemented by small, lethal teams of special operators continuing to keep al Qaeda and its affiliates under unrelenting pressure wherever they might congregate. This shift suggests greater emphasis on naval, air, and special operations capabilities, and a substantially reduced role for traditional ground forces.

This approach is appealing on multiple levels. Consistent with fiscal demands, it suggests opportunities for savings by cutting ground forces, which seem to have less future utility. It also plays to America's conception of its natural advantage, the ability to more effectively leverage advanced technology to its benefit. And it implies that, despite the experiences of the last decade, wars of the future can finally be conducted from afar, or be administered so precisely, that they will command little emotional or financial attention from a public preoccupied by economic concerns.

History has demonstrated, however, that every post-Cold War president has come into office vowing to avoid large, costly, foreign interventions requiring tens of thousands of "boots on the ground," only to have their hand forced by unforeseen events. Today's answer to unexpected crises that arise outside of Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean is for the U.S. military to rely more heavily on allies, partners, and other U.S. government agencies when the need arises. What makes sense in theory, however, runs up against the reality of diminished allies, uncertain partners, and civilian agencies slow to the fight.

It is within this context that this report seeks to look more closely at the ground force capabilities that are likely to be most relevant in the future. Based on a comprehensive review of threats and challenges, as well as trends in the size and character of both U.S. and allied ground forces, it reaches three major conclusions. The first is that ground forces remain relevant, useful, and increasingly unique and will likely remain in greater demand over the next 10 years than many

expect. Second, the capabilities associated with strategic and operational responsiveness, forcible entry, and armored maneuver (e.g., armored- and armor-protected infantry and tanks) will be broadly useful to and important in the future strategic environment. On the latter—armored maneuver—the circumstances under which these capabilities are employed and their distribution on the battlefield will most likely change fundamentally. However, their protection and firepower remain highly relevant. Third, satisfying future demands for building other nations’ security forces or providing large-scale stabilization forces can be managed without adding new specialized military capabilities (e.g., standing military adviser, constabulary, or post-conflict reconstruction formations).

These conclusions run counter to conventional wisdom. First, they serve as a caution against underestimating the role of ground forces in the future, not only against high-end state competitors and small terrorist networks, but particularly in the historically active “messy middle.” This includes crisis interventions in the developing world, wars *within* important states, or peace operations. Second, they suggest that the future ground force role is not what many presume (or would like) it to be. It will be broader than building up like-minded friends; instead, “traditional warfighting capabilities” will be relevant across a wide range of contingencies. They will be more relevant and useful, in fact, than specialized units or formations tailored to meet unique missions like security force assistance or stability operations. Flexible ground forces *that retain many of their traditional features* will be increasingly unique globally, remain highly useful, and will offer the greatest range of options to future national leaders.

The conclusion of this report is that the unique contributions of ground forces—the ability to take and hold terrain, operate discriminately in close proximity to vulnerable populations, and instill confidence in allies and partners—will be no less vital in the coming decade. The challenge is identifying and articulating the risks associated with strategic changes in ground force capability. This report attempts to transcend the very simplistic argument that pits a counterinsurgency/counterterrorism future against a future dominated by tensions between competing states. Instead it seeks to present the most comprehensive menu possible of very real ground contingency demands, comparing those to the current and projected supply of ground force capabilities.

This may seem farfetched or excessive in light of the potential dangers posed by China’s rapidly modernizing military. But it is easy to conceive of instances, both in the recent past and the plausible future, in which a diminished ground force capability would greatly restrict presidential options for addressing crises. If Egypt’s uprising had threatened to disrupt the Suez Canal and key oil networks, for example, and national or regional leaders had asked for help, only ground forces would have been capable of seizing and protecting the 300-plus miles of critical infrastructure resident in that country. Precarious governments in nuclear North Korea or Pakistan, should they falter or break down, would similarly create immediate, large-scale crises to which ground forces would be highly relevant. In any of the three instances, U.S. forces may have been called upon to respond in force under severe time constraints, initiate complex operations immediately upon arrival, and fight very discriminately against an array of hostile actors with highly lethal weapons.

Beyond specific contingencies, but equally important, the mere presence of ground forces reassures allies and partners in Asia, the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Europe. Air and naval power may make substantial contributions to winning future conflicts and to deterring enemies, but only ground forces forward deployed signal the ultimate commitment—the resolve and willingness to put American men and women shoulder to shoulder with the populations of foreign partners in harm’s way.

The challenges that adversaries' advancing capabilities pose to inserting large numbers of ground forces in numerous areas around the world are real, but the belief that naval and air power alone will overcome those challenges and effect decisive outcomes is ahistorical and incomplete. Instead, the United States must develop a comprehensive approach to managing this problem that ensures U.S. forces can gain physical access to critical regions of the world when needed, while remaining prepared to continue sustained operations on the ground as necessary to ensure a favorable resolution. This will require harnessing the respective advantages of the entire joint force—not only across air, sea, space, and cyberspace, but also on land.

This is not to suggest that ground force capabilities cannot or should not change—larger numbers of heavy ground forces are clearly unrealistic in the current context. We do need, however, a more complete and tangible picture of future land-based challenges and of the force that can best address them. This report is intended to serve as a step in this direction. Whether we like it or not, those who threaten U.S. interests still have a vote, and it may well be for conflicts that cannot be won decisively without employing the myriad capabilities resident in our ground forces.



INTRODUCTION

As an era of greater austerity rushes in, policymakers face numerous difficult choices about how to prioritize shrinking resources. This study is an effort to inform those choices in the particular area of U.S. ground force capabilities, based on an examination of how well current plans align with potential future challenges ground forces might be called upon to address.

The study team employed a straightforward approach. First, the team surveyed the existing literature and solicited expert opinion to inform a characterization of the types of operations in which ground forces might engage over the next decade. Second, to amplify that understanding, the team explored in more detail the primary tasks those operations would involve. Finally, the team assessed, at a very high level, the current and planned capabilities that future leaders might be able to call upon to conduct those missions. The results indicate that future investments in two areas—stability operations and security force assistance—may exceed what will be needed. Capabilities in three other areas—strategic responsiveness, armored maneuver, and forcible entry—are particularly important, and either are or may become areas where, should they be cut back too far, U.S. options to meet key threats would be severely constrained.

The report that follows is a high-level summary of more detailed analysis laid out in three comprehensive appendixes. The analysis is based on an extensive literature review, interviews, and two large workshops with experts representing numerous key stakeholders (workshop participants are listed in Appendix D). Prior to its release, this report was also vetted by a panel of former senior officials from the U.S. military and the executive and legislative branches.

The report is organized into three chapters. Chapter 1 describes the range of future ground-centric operations, analyzes key operational tasks that relate to those operations, and draws inferences about the relative utility of ground force capabilities going forward. Chapter 2 summarizes trends in the aggregate capacity and nature of capabilities relevant to future ground operations for likely partners, for the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces, and for U.S. civilian agencies. Chapter 3 evaluates how well the challenges described in Chapter 1 align with the trends in the supply of ground force capabilities outlined in Chapter 2 and highlights key areas of potential disconnect.

The main body of the report is aimed at policymakers, whose level of familiarity with the specifics of ground force operations may vary. The appendixes are provided for those who wish a more thorough explanation of the information presented in subsequent chapters. Appendix A provides additional specifics about the types of operations considered, the criteria used to develop them, and their characteristics. Appendix B offers additional detail about the key tasks associated with the success of the operational types. Finally, Appendix C provides a more complete discussion of aggregate ground force supply.

1

FUTURE GROUND FORCE CHALLENGES

Types of Contingencies

Assessments of the security environment in which American forces may engage in the future have consistently concluded that it will have at least two major characteristics: uncertainty and complexity.¹ This study's evaluation of a more specific subset of those challenges—those for which the responses would likely be ground centric—reaffirms this conclusion.

The study team developed its view of future challenges in a series of sequential steps. The first was a broadly scoped survey of existing literature about ground-centric operations that included existing military doctrine but also the analysis of outside experts and scholars. From that, the study team derived a list of 14 future operational types and their basic characteristics, to include likely levels of violence, the probability a given operational type might come up for consideration by national leaders, the kinds of potential adversaries involved, and other key features. Basic definitions of each type can be found in the text box on the next page. Table 1 summarizes the operational types and some of their key characteristics.

In practice, combinations of one or more of these operational types may be the rule rather than the exception. As one example, over time Operation Iraqi Freedom has included at least six of the operational types outlined below: a major combat campaign, opposed stabilization, seize and secure operations, a counter-network campaign, foreign internal defense, and support to foreign unconventional forces.

That said, the unit of analysis here was set at a level where each operational type could be a stand-alone contingency. For example, in this context, raids are represented as a unique operational type. This is not intended to suggest that they could not also be a component of a larger counter-network or major combat campaign. Instead, operational types imply that the entire set of capabilities that support that type would be the lowest level of prudent disaggregation before operational success is at risk.

1. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010), p iii; and U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, February, 2010), <http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/joe2010.pdf>; as well as numerous other works cited in the bibliography.

Future Operational Types

Show of force—Dispatching, repositioning, or increasing the visibility of forward-deployed U.S. forces to compel hostile actors to cease threatening behaviors in advance of open hostilities (e.g., the 1988 deployment of U.S. forces to Honduras to counter Nicaraguan invasion).

Humanitarian assistance and consequence management—Operations typically in support of civilian agencies of the U.S. government, state and local authorities, or a foreign partner government in order to temporarily relieve human suffering, provide basic public goods, and help offset immediate threats to public safety and health in the wake of foreign catastrophes or domestic disasters (e.g., relief efforts on the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina in 2005).

Foreign internal defense—Military support and assistance to a foreign partner combating serious internal conflict and instability (e.g., the provision of training and equipment to Colombian forces, 1996–2006).

Support to foreign unconventional forces—Covert and/or clandestine military support and assistance to a surrogate force of irregular foreign fighters operating against a state or group hostile to the United States (e.g., U.S. SOF support to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, 2002).

Enabling operation—Typically involving few or no U.S. combat forces, these operations support the defense of an ally or underwrite partner-led combat, disaster relief, or law enforcement operations (e.g., the provision of intelligence, communications, and logistical support to Australian forces in East Timor, 1999).

Noncombatant evacuation operation—The orderly evacuation from foreign territory of U.S., host nation, and designated third country nationals facing the threat of imminent harm under the protection of U.S. military forces (e.g., the evacuation of U.S. citizens from Liberia, 1996).

Peacekeeping—Operations to separate warring states or factions, monitor their activities, dissuade resumption of hostilities, and support implementation of a negotiated end to conflict (e.g., the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 in order to enforce a cease-fire and maintain order).

Seize and secure—Operations undertaken to prevent critical foreign infrastructure (e.g., ports, pipelines, or canals), dominant terrain (e.g., strategic choke points), and/or dangerous capabilities (principally chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and/or their delivery systems) from being actively threatened by intrastate conflict, instability, or illegitimate seizure (e.g., the Anglo-French seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956).

Human security—Operations conducted to protect large numbers of innocent civilians from grave harm due to civil conflict (e.g., the UN-authorized operation in Somalia to provide protection and security for relief effort, 1992–1993).

Future Operational Types *(continued)*

Opposed stabilization—Operations conducted when a state has lost control over security in all or part of its sovereign territory and the associated disorder and internal strife threatens core U.S. interests. The minimum essential objective for intervention is establishment of “an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions [can] be carried out”¹ (e.g., the “surge” of U.S. forces into Iraq, 2007).

Sanctuary denial—Operations undertaken to redress or forestall significant harm to core U.S. interests by temporarily controlling hostile territory, precluding terrorist, insurgent, or serious criminal activity posing persistent hazards, and/or disrupting or destroying adversary leadership, networks, and capabilities that enable hostile or illegal actions (e.g., the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970).

Raid—Small-scale, short-duration military operations undertaken in pursuit of a set of very specific objectives such as seizing individuals or disabling threatening capabilities (e.g., the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound).

Counter-network campaign—A dedicated, sustained effort comprising multiple discrete military actions with the specific purpose of systematically disrupting or dismantling hostile nonstate networks—terrorist, criminal, insurgent, or otherwise (e.g., the on-going U.S. campaign against leaders of al Qaeda and its key affiliates).

Major combat campaign—Large-scale military operations focused on the defeat of an enemy state’s conventional and irregular military capabilities and methods (e.g., the United Kingdom’s recapture of the Falkland Islands, 1982).

1. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters* XXV (Winter 1995/1996): 60.

Table 1: Operational Types and Key Characteristics

	Operational Characteristics								
	Scale (expected)	Scale (range)	Probability (expected)	Probability (range)	Strategic Warning	Duration	Adversary Types	Permissiveness	
Operational Type	Show of force	Medium	Medium to Large	High	Moderate to High	Extremely Short	Short to Moderate	M, I, S	Uncertain
	Humanitarian asst/consequence mgmt	Small	Very Small to Large	Extremely High	Extremely High	Extremely Short	Short to Moderate	C, T	Permissive to Uncertain
	Foreign internal defense	Very Small	Up to Medium	Extremely High	Extremely High	Moderate	Long to Very Long	C, T, I, M	Permissive
	Spt to foreign unconventional forces	Very Small	Up to Medium	Moderate	Low to Moderate	Long	Short to Long	T, I, M, L, S	Semi- to non-permissive
	Enabling operation	Small to Medium	Very Small to Large	High	Moderate to Extremely High	Extremely Short to Moderate	Short to Long	C, T, I, M, L, S	Permissive to non-permissive
	Non-combatant evacuation	Very Small	Up to Medium	Extremely High	Extremely High	Extremely Short	Very Short to Short	T, I, M, L	Semi-permissive to Uncertain
	Peacekeeping	Small to Medium	Very Small to Medium	High	High to Extremely High	Moderate	Long to Very Long	I, M, L, S*	Semi-permissive
	Seize and secure	Medium	Medium to Large	Moderate	Low to High	Extremely Short	Moderate to Long	I, M, L, S	Non-permissive to Uncertain
	Human security operation	Medium	Small to Large	High	Moderate to Extremely High	Moderate	Long to Very Long	M, L	Permissive to non-permissive
	Opposed stabilization	Large	Medium to Large	Moderate	Low to High	Short to Moderate	Long to Very Long	I, M, L	Semi-permissive to Hostile
	Sanctuary denial	Medium	Very Small to Large	Moderate	Moderate to High	Moderate	Short to Long	C, T, I, M	Non-permissive to Hostile
	Raid	Very Small	Very Small to Small	Extremely High	Extremely High	Extremely Short	Extremely Short to Short	C, T, I, M, L, S	Non-permissive to Hostile
	Counter-network campaign	Small	Very Small to Small	Extremely High	Extremely High	Long	Long to Very Long	C, T, I	Uncertain to Hostile
	Major combat campaign	Large	Medium to Large	Low	Low to Moderate	Long	Moderate to Very Long	M, L, S	Hostile

Keys							
Scale	Probability conditions will arise over next decade	Strategic warning/Duration	Adversary				
Very Small	Up to battalion	Low	25 percent or lower	Extremely Short	Hours	C - Criminal	L - Limited
Small	Smaller than brigade or MEU	Moderate	26 to 50 percent	Short	Days	T - Terrorist	Capability military
Medium	Brigade or MEU to division	High	51 to 75 percent	Moderate	Weeks	I - Insurgent	S - Sophisticated
Large	Larger than division or MEU	Extremely High	76 to 99 percent	Long	Months	M - Militia	Capability military
				Very Long	One to several years		


A more detailed description of each operational type and its primary characteristics is at Appendix A. In brief, however, a review of the 14 types offers a number of key insights:

- Overall, future operations will be more complex.** Some of the “messiest” operations are becoming more probable as well. Many may take place in countries with little or no state control and involve multiple adversaries who employ very lethal high- and low-end capabilities and pursue different and often competing ends. The conflicts themselves might occur among large civilian populations. Though desirable given the experience of the last decade, opting out of them may be difficult, as they can occur in areas where key strategic interests are at risk; interests ranging from access to key resources or regions and control of weapons of mass destruction to formal or informal alliance commitments.
- As a result of many of the trends noted above, certain operational types merit more deliberate attention in future force planning.** These include the potential for opposed stabilization missions, which comprise not only the counterinsurgency operations that have become familiar over the past decade but also broader versions of stabilization that are aimed at imposing some level of basic civil order after central authority has failed in important states (e.g., collapsed North Korea or Pakistan). Stabilization once implied lower levels of lethality, as in the case of classic counterinsurgency. However, with the Arab Spring as just one example, states possessing sophisticated military capabilities can suffer crippling internal conflict. Any stabilization operation in cases like this would confront more capable adversaries. In addition, certain operational types that seemed remote possibilities in the past are becoming far more plausible. These include missions narrowly focused on inserting forces to take control of critical infrastructure, geography, or dangerous weapons. What links these operations is the continuing need for many of the capabilities long associated with major combat operations.

- Significant violence is more likely across operation types.** The forces of globalization, the proliferation of sophisticated military capabilities, and advances in and broad dispersal of technology, manufacturing capability, and technical knowledge have increased the potential for harm resident in a wide community of state proxies, nonstate actors, and even “super-empowered individuals,”² chipping away at state authority and states’ traditional monopoly on violence. Ultimately, this new “democratization of violence” means that almost every future operational type has the potential for sophisticated armed resistance on some level.³ In many cases, the potential for extreme violence is very real. This includes some operational types that have generally been assumed to be less intense (e.g., humanitarian assistance or human security operations). By implication, capabilities to ensure forces will be adequately protected, can enter various areas at will, and will enjoy freedom of movement upon arrival are increasing in value.

Figure 1 depicts expected levels of violence across operational types and their relationship to the probability each type might occur. One implication is that traditional models that depict an inverse relationship between expected levels of combat intensity and probability of occurrence are less valid in the future. While the operational type that would involve the largest levels of sustained violence—major combat campaign—remains the least likely, the trend for the remainder of potential engagements is not linear. Similarly, while there is a basic presumption that most operations of a given type would involve greater violence as one moves along the operational spectrum, within each operational type, violence levels will vary substantially.

Figure 1: Probability and Violence Levels of Future Operations



2. Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke, “WikiLeaks, Media, and Policy: A Question of Super-Empowerment,” *Small Wars Journal*, September 29, 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/558-elkus.pdf>.

3. John Robb, “Small Groups and Global Warfare,” *Global Guerrillas*, February 16, 2005, http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/02/the_democratiza.html.

- **Future operations will be global.** While developing multiple, detailed scenarios for every operational type exceeded the scope of this project, the literature review, interviews, and workshops conducted as part of the project made clear that almost every single operational type could be reasonably anticipated in every region of the world.⁴ The implications are twofold. First, any future strategy that fails to be globally comprehensive will be highly vulnerable to failure. Second, U.S. capabilities to support strategic and operational responsiveness—a combination of strategic lift by sea and air, forward-stationed or forward-deployed forces, and prepositioned stocks—will be a vital component of America’s ability to address future challenges.

Anticipating Future “Demand”

Determining what types of operations ground forces might be called upon to perform involves identifying various contingencies within a framework that is both comprehensive and discrete. Implicit in that formulation is some judgment about whether future U.S. leaders might elect to address a given set of geopolitical circumstances, and if so, what form that response might take.

The approach taken in this analysis was to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, judgments about future political actions. Instead, the study team attempted to describe a set of operational types that represent the range of responses that future leaders might *consider* should various circumstances present themselves. That effort involved making judgments about the probability that such circumstances might actually unfold, but stopped short of anticipating the decisions that might ensue.

The probability judgments presented here, therefore, are an attempt to represent, as neutrally as possible, the likelihood of certain scenarios arising, not whether U.S. forces would actually do them. In some instances, the distinction is not likely to be very meaningful. For the most part, U.S. leaders are likely to contribute military capabilities, at least to some degree, to almost every major humanitarian disaster that might occur around the globe, if forces are available. The divergence between occurrence and likely participation would presumably be greater, however, in some situations of localized ethnic conflicts, or even state collapse if it appeared to be relatively orderly and peaceful.

The implication of the “incidence-based” approach adopted here is that the projected frequencies represent a larger “demand” signal than would actually be engaged in. On the other hand, it represents a more objective baseline upon which others can then impose additional filters, depending on their particular vision of U.S. strategic priorities.

4. There are, however, some illustrative future cases laid out in Appendix A.

Key Operational Tasks

The operational-level analysis above sheds light on the range and variability of missions ground forces will face and offers some indication about the utility of some general ground force capabilities and characteristics. To further this analysis, the study team identified 19 key tasks that support each operational type (additional detail about each is in Appendix B). Although the list is not exhaustive, it is intended to cover the range of actions that must be performed to achieve success in any given contingency. The tasks are:

1. Conduct distributed mission-oriented military operations;
2. Exploit all-source intelligence, information, reconnaissance, and surveillance;
3. Gain and exploit information advantages;
4. Defend networks, conduct operations in a degraded information environment, and exploit advantages in the electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS);
5. Project forces over strategic and operational distances;
6. Conduct deliberate theater entry and opening;
7. Conduct forcible entry and theater opening;
8. Conduct entry under uncertain or ambiguous conditions;
9. Employ combined arms forces in combat;
10. Employ combined arms forces in security operations;
11. Conduct stability operations;
12. Improve capability, capacity, and performance of foreign security and paramilitary forces (security force assistance);
13. Conduct operations in permissive environments;
14. Conduct operations entirely in contested or denied territory;
15. Conduct operations under uncertain security conditions;
16. Conduct an opposed egress or egress under uncertain security conditions;
17. Operate against and recover from a large-scale biological hazard;
18. Operate against and recover from a large-scale chemical or nuclear hazard; and, finally,
19. Sustain distributed military operations for extended periods under austere conditions.

After identifying these tasks, the study team assessed their relationship to the operational types. Most tasks had the potential to be part of almost any operation, so the standard the study team applied was to identify tasks that would be *decisive to the outcome* of any given operation within a type. Thus tasks that might be conducted but would not be critical did not inform the conclusions.

The relation of tasks to operations is depicted in Table 2 (on page 10). From these relationships, the study team drew inferences about the relative importance of various capabilities associated with the tasks, based on how broadly they applied across types as well as the characteristics

of the types to which tasks were relevant (e.g., probability, warning time, or scale). Overall, this comparison indicates the following:

- **Capabilities closely associated with the performance of five key tasks will be critical across all future operational types.** The five tasks are conducting distributed operations, exploiting intelligence, exploiting information, conducting cyber and electronic warfare, and projecting forces.
- **Ground forces will need significant combat capabilities.** As further amplification on the point about increased violence evidenced by the operational typology above, a task-based review reveals that some or most incidences in 10 of 14 operational types will involve putting ground forces into environments where there is a reasonable potential for real violence and/or sophisticated opposition. This includes major combat campaigns, where this might be expected, but also a number of other operational types that are typically conceived of as more benign. The implication—that ground forces must be prepared to encounter and overcome violence—is further reinforced by the finding that 6 of the 14 mission types can be reasonably themed as combat actions. As discussed above, more probable operational types (i.e., sanctuary denial, seize and secure operations, and opposed stabilization) will require the same types of capabilities and methods as would be employed in a (less likely) major combat campaign, perhaps in equal or greater numbers. Of course, depending on the operation and adversary, the circumstances under which they are employed and the numbers, types, and distribution of higher-end capabilities will differ significantly from case to case. As even further reinforcement of this point, in eight operational types, most or all of the specific contingencies that might occur would involve ground force actions under uncertain security conditions. Still further, also in eight operational types, irrespective of whether forces enter or operate in a relatively benign environment, conditions exist where adversaries may attack U.S. forces as they exit. In total, these findings clearly indicate that most force packages must possess a minimum level of combat capability, perhaps to an even greater extent than is currently assumed.
- **Responsiveness will be at a premium.** The strategic warning associated with half of the 14 operational types ranges from hours to days. Of these 7, it is likely that 4 would be relatively small in size (less than a brigade or Marine Expeditionary Unit [MEU]), but are nonetheless likely. Three others, on the other hand, would be larger but less common. Together, these findings indicate that rapid response will continue to be essential to ground force success. Much could be handled by relatively small units, but in some instances greater capacity will be required. In the end, the very real prospect of numerous short-notice contingencies occurring in any of several far-flung locations, possibly simultaneously, and potentially requiring thousands of ground forces in response, indicates that the capabilities to project forces over great distances will be broadly relevant and important going forward.
- **Capabilities to support operations in contaminated (nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological) environments will be critical in the future.** These circumstances could arise in at least 10 of the 14 operational types, although in most instances the likelihood is relatively low. This suggests a strong need for U.S. forces to maintain associated capabilities, as when these circumstances arise, the ability to continue operations despite them will be critical to mission success.

- **Stability operation tasks will be important to some operational types, but not the majority.** While stability operations will be a part of almost all types of contingency operations, they will be decisive some or most of the time in only 5 of 14 cases. Of those, 3 were identified as likely or very likely and would arise on short notice, but would require a relatively modest force commitment. In the other 2 less likely cases, the scale would be significantly larger, but strategic warning may be longer. By implication, while the capabilities to conduct stability operations tasks should be resident in some basic form across the ground forces (particularly because operational types can morph or combine, simultaneously and with little or no notice), it may be more important to have a strong core set of capabilities that could be rapidly expanded when needed than to have large amounts of standing capability dedicated to these tasks.
- **Security force assistance (SFA)—enhancing other nations’ self-reliance by developing their security forces and supporting institutions and processes—will be an essential part of some, but not most, future operations.** Like stability operations, security force assistance was found to be less decisive to the range of future contingencies than might be expected. The study team concluded that SFA was essential some or most of the time in only 5 of 14 cases. For all 5, strategic warning was judged in most cases to be weeks to months, suggesting that immediate response forces need not have large amounts of capacity for these tasks. Scale could vary widely, however, which indicates that an expandable capability would be relevant for these missions.

Some of these conclusions may seem antediluvian, or representative of a mindset better suited for the 1980s than for 2020. That interpretation would be mistaken, however. The finding here that conventional combat forces—including armor—matter is based not on a restatement of their utility in “traditional” missions. Instead it flows from an objective assessment indicating that while much (but not all) of the purpose for which those capabilities were originally designed—to fight other conventional forces—has dissipated, they are broadly useful and even critical to many other types of missions, ones that will persist or become even more likely going forward.

It would be similarly mistaken to view the conclusions about the relevance of stability operations and SFA capabilities as a suggestion that ground forces should repeat the errors of the past and willfully ignore the reality that such tasks will need to be conducted in the future, however distasteful. Instead, the analysis finds that these tasks remain important. But in an era of constrained resources, every specialized resource represents an opportunity cost relative to other missions. Thus the analysis is intended to suggest that decisions about these capabilities should be made with that in mind. It indicates that the costs of large amounts of specialized forces for these missions would be high and that demands can likely be best satisfied with more flexible and expansible approaches.

This chapter outlined a basic vision of the future facing ground forces and the capability areas that will be most relevant. The next describes the projected supply of ground force capabilities from three perspectives: that of likely allies, the U.S. military, and from other relevant U.S. government agencies. Chapter 3 then evaluates how that supply aligns with the challenges posited here.

Table 2: Operational Types and Key Tasks

Key Operational Tasks	Operational Types													
	Show of Force	Humanitarian assist/ consequence mgmt	Foreign internal defense	Support to foreign partner forces	Enabling operation	Non-combatant evacuation	Prisoner release	Seize and secure	Human security operation	Opposed subjugation	Sanctuary denial	Raid	Counter-network campaign	Major combat campaign
PROBABILITY	High	Extremely High	Extremely High	Moderate	High	Extremely High	High	Moderate	High	Moderate	Moderate	Extremely High	Extremely High	Low
Conduct distributed mission-oriented military operations.	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Exploit all-source intelligence, information, reconnaissance, and surveillance.	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Gain and exploit information advantages.	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Defend networks, conduct operations in a degraded information environment, and exploit advantages in the cyber/EMS domain.	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Project forces over strategic and operational distances.	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Conduct deliberate theater entry and opening.	S	M	M	M	M	F	M	M	M	F	M	M	M	S
Conduct entry under uncertain or ambiguous conditions.	S	F	F	M	M	M	F	M	F	S	S	S	S	S
Conduct forcible theater entry and opening.						F		S		S	M	S	S	S
Conduct operations in permissive environments.	S	M	S	M	M	F	S	F	S					
Conduct operations entirely in contested or denied territory.		F	S	M		S	M	M	F	S	S	M	M	M
Employ combined arms forces in combat.				S	F	F	M	M	F	M	M	M	M	M
Employ combined arms forces in security operations.	F	S	F	F	S	S	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
Conduct stability operations.		M					S		S	M	F			S
Improve capability, capacity, and performance of foreign security forces (Security Force Assistance).			M	M			S		S	S				S
Conduct operations under uncertain security conditions.	F	S	F	M	S	M	M	S	S	M	M	S	S	S
Conduct an opposed egress or egress under uncertain security conditions.		F		F		M	M	M	S	M	M	M		
Operate against and/or recover from a large-scale biological hazard.		S			F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	S
Operate against and/or recover from a large-scale chemical or nuclear hazard.		F			F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Sustain distributed military operations for extended periods		M	S	M	M	M	M	F	S	F	F	M	M	M

Key	
Most	Would apply in 50 percent or more instances of this operational type.
Some	Would apply in 25 to 49 percent of the instances of this operational type.
Few	Would apply in 6 to 24 percent of the instances of this operational type.
Blank	Does not apply, or would apply in 5 percent or less of the instances of this operational type.

2

FUTURE SUPPLY OF GROUND FORCE CAPABILITIES

Going forward, decisionmakers contemplating whether to engage in a given operation would likely include judgments about the availability of key capabilities in that process. While for ground-centric operations these would clearly include the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces (SOF), the ability and willingness of allies to participate would also be assessed, as would the potential contributions of relevant civilian agencies.

Conceptually, capability has both a qualitative and quantitative dimension. Budget constraints facing the United States and many of its traditional allies are resulting in smaller ground forces in general, but operational lessons learned are also driving some qualitative shifts. The next section briefly describes the growing convergence between some of the United States' traditional and newer operational partners. The following section provides a brief overview of trends for U.S. ground forces. The last section describes the challenges facing many of the civilian agencies that might be called upon to contribute to future ground force operations. A more complete discussion of the capabilities covered in this chapter can be found at Appendix C.

Partner Nation Ground Force Capabilities

A key tenet of U.S. strategy is that we will seek to engage in future operations with international partners whenever possible.¹ Traditionally, a relatively small group of like-minded nations has demonstrated a repeated willingness to put forces alongside those of the United States. Many of these nations have highly sophisticated forces that are trained and equipped to engage in the most lethal operations. Most are also facing serious budgetary problems that are forcing them to reduce the overall size of their armed forces (ground forces in particular). These reductions are almost exclusively coming from the active rolls, though in some instances (e.g., the United Kingdom) they are accompanied by growth in reserve forces. Changes in perceptions of the strategic environment have also caused many nations to reorient their forces away from large-scale conventional conflicts with states, placing more emphasis on the challenges posed by irregular or nontraditional enemies. This includes increasing, or at least protecting, capabilities that support stability operations and security force assistance tasks.

Concurrent with this trend, the United States has recognized both the need and the opportunity to broaden its pool of potential operational partners. It is now a key element of U.S. defense strategy to develop deeper relationships with a wider range of nations. As a general statement, many of these nations have relatively nascent or small ground force capabilities that are typically lightly armed and designed to meet the minimum demands of securing national borders and providing internal security. Unlike many Western nations, however, a number of these countries

1. The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010).

are expanding their strategic appetites and seeking to play a larger role in regional and global affairs. These include Brazil, South Africa, and Australia, among others. A number are increasing their defense investments, including in high-end special operations forces but also in more general purpose ground force capabilities. However, most are either a long way from or have no desire to build up large amounts of armored maneuver capability. Instead, in general, they are focusing on developing more capacity to project power within their own regions, enhancing their capabilities to withstand higher levels of violence, and improving their capacity for logistical support.

From the perspective of future partner contributions to ground force operations, the net result of these two trends could be characterized as a regression toward the mean. Many larger Western forces are shrinking, while smaller forces elsewhere in the world are growing. Higher-end Western capabilities are giving way to a more “middleweight” orientation, while growing regional powers are adding greater firepower.

U.S. Military Ground Force Capabilities

Though the future is still very much being written for U.S. ground forces, some decisions have already been made. As operational commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan decline, the Army and the Marine Corps together will eliminate up to 67,000 active duty service members by 2016. The Marine Corps has laid out a more explicit plan outlining qualitative changes in its future force that involve consolidating some headquarters, divesting some combat capability, and reorganizing logistics support, while increasing its investments in special operations and cyber capabilities. Marine Corps leaders have also emphasized the need to lighten the overall equipment inventory to preserve responsiveness, characterizing itself as a “middleweight force [that is] lighter than the Army, and heavier than SOF.”² Both services remain committed to preparing to operate across the full range of operational types, though the Marine Corps has restated its particular utility in crisis response.

Just as many of the nations that have contributed to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are applying lessons learned from those conflicts by enhancing their capacity in security force assistance and stability operations, U.S. ground forces are debating how best to shore up those capabilities for the long term. A key characteristic of special operations forces is regional and cultural expertise, and the Army and Marine Corps both intend to enhance the capacity of their forces in this regard as well. Similarly, the Army in particular is deliberating how best to structure and prepare for stability operations and security force assistance tasks. Options range from the creation of units or organizations dedicated to those missions, to supporting small cadres of experts that could rapidly direct training and enhancements to general purpose forces, should large-scale demands emerge unexpectedly.

Unlike the so-called general purpose forces, special operations forces plan to continue past growth at a rate of 3 to 4 percent annually for at least the next five years.³ Looking forward, SOF is principally focused on continuing to conduct counter-network campaigns, and as capacity be-


2. General James F. Amos, “Role of the United States Marine Corps,” Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, DC, September 12, 2011, p. 2.

3. Admiral Eric Olson, “Posture Statement, U.S. Special Operations Command,” Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2011, www.socom.mil/Documents/2011%20SOCOM%20Posture%20Statement.pdf.

comes available (either through decreased commitments elsewhere or as the force grows), expanding its focus on foreign internal defense missions.

Figure 2 illustrates the aggregate numbers of active duty ground forces for the United States and four of its key allies—Canada, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Allies have already begun to make ground force reductions, and more are planned. U.S. ground force levels have been steady or rising in recent years but, as discussed above, are projected to fall by 67,000 over the next five years. Collectively, by 2016, the United States and some of its key allies plan to cut their active duty ground forces by over 174,000, a 15 percent reduction from 2009 levels.

Figure 2: U.S. and Key Allies' Active Duty Ground Forces, 2009–2016



Source: Created by the CSIS New Defense Approaches Project based on data from *Jane's World Armies* and from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge, 2011).

Notes: Graph represents active duty components for all ground forces. An increase in the United Kingdom's reserve component is expected to offset some of its planned active force reduction. U.S. SOF component reflects a 3 percent annual growth rate, as projected by the 2011 U.S. SOCOM Posture Statement.

U.S. Civilian Agency Contributions

Operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade have brought into high relief the need for civilian expertise in certain types of military operations. In recognition of this fact, new funding mechanisms and organizations have been established to increase both responsiveness and overall capacity, particularly for expertise resident in the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While civilian augmentation of military-led operations that require stability-related tasks in particular remains important, in popular

conception these operations sometimes overshadow an equally vital but longer-standing set of operational types in which military forces are subordinate to civilian authorities. In the main, these include any mission that might be conducted domestically, from disaster relief to responding to a terrorist attack, as well as certain types of overseas operations.

While rhetorical support for “whole-of-government” operations remains strong, the budgetary foundation is weakening. The State Department, USAID, and even potentially the Federal Emergency Management Agency have already experienced or are anticipating real budgetary cuts that are in some instances significant. Congress is increasingly unwilling to support key enhancements to civilian agencies that would underwrite meaningful contingency response capabilities.⁴ And, initiatives in the State Department in particular that may seek to shore up these capabilities are unlikely to be resourced sufficiently to relieve ground forces of their implicit responsibilities for many nonmilitary stability operations tasks.⁵ While the ultimate outcome is unclear, as a general proposition it seems reasonable to expect that plans to expand civilian support to military-led foreign contingency operations are unlikely to be realized and, in fact, that such support may be reduced over the next decade.

On the whole, the brief overview of trends in partner and U.S. military ground force capabilities, and in expected civilian support, indicates the following:

- The collective ground force capacity of the United States and its key allies is falling, though some future shortfalls could be offset by regional partners when applicable.
- Special operations capabilities are robust and growing, both in the United States and with many potential partners and friends.
- With allied armored forces shrinking significantly, U.S. armored capabilities are becoming increasingly unique.
- Partner nations’ ground force capabilities are increasingly converging toward middleweight forces with regional, rather than global, reach.
- Given the likely decline of resources in other U.S. government agencies, deployed ground forces will still perform many nonmilitary stability operations tasks.

4. Susan Epstein et al., “Fact Sheet: The FY2012 State and Foreign Operations Budget Request,” Report R41680, Congressional Research Service, March 9, 2011, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41680.pdf>.

5. Nicole Gaouette, “State Department Plans Cuts in Security Funding, Aid,” Bloomberg, February 14, 2011, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-14/state-department-s-47-billion-budget-would-cut-some-security-aid-funds.html>.

3

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

The overview of the future presented in Chapter 1 confirms the analysis of so many others: the future security environment will be complex and uncertain, and highly variable. Examining the implications of that environment for ground force operations in particular, and then comparing those findings with trends in the aggregate supply of ground force capabilities, suggest at least five areas in which a misalignment either exists or could be introduced as policymakers consider how to apply budgetary cuts of a-yet-uncertain magnitude. A more fulsome discussion of the detail behind these findings can be found in Appendixes A through C. But, in brief, the following are identified as current or potential misalignments:

- **Lower demand for stability operations capabilities.** This finding acknowledges that existing specialized and general purpose forces will need to both provide security during future stabilization efforts and continue filling significant gaps in civilian contingency capability (U.S. and foreign partner militaries are also preserving supply in this area). However, based on an analysis of contingency requirements, we conclude that future demand may be overstated and that the forces required for stability operations are either sufficient and ready or sufficiently adaptable to meet the immediate stabilization needs associated with most contingency types. In addition, foreign partners are likelier to commit their finite ground force capabilities to more benign stabilization efforts than they are to contribute to more intense combat actions. As a result, a more expansive stability operations capability for larger and/or longer contingency demands might be better positioned in the U.S. reserve components (which might also contain more relevant expertise and thus be more effective).
- **Lower demand for security force assistance capabilities.** Again, these capabilities will be needed, but will likely represent a smaller proportion of overall contingency demands than conventional wisdom suggests. As in the case of stability operations, supply is being preserved both in U.S. and allied militaries, and partners' willingness to support security force assistance under more benign circumstances may be more likely than commitments of combat forces. Finally, demands for security force assistance capabilities will likely be more evident over time than they will under exigent contingency conditions.
- **Greater demand for capabilities that support strategic responsiveness.** The uncertainty of the future environment and the likelihood that many ground force contingencies will emerge with very little strategic warning, place a high premium on ground forces that can rapidly deploy and operate effectively with very little strategic notice and little or no requirement to stage and reconfigure before initiating follow-on operations. Thus, demand both for responsive ground forces and the joint capabilities (e.g., air and sea lift) enabling their timely deployment will be high. Others' supply, in this regard, is limited and, from a global perspective, likely diminishing. And, current U.S. capacity could be further strained by reductions in forward-deployed forces, as well as any potential reductions in overseas prepositioned stocks.

- **Greater demand for forcible entry capabilities.** Demand is high in this case because forcible entry capabilities are more broadly applicable than many perceive. The United States maintains much of the likely supply among a broader community of allies and partners. Current levels may be adequate, but if an under-appreciation of the potential demand leads to substantial reductions in forcible entry capabilities and forces either in the Marine Corps or in the Army, future decisionmakers' options could be greatly reduced. This also applies to careful consideration of the entire family of joint enablers that underwrite the U.S. capability for forcible entry (e.g., amphibious shipping, suppression of enemy air defenses, counter-mine capabilities, and strategic and operational airlift).
- **Greater demand for armored maneuver capabilities.** As in the case of forcible entry above, based on their broad applicability across multiple operational types, demand for armored maneuver capabilities (e.g., armored- and armor-protected infantry and tanks) is higher than is popularly conceived. However, aggregate supply in this area is falling. Many traditional U.S. allies are shedding some armored capabilities in favor of greater flexibility and lower cost. The U.S. Army faces likely cuts of uncertain magnitude to armored capabilities. And, the U.S. Marine Corps' force structure review resulted in elimination of two tank companies.

This finding should not be interpreted as an endorsement of a postwar ground force reorientation on large-scale conventional conflict, however. Indeed, the environments under which these capabilities will be employed are substantially different than anticipated prior to 9/11, and major conventional campaigns may now be the lesser included case for ground forces relative to many other operational types. Nonetheless, capabilities like armored maneuver that are essential to success in a major combat campaign are also essential to ground force success in a whole range of other more likely operations. This recommendation should not be interpreted as any type of commentary about the number, type, or apportionment of specific armored capabilities that should be resident in the force. Current capabilities may be adequate, or even too large. The point, however, is that armored maneuver capabilities are more broadly relevant than many currently envision.

Conclusion

As noted in Chapter 1, an interpretation of the findings above as reflecting a vision more in line with the past than the future would represent a failure on the part of the authors to adequately express their thoughts. While some of the conclusions echo refrains that have been heard before, they are thoroughly anchored in a dispassionate review of the future. Ironically, a desire to “talk anew” about that future may override objective attempts to “think anew.” This would be a strategic error of great magnitude.

It is apparent from the work underwriting this study that U.S. ground forces are relevant and useful to a variety of contingency demands and increasingly unique when compared to the capabilities of U.S. allies and partners. Additionally, ground forces will likely be in greater demand over the next 10 years than many expect. There is an abiding need for the United States to maintain the capacity to rapidly project sufficient ground forces under a variety of crisis conditions to affect favorable outcomes on its terms; failure to do so will likely place clear limitations on future contingency options. Further, defense policymakers should also not shy from acknowledging that armored capabilities remain useful, not for the same reasons as they have been in the past, but

because of their broad utility in meeting challenges the United States will almost certainly face going forward. Finally, policymakers should not overcorrect for the errors of the past by institutionalizing large-scale capabilities that go beyond likely needs in the areas of stability operations and security force assistance. Hedging against that risk might have been possible in an earlier era, but the opportunity costs in an era of defense austerity are too high to warrant this approach.

More generally, the conclusions above are intended to help inform calculations about the relative utility of investments in (or reductions to) different kinds of ground force capabilities. The analysis is also relevant, however, to the broader trades across the full portfolio of defense capabilities, ground forces or otherwise. If, as many suggest, the United States needs to reorient on Asia strategically, the success of an Asia-focused strategy is predicated, at least in part, on ensuring that conflicts in other parts of the world remain manageable. Ground forces have a substantial and critical role to play in that regard, and a strategy that fails to acknowledge that reality will be incomplete.



APPENDIX A OPERATIONAL TYPES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS

To determine the types of operations ground forces might be called upon to perform over the next decade, the CSIS study team employed three sequential filters. The first was that contingencies had to be executed principally on land.¹ Of those, determining whether a given military action warranted its own specific type involved determining whether it could be conducted on its own as a named operation.² The study team recognized that many types could, and in many cases would, be conducted within a larger operation, but the types are designed to represent the narrowest set of activities that might be conducted independently. Finally, in instances where operational types resembled one another, the study team maintained separate categories only in instances in which the types were deemed to differ in critical dimensions, specifically a different probability of occurrence or a significantly different set of supporting key tasks. Applying these criteria, the study team identified the following operational types:

1. Show of Force
2. Humanitarian Assistance and Consequence Management
3. Foreign Internal Defense
4. Support to Foreign Unconventional Forces
5. Enabling Operation
6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
7. Peacekeeping
8. Seize and Secure
9. Human Security
10. Opposed Stabilization
11. Sanctuary Denial
12. Raid
13. Counter-Network Campaign
14. Major Combat Campaign

¹ We therefore exclude missions such as maritime security operations, sanctions enforcement/maritime intercept operations, and exclusion zone enforcement, which occur largely in the maritime domain, or operations that would only be conducted electronically, which occur in the cyber domain.

² For a discussion of what constitutes a “named operation” see Adam Rawsley, “What’s in a Name? ‘Odyssey Dawn’ is Pentagon-Crafted Nonsense,” *Danger Room: Wired.com*, March 21, 2011, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/03/whats-in-a-name-odyssey-dawn-is-pentagon-crafted-nonsense/>.

This list does not represent the full range of ground force activities. First, because the study focuses on foreign contingency missions, support to civil authorities within the United States is discussed only briefly in the context of two of the 14 operational types (enabling operations and humanitarian assistance and consequence management). Further, the categories do not include routine military activities such as security cooperation and security assistance, exercises, and regular forward presence. To the extent that these activities cannot be met with forces planned and designed for contingency operations, this would represent an additional “demand” that is not represented here. While exercises and training activities in particular can favorably impact adversary decision making, for the purposes of this analysis the study team assumed that the forces would have to be credible operational units (and thus captured in the operational taxonomy above) in order to achieve maximum impact.

In some cases the operational types adhere very closely to military doctrine – either directly or as clear amalgamations of existing doctrinal concepts (e.g., humanitarian assistance and consequence management or foreign internal defense). In other instances, however, the study team has proposed new operational types for consideration as standalone cases for strategic planning. Examples of these “new” operational types include enabling operations, opposed stabilization, counter-network campaigns, sanctuary denial, and seize and secure operations. These reflect the study team’s view that U.S. ground forces are likely to face new demands in the coming decade that are currently under-considered in national-level strategic planning.

Admittedly, the typology proposed here also suffers from a lack of consistency in its naming convention. Some operational types are expressed in terms of their ends (sanctuary denial, for example), while others more clearly relate to ways the missions are conducted (e.g., raid or seize and secure). The study team acknowledges that investing the time to develop and socialize terms associated with a more consistent typology would be beneficial in the long-term. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the team believes the proposed terms are sufficiently familiar, or, if new, defined clearly enough that developing entirely new terminology was not necessary.

Operational Characteristics

Defining the typology was informed by an evaluation of numerous key operational characteristics. These include the expected *scale* and *duration* of a specific operational type; an evaluation of various *environmental characteristics* that would affect the mission; the relative *weight of four key operational tasks*; the *probability of occurrence* and anticipated *strategic warning*; and an assessment of *potential theaters of operation*.

Scale refers to the assumed size of a potential U.S. contingency response. It is expressed in terms of units (e.g. battalions, Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and divisions) and a range (from very small—less than a battalion to large—division or greater).³ *Duration* reflects how long the operation in question might be expected to last, expressed as one of the following: extremely short (hours), short (days), moderate (weeks), long (months), and very long (one to several years).

Environmental characteristics refer to some of the primary internal and external aspects of specific contingency events that would affect U.S. planning. The following could be expected to have a significant impact on force size and composition:

3. Definition of Scale: Very small (up to a battalion), Small (smaller than a brigade or MEU), Medium (Brigade or MEU to division or MEF), Large (Larger than a division or MEF).

- *Command, Control, and Authorities, or the anticipated command and control environment, as well as the authorities under which the operation would likely be conducted (e.g., unilateral, ad hoc coalition, alliance, or international organization).*
- *Host nation/partner governmental capability and capacity, or expectations about how well authorities in an affected state (or states) might be expected to govern, secure sovereign territory, and provide basic public goods under a given set of contingency circumstances.*
- *Adversary type, sophistication, and centralization, or the expected character, composition, and capability of enemy forces. This will generally be expressed using the terms criminal, terrorist, insurgent, militia, and less capable or sophisticated state military. In all cases, it will be a combination of two or more of these.*
- *Permissiveness, or the level of violence, describes the expected intensity of violence targeted against U.S. and/or partner forces and affected populations, as well as the degree to which conditions are benign, uncertain, or hostile during entry and throughout the conduct of military operations.*
- *Allied/partner civil-military contributions reflects judgments about the scale and nature of non-U.S. military contributions that would ideally be available in specific contingency missions. This includes both foreign military and civilian contributions as well as U.S. interagency participation.*

In addition to the discussion of operational types below, the study team also identified 19 tasks that could occur within any given scenario. Successful performance of the relevant tasks is deemed essential to operational success, and thus should help inform capability requirements. While the more detailed discussion of these tasks is included in Appendix B, the study team concluded that the relative weight of four tasks in particular—the conduct of *combat*, *security*, *stability*, and *security force assistance* operations—is an important discriminator between the operational types and thus merits inclusion in the discussion of operational characteristics. Briefly, these tasks are defined as follows:

- *Combat operations: offensive and defensive actions specifically focused on defeating armed opponents and securing U.S./partner forces against enemy action;⁴*
- *Security operations: the employment of U.S. forces to protect and control critical infrastructure, vital territory, and/or vulnerable populations;⁵*
- *Stability operations: providing for the emergency restoration and temporary delivery of essential services and basic public goods in the wake of conflict or catastrophe;⁶ and*
- *Security force assistance operations: the actions undertaken by U.S. ground forces to improve the capability, capacity, and performance of foreign security and irregular paramilitary forces.*

4. U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)*, V3.0, 2009, pp. 15–16, www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov3.pdf.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 16. Security here includes but is not limited to the activities described under the category of the same name in the CCJO.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.5, Stability Operations*, September 2009, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.

Each operational type routinely includes two or more of these four key tasks; a handful includes all four. The relative emphasis on each within an operational type provides some appreciation for the contingency's overall character.

Descriptions of the operational types also include judgments on the likelihood that circumstances calling for a given operational response might emerge over the next decade. **Probability of occurrence** is expressed within one of four bands—low, moderate, high, and extremely high. Low probability means the likelihood of conditions emerging between now and 2020 that in theory call for a particular operational response is 25 percent or less. Moderate probability means the likelihood falls between 26 and 50 percent, high probability between 51 and 75 percent, and extremely high probability between 76 and 99 percent.

Importantly, these judgments are not intended to reflect whether the United States will actually conduct a given operation. Instead, this probability judgment relates solely to the question of whether circumstances will arise over the next decade that might call for a specific operational response. More colloquially, the judgments reflect not whether the President might decide to engage in a given operation, but whether he or she might be presented with an option to engage in it. Thus the probability of occurrence as used here reflects the probability of a demand for a given operation, not the probability forces would actually be used.

Strategic warning refers to the assumed notice U.S. leaders might expect in advance of circumstances that would call for a specific operational response. As with duration, it is expressed as one of the following: extremely short (hours), short (days), moderate (weeks), long (months), or very long (one to several years). **Potential theaters of operation** offer preliminary judgments on where certain operational types are most likely to occur, expressed either as specific countries or as regions.

Finally, to provide a tangible image of the types of conditions associated with each operational type, each narrative includes one or more illustrative examples. These scenarios are not intended to be predictive in any way. Rather, they are offered as descriptions of circumstances where it is reasonable to posit that the contingency conditions implied by a given operational type could emerge. The illustrative scenarios were developed after the study team constructed the list of operational types. Therefore, it should be clear that the operational types were not designed around these specific scenarios. To augment discussions about the future, this appendix further includes a number of historical vignettes. These are provided not as templates of how best to approach a given operational type, but rather to further illuminate the range of conditions (and sometimes outcomes) within any given operational type.

What follows is a detailed discussion of each of the fourteen operational types, to include their key characteristics. Later Appendix B provides a detailed discussion of the 19 key operational tasks.

Operational Types

1. Show of Force

Shows of force are intended to compel hostile actors to cease threatening behaviors in advance of open hostilities by dispatching or repositioning U.S. forces and/or by increasing the visibility of forward-deployed forces already present in a contested region. Shows of force employ unambiguous

Show of Force: Operation Golden Pheasant (1988)

In an ongoing conflict between the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and Honduras, the Soviet-backed Sandinista forces penetrated into Honduran territory to attack the base camps and supply centers of U.S.-backed Contra forces. Concerned about the growing instability and threat of escalation in the region, the United States rapidly deployed elements of the 7th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions. U.S. forces staged at Honduran airfields and conducted training exercises, while preparing to defend Honduran territory should Nicaragua continue its offensive. This rapid show of force in the region prompted the Nicaraguan government to negotiate a truce with Honduras, resulting in the withdrawal of Nicaraguan forces. Within two weeks of their initial deployment, U.S. forces returned home.⁷

demonstrations of U.S. warfighting capability with the aim of defusing international tensions by establishing clear red lines for those purposefully threatening the security of key states or regions.

The United States initiates shows of force when core interests and/or foreign order, infrastructure, property, installations, or populations are at risk of sudden loss or harm as a result of imminent conflict.⁸ They may be undertaken to preclude war between or within states. Contemporary examples of shows of force include Operation *Golden Pheasant*, the 1988 U.S. response to a Nicaraguan border incursion into Honduras; Operation *Nimrod Dancer*, the precursor to 1989's Operation *Just Cause* in Panama; Operations *Sea Soldier* and *Imminent Thunder*, amphibious actions in support of Operation *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* in 1990/1991; and Operation *Desert Thunder*, the 1998 build-up of U.S. forces in Kuwait.

The scale of a show of force response takes its cues from the scale and/or intensity of the initial provocation. Therefore, the size, type, and mix of forces employed in shows of force rely on the nature of the threat. Shows of force targeted at the behaviors of a traditional military power like North Korea, for example, are apt to rely on medium to heavy conventional ground forces or precision attack capabilities, whereas shows of force targeted at insurgents, militias, and paramilitaries might be lighter, infantry-centric, and potentially more unconventional in nature.

Regardless of the responding ground force's composition, it must be able to rapidly transition to more robust and lethal operations (e.g., opposed stabilization, seize and secure, or major combat campaign) in the event that deterrence fails. In the end, while the force employed for messaging purposes may be insufficient to fully address open hostilities should they erupt, it must

7. Fred Pushies, *82nd Airborne* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press: 2008), pp. 22–23.

8. See U.S. Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations*, December 1994, pp. 2–4, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_23.pdf; and U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Dictionary of Military terms*, "Peace Operations," August 2011, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. This concept shares some common characteristics with that of "preventive deployment" as outlined in Army and Joint doctrine but is not confined to the realm of peace operations.

be sufficiently robust and credible to deter escalation and allow time for continued diplomacy and preparation for an expanded conflict.

With these general rules in mind, future shows of force are likely to range in size from medium to large—a MEU or Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) through a division headquarters and up to four BCT equivalents or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and its affiliated units. Duration of shows of force will range from short to moderate, as it is likely that tensions will either subside over time or escalate, necessitating a fundamental change of mission.

Shows of force in response to potential cross-border aggression are typically undertaken on behalf of foreign partners threatened by an opponent's superior military capability. Those triggered by threats of imminent internal conflict may occur under very different circumstances. A partner state may be fast losing its ability to effectively govern and secure its sovereign territory and could therefore urgently need external assistance to bolster internal security. Alternatively, the principal threat could be a host nation government that is actively threatening U.S. interests, citizens, or facilities inside their territory.

Given this wide variance, shows of force may occur at the request of a host nation or by one or more parties to an imminent internal conflict. They may occur according to treaty obligation or under the authority of an international mandate. Finally, U.S. leaders may opt to initiate a show of force unilaterally when a clear and present danger exists and no requests for assistance appear to be forthcoming.

The type, sophistication, and organization of adversaries will vary widely in shows of force as well. In cases of possible interstate conflict, the principal adversaries may be sophisticated enemy military forces. However, U.S. forces can anticipate innovative combinations of traditional and irregular threat capabilities. In the case of imminent intrastate violence, opponents will range from disorganized criminals to sub-state militias and breakaway or rogue elements of an ailing state's security forces. Regardless of the potential opponent, in most instances the environment can be expected to be permissive but uncertain, as the U.S. deployment occurs under the threat of imminent violence.

**Show of Force:
Operation Nimrod Dancer (1989)**

After May 1989 elections in Panama resulted in an overwhelming victory for an opposition party, incumbent Manuel Noriega annulled the results while his militias harassed members of the opposition coalition. Pro-Noriega "Dignity Battalions" physically assaulted opposition leaders and attempted to coerce Panamanians into voting for Noriega's candidates during the election. Concerned with the safety of thousands of U.S. citizens, President Bush dispatched 1,900 troops to the country with orders to provide visible security for the Panama Canal Zone as well as for U.S. citizens and property. The brigade-sized element deployed by air, with many sub-units arriving within 24 hours. Given the strong show of force, Noriega instructed his militias to avoid confrontations with U.S. forces and curtail more aggressive activities. Remaining in place for six months, U.S. forces conducted training exercises and contingency planning that would be later be utilized during Operation Just Cause.⁹

9. Ronald Cole, "Operation Just Cause," Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/history/justcaus.pdf>.

Initially, ground force actions would be heavily weighted in favor of security operations. However, in order to underwrite deterrence, the build-up of capabilities associated with a show of force must at some point demonstrate the capacity for more decisive combat operations. Depending on the maturity of the theater and the circumstances of *in situ* foreign partners, forces involved in these types of operations may perform a variety of limited stability operations for the duration of their deployment or period of heightened readiness. Finally, though shows of force will often occur alongside a foreign partner, they will likely involve only limited security force assistance operations. Any security force assistance that does occur will likely revolve around increasing a foreign partner's interoperability with U.S. forces. Overall mission success, however, will not rely on either stability operations or security force assistance.

Show of Force: Operations Sea Soldier and Imminent Thunder (1990-1991)

Operations Sea Soldier and Imminent Thunder were shows of force conducted by U.S. Marines aboard twelve U.S. Navy ships as a supporting effort to Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991. These operations were intended to influence Saddam Hussein's decision making and that of senior Iraqi military leaders in ways advantageous to the United States. Initially, these operations were aimed at deterring Saddam Hussein from further aggression, and later they were conducted to display U.S. capability and prevent Iraqi military commanders from identifying U.S. intentions.¹⁰

Over the coming years, there is a moderate to high probability that the United States will face circumstances where a show of force may be required. As has been demonstrated by unpredictable actions of both Iran and North Korea, strategic warning of a potential show of force might be extremely short to short, and is unlikely to be any longer than moderate. The Arab Spring provides an interesting and useful model with respect to the potential warning associated with shows of force tied to internal instability. Geographically, the Middle East, Northeast and Southeast Asia, Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, and the Baltic States are among the candidate areas for future ground-based shows of force.

Illustrative Show of Force: The Baltic States (2018)

As Russia prepares to conduct a major military exercise along the borders of the Baltic States, the Russian Foreign Minister also delivers provocative comments regarding Baltic unification into a federation. Coincidentally, a major cyber-attack cripples the air defense networks and command and control systems of Latvia and Lithuania. Given the experience of Georgia, U.S. intelligence agencies suspect Russian involvement. As Moscow begins positioning its ground forces for the alleged exercise, the Baltic States call on NATO to deter any potential Russian aggression. The United States considers swift movement of an Amphibious Ready Group and a heavy U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team to demonstrate resolve.¹¹

10. "Amphibious Operations 1990-1999." U.S. Naval Institute, May 2009, <http://blog.usni.org/2009/05/25/amphibious-operations-1990-1999/>.

11. Similar to potential future scenarios described by other defense experts. See Thomas Harding, "Strategic Defence and Security Review: Four Future Scenarios and How They Might Play Out," *The Telegraph*, September 14, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8001936/Strategic-Defence-and-Security-Review-four-future-scenarios-and-how-they-might-play-out.html>.

2. Humanitarian Assistance and Consequence Management

Humanitarian Assistance and Consequence Management (HA/CM) operations are undertaken by military forces largely in support of the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state and local authorities, or a foreign partner government in order to temporarily relieve human suffering, provide basic public goods, and help offset immediate threats to public safety and health in the wake of foreign catastrophes or domestic disasters.¹² These operations focus on the immediate protection and well-being of affected populations and the near-term restoration of minimal routine civil functions. HA/CM operations are distinct from enabling operations (described later) supporting civilian agencies in that U.S. forces serve as the most significant and visible (though not necessarily lead) component of a U.S. government response.

Humanitarian Assistance/Consequence Management: Joint Task Force Katrina (2005)

Joint Task Force (JTF) Katrina was stood up in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Katrina caused substantial damage to lives and property along the Gulf coast from Florida to Texas. JTF Katrina deployed substantial military capabilities from across the services. Just a week after the hurricane, DoD assets included 42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty personnel, 20 U.S. ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft. For the better part of two months, approximately 58,000 active duty and National Guard forces were deployed in the gulf region both on shore and afloat.¹³

Humanitarian Assistance/Consequence Management: Joint Task Force Haiti (2010)

JTF Haiti stood up in January 2010 in response to the earthquake centered near Haiti's capital city Port au Prince. The mission lasted six months, and just over 22,000 U.S. personnel were deployed in support. 8,000 soldiers, marines, sailors, airmen, and coast guardsmen were on the ground at any given time during the height of operations.¹⁴

Events that trigger HA/CM operations may be natural (e.g., hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, or pandemics), technical (e.g., nuclear or industrial accident or blackouts), or purposeful (e.g., acts of sabotage, war, or terrorism). Regardless of origin, however, their human and environmental effects share qualities that require many common military responses. These responses include but are not limited to relieving human suffering, ameliorating the immediate consequences

of catastrophe and disaster, and providing security for others' relief and assistance efforts. Under the worst conditions, HA/CM efforts may occur in and be focused on overcoming the effects of nuclear, biological, or chemical hazards (also known as "consequence management"). Contemporary examples of HA/CM operations of the type and scale described here include

12. U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, "Humanitarian Assistance," May 2011, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

13. Steve Bowman, "Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response," CRS Report for Congress, September 5, 2005, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA458318>.

14. Christen N. McCluney, "Joint Task Force Haiti set to complete mission June 1," May 13, 2010, www.army.mil/article/39011.

1992's *Joint Task Force (JTF) Andrew* (Hurricane Andrew); 2005's *JTF Katrina* (Hurricane Katrina), 2010's *JTF Haiti* (the Haitian earthquake), and 2010's U.S. military response to flooding in Pakistan.

HA/CM commitments range in scale from very limited technical assistance to a MEU, Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), one to four Army BCT's (with associated headquarters, support forces, and attached specialized capabilities), or a MEF and its affiliated ground, air, and logistics components in the event of a more wide ranging catastrophe. Domestic and foreign chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) incidents such as a deliberate nuclear attack or accident (e.g., the Japanese nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi) would necessitate application of more specialized capabilities like the Marine Corps' Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), the Army's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) and potentially large numbers of general purpose ground forces as well. Any individual HA/CM operation will most likely be of short to moderate duration.

U.S. forces can expect significant foreign partner and interagency contributions to humanitarian assistance operations, but given the premium on a speedy response they may initially be undertaken unilaterally (but in close coordination with other responding nations and agencies). Entry in foreign disaster scenarios would most likely be under permissive or uncertain conditions and at the request of a host nation government that could be hobbled but would not likely be incapacitated. Host nation security forces would more than likely be willing partners in any U.S. response.

Illustrative Humanitarian Assistance/Consequence Management Operation: Ethiopia (2015)

Exacerbating existing drought and food shortages, a magnitude 6.5 earthquake occurs along the Nazret Fault in Ethiopia. The epicenter is approximately 70 km from Addis Ababa's city center. In Addis Ababa, the damage is widespread, with estimates of 5,000 killed, 10,000 injured and 500,000 homeless. The towns of Nazret and Debre Zeyit are destroyed, with tens of thousands estimated killed and injured. Key infrastructure throughout the affected area is severely damaged, to include city-wide public communications. In addition, virtually all utilities and public and emergency services have collapsed. The Ethiopian government struggles to demonstrate its control and is expected to request humanitarian assistance. U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations are seeking assistance to reach the disaster location. U.S. planners begin developing options for providing emergency relief to Ethiopia and helping assist and secure the wider international response.

It is possible, however, that the environment may not be completely benign in instances where the affected state suffers from rampant criminality and/or in countries where the government's view of the United States may be more favorable than that of the people, or of key groups within the population. In such instances prudent measures for self-defense against terrorism, for example, would obviously be essential. Disaster relief within the United States will presumably occur under benign conditions, with U.S. forces coming under the coordinating authority of appointed civilian officials.

From a task perspective, humanitarian assistance missions will have a dual focus on stability and security operations, with the former taking some precedence over the latter. If conditions

changed in a manner that emphasized combat or required extensive security force assistance, this would necessitate conduct of a different operational type altogether (e.g., opposed stabilization or human security operations).

The probability of circumstances arising over the next decade that call for humanitarian assistance operations is extremely high. This is especially true given environmental and demographic trends which suggest that natural disasters in particular will occur with steady or increasing frequency.¹⁵ Given increasing proliferation of the knowledge and technologies essential to developing and employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), catastrophes may increasingly involve or be due to CBRNE events, as well. Again due to the frequency and unpredictability of natural and technical disasters specifically, the strategic warning associated with HA/CM operations ranges from extremely short to moderate. Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean Basin, and Latin and North America are all likely theaters for HA/CM.

3. Foreign Internal Defense

Foreign Internal Defense (FID) operations involve the employment of ground forces in direct support of a foreign partner combating serious internal conflict and instability. Ground forces conducting FID assist foreign forces of friendly nations, in generating, fielding, employing, and sustaining competent security forces in response to armed opposition.¹⁷ FID is sometimes considered a routine U.S. military activity; however in this case, FID is the contingency use of ground forces to respond to an exigent need.

FID focuses on raising and fielding regular forces in concert with a friendly partner government. U.S. forces are not engaging directly in combat operations, but instead are providing foreign partners with extensive in-country assistance in areas like command, control, and communications; operational planning; intelligence; military training, logistics; and mobility.¹⁸ FID-specific operations may also include training in civil affairs and civil-military operations as well.¹⁹

Foreign Internal Defense: Plan Colombia (1999-2006)

Plan Colombia was an overarching effort co-developed by the Colombian and U.S. governments to protect Colombia's democratic institutions, combat the drug trade, and enhance Colombian internal security. A broad plan led by the State Department, Defense Department responsibilities included support to Colombian forces to help them man, equip, and train counter-narcotics units; provision of Blackhawk and Huey helicopters; support for human rights, rule of law, and anti-corruption campaigns; the provision of enhancements to Colombia's intelligence infrastructure to improve drug interdiction efforts; and all-encompassing national police training.¹⁶

15. In 2010 alone, 78 federal disasters were declared in the U.S. alone, and 950 worldwide. See Records of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, <http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/311.html>.

16. U.S. Department of State, "Plan Colombia Fact Sheet," http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html, accessed on August 25, 2011.

17. U.S. Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance*, May 1, 2009, p. 1-1, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_071.pdf.

18. Ibid.; and Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense*, July, 12 2010, p. X, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf.

19. Ibid.

Foreign Internal Defense: Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines (2002-Present)

Responding to the significant threat posed by the al Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyef group in the Philippines, the United States deployed SOF forces to increase the capacity of the Filipino security forces. The effort began in early 2002 with a 1,500-strong deployment of U.S. forces. Through constant training, advising, and some intelligence and logistical support, Filipino forces pursued the terrorist network throughout the southern islands of Basilan and Mindanao. With an estimated 2,000 fighters in 2001, Abu Sayyef subsequently suffered major losses to its organization. By 2007, Filipino forces had successfully shrunk Abu Sayyef to around 300 guerrillas. Still ongoing, Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines has provided the Filipino military with vital training and assistance.²⁰

In practice, future FID missions are likely to be much more modest than the reconstruction of Iraqi and Afghan security forces. Therefore, *Plan Colombia* and *Operation Enduring Freedom - Philippines* are better contemporary analogs for future FID operations. Less prominent examples also include on-going FID deployments to Pakistan, as well as episodic FID-like missions in the Andean Ridge region, Central America, the Maghreb, and the Horn of Africa.

Army SOF has a long tradition of low-visibility FID missions. However, smaller-scale FID operations can be conducted by Marine SOF, SEAL platoons, as well as Army SOF. The demand for larger-scale, FID-specific operations has grown over the last decade, both because of the demands of building Iraqi and Afghan security forces, as well as the wider

counter-al Qaeda campaign. Thus, the scope and scale of the requirement has led to a significant migration of FID-specific responsibilities to Army and Marine general purpose forces as well. Indeed, the U.S. Army's Advise and Assist Brigades and their regionally aligned brigade initiative, as well as the Marine Corps' concept of a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) optimized for security cooperation and the Marine Corps' pledge to increase their Special Operations Command, are indications of that services' commitment to expanding FID capacity.²¹

Though there may be little public enthusiasm for large-scale FID missions going forward, they might still be required. Most future FID missions, however, are unlikely to exceed a size that could be supported by an Army Special Forces battalion, a SPMAGTF or MEU, and/or four Army Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) in a single contingency.²² Depending on the quality of the partner forces involved, the duration of future contingency FID operations will likely range from long to very long, lasting from several months to one or more years.

Future FID operations will generally occur under the auspices of some bilateral agreement between the United States and a state facing internal threats, and could occur as part of a broader coalition effort. As the Iraq and Afghan FID efforts sprang from regime change, they are not representative of a typical FID partner's ability to govern and secure their territory. In future

20. Colonel Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach," *Military Review* (November/December 2006), http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume5/january_2007/1_07_1.html

21. General James F. Amos, "2011 Report to Congress on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps," http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/FY-12%20USMC%20Posture%20Statement_Generic.pdf.

22. Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance*, July 14, 2008, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf>.

contingency FID operations U.S. forces can expect indigenous authorities to be weakened as a result of on-going fighting but still at least modestly capable. Adversaries will include disorganized criminal elements, networked terrorists and insurgents, and well-armed and well-organized sub-state militias. Because U.S. activities are presumed to be occurring with the approval of the host nation, U.S. forces can expect to enter the theater of operations under permissive and generally benign circumstances, although this may be less true in certain contingencies.

For U.S. ground forces, FID lies largely under the remit of security force assistance and stability operations. U.S. advisers and trainers may participate in combat operations alongside partner forces, but only in their advisory capacity. Thus, neither combat nor security operations will characterize or define the overall U.S. commitment. Over the next decade, there is an extremely high probability that the United States will face circumstances where FID responses would be appropriate. Indeed, the perceived success of recent FID operations (e.g., Colombia, the Philippines, and Iraq), their limited U.S. footprint, and their perceived economy when compared to direct, large-scale interventions increasingly push U.S. leaders toward FID as a substitute to a number of costlier alternatives. Strategic warning for FID operations will likely be moderate to long, as almost all FID operations are nested in more expansive U.S. government engagement strategies. In the few instances where a crisis occurs and an emergent requirement results, the timeline would still be fairly deliberate.

**Illustrative FID Operations:
Guatemala (2014)**

As pressure on the drug cartels in Mexico increases, the traffickers retreat south to Guatemala. Over time, economic and political weaknesses provide fertile ground for the drug trade, corruption, lawlessness, and human trafficking. The cartels increasingly look to undermine the Guatemalan government to their advantage. Guatemala requests U.S. financial and material support, as well as military training assistance, to combat the growing cartel threat.

The Middle East—including North Africa—will remain a likely growth area for FID, particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. U.S. forces can anticipate FID requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, the Maghreb, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Horn of Africa. In the Americas, the Andean Ridge and Central America, Mexico, Haiti, and a transitioning Cuba are also candidates for future FID operations. Southeast Asian countries in the vicinity of the South China Sea like Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia are viable candidates for future FID missions as well.

4. Support to Foreign Unconventional Forces

Support to foreign unconventional forces (SFUF) involves the employment of ground forces in direct support of a surrogate force of irregular foreign fighters who are in the midst of a conflict with a state or group hostile to the United States. SFUF includes the concept of unconventional warfare (UW), a traditional SOF mission focused on subverting an enemy government or combating a foreign occupation force.²³ However, here the concept is expanded substantially.

23. U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, “Unconventional Warfare,” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/u/7795.html.

Ground forces conducting SFUF assist foreign irregular forces,²⁴ in generating, fielding, employing, and sustaining paramilitary forces to conduct offensive actions against a hostile regime or group and/or defend vulnerable populations and themselves against the predations of enemy military or paramilitary forces.²⁵ Here, SFUF is intended to imply a standalone operation. However, like many of the other operational types, it can occur as a supporting effort in a larger operation as well.

A UW-oriented SFUF sees local irregular forces conducting ambushes, sabotage, and subversive activities against stronger—typically state-based—opponents. In many respects SFUF resembles FID, in that U.S. forces are not engaging directly in combat operations, but instead are providing foreign partners with extensive training, advising, and material assistance.

SFUF's expansion beyond UW and into the general purpose forces is evidenced in U.S. support to the Sunni tribes in Western and Central Iraq in what was called the Anbar Awakening. The Awakening's local tribal militias were created to protect vulnerable Sunni Arab populations from al Qaeda in order to free up U.S. and Iraqi combat forces to conduct increased offensive operations. The Awakening broke the prototypical SFUF model as a SOF-only mission, as general purpose forces were instrumental in raising indigenous irregular capability.

Future SFUF efforts—particularly those focused on UW—will likely be more modest, requiring several dozen to several hundred special operators and/or covert operatives. Indeed, SFUF might be conducted by U.S. forces alone or more likely in close cooperation with the CIA's clandestine service.

Though the upfront investment of U.S. personnel may be very small in SFUF, U.S. material and financial support obligations to the indigenous force can still be very costly over time. Historical examples of SFUF demonstrate that duration can vary from relatively short to somewhat long. During the Cold War, some instances of SFUF—Guatemala in 1954 and Indonesia in 1955—were short-lived.²⁶ But in other cases (e.g., CIA involvement in the Belgian Congo²⁷), operations took place over years, and support to the Nicaraguan Contras spanned nearly a decade in the 1980s.²⁸ While most of the aforementioned efforts were undertaken by the CIA's clandestine service, they nonetheless fit the general model of SFUF.

Given its general covert and clandestine character, command of SFUF is likely to be limited to U.S.-only control, though other outside actors in countries may also make contributions. U.S. forces conducting SFUF in entirely contested territory—the norm—can expect cooperation only from the paramilitaries they are assisting; the environment will be semi- to nonpermissive and local authorities will be hostile. The principal adversary in SFUF operations will be either rival militias or organized military forces of varying levels of capability and sophistication.

24. U.S. Army, Headquarters, Training Circular No. 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, November 2010, p. 1-1.

25. U.S. Army, Headquarters, *Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance*, May 1, 2009, p. 1-1, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm3_071.pdf.

26. Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990*, chapter 5, <http://www.statecraft.org/chapter5.html>

27. *Ibid.*

28. Central Intelligence Agency, *World Fact Book*, "Nicaragua," 2011, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html>.

For U.S. ground forces, SFUF is a security force assistance mission exclusively, albeit one in support of foreign irregular forces. The probability of SFUF occurrence is low to moderate, and strategic warning for the need to conduct SFUF is assessed as long to very long. Potential regions where SFUF might be necessary include the Persian Gulf, the Levant and Maghreb, and the Americas.

Illustrative Support to Foreign Unconventional Forces: Yemen (2014)

In the coming years, al Qaeda and its affiliated networks gain momentum in southern Yemen. President Saleh's government remains weak and faces continuing challenges from groups inspired by the Arab Spring. Iran increases its support for al Houthi rebels in the Saada region, further increasing the pressure on Saleh's regime. By 2014 the southern separatists have established a strong state within a state, enabling al Qaeda and its affiliates to safely train and organize. A complex proxy war ensues with Saudi Arabia and Iran as the main protagonists, while U.S. intelligence warns of more anti-western terrorist plots originating in Yemen. To contest the al Qaeda foothold, the United States develops an indigenous Yemeni insurgent force with the tacit support and covert cooperation of Saudi Arabia to combat the new central government and Iranian proxies in the north.

5. Enabling Operation

U.S. forces undertake enabling operations (EO) when foreign and/or domestic partners are the principal actors but face critical capability shortfalls that only U.S. ground forces can fill.²⁹ U.S. ground forces conduct enabling operations to support defense of an ally or to underwrite partner-led combat, disaster relief, or law enforcement operations. ("Partners" in this context range from other U.S. military services (e.g., the Air Force) to other nations to international organizations to other U.S. government agencies.) In enabling operations, ground forces are not the lead agent of mission success, but instead enable it under others' leadership.

Enabling operations are typified by the provision of unique U.S. command and control or support capabilities (especially logistics). These include but are not limited to: command, control, and communications; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); computer network attack, defense and exploitation; civil affairs; military information support operations; and logistical support. In addition to supply, maintenance, engineering, and installations, the latter includes transportation and medical support as well.

By definition, enabling operations should involve few, if any, U.S. combat forces. When combat forces are involved, they are employed principally for self-defense and the protection of important U.S./partner bases and critical support infrastructure (e.g., roads, railways, bridges, and tunnels, etc.). Air and missile defense might be one of the more important contributions in this regard. On rare occasions, enabling operations may involve limited provision of specialized offensive combat capabilities like precision/long-range fires and attack aviation.

29. There are clearly enabling operations that might be performed principally, or even solely, by U.S. air or naval forces. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the discussion of operational types emphasizes their relevance to U.S. ground forces in particular.

Enabling Operation: Operation Stabilise (1999)

An Australian-led peacekeeping force responded to the humanitarian and security crisis in East Timor (Indonesia), stemming from separatist unrest. Under Operation Stabilise, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), comprised of 11,000 troops from throughout the region, sought to end the violence, protect refugees and safeguard humanitarian aid.³⁰ The United States provided a number of enabling assets to facilitate execution of the UN peacekeeping mandate.³¹ INTERFET's headquarters integrated U.S. personnel to provide data communication and counterintelligence support during the operation. Navy Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units provided sea-based support as well as a quick reaction force, while U.S. Army civil affairs teams established civil-military operations centers to coordinate international relief efforts with available military transportation resources. Other U.S. assets provided air and maritime surveillance and set up reliable communication systems at the main airport and seaport.³²

Examples of enabling operations include U.S. participation in NATO's Operation *Unified Protector* in Libya, support to the Republic of Vietnam after withdrawal of U.S. combat forces in 1972; U.S. participation in Australia's Operation *Stabilise*³³ in East Timor (1999-2000) and numerous contingency deployments of Patriot missiles in defense of Israel and Gulf Arab partners since 1991.³⁴

Though this study focuses on foreign contingencies, enabling operations might be the most likely military activity on U.S. soil. Domestic enabling operations could involve contingency support to civilian authorities responding to extraordinary domestic emergencies, catastrophes, or law enforcement challenges.³⁵

As historical examples demonstrate, both the scale and duration of enabling operations can vary widely. Mission variation and the wide variety of unique assets involved make universal judgments on scale and duration difficult. Contingency deployments of air and missile defense capabilities or logistical support in the case of humanitarian disaster, for example, could be

30. William Guinn, "Contingency Contracting in East Timor," U.S. Army Logistics University, August 2000, <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug00/MS565.htm>.

31. Lisa Alley, "Thunderbird brigade overcomes challenges of East Timor," U.S. Army Signal Center of Excellence, <http://www.signal.army.mil/ocos/ac/Edition,%20Fall/Fall%2000/11SGTIMR.HTM>.

32. Craig Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: Support to Operation Stabilise," *Military Review* (February 2001), <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/library/bibs/peace04.htm>.

33. Jim Garamone, "'Hundreds' of Service Members Destined for East Timor," *Armed Forces Information Service*, News Articles, http://osd.dtic.mil/news/Sep1999/n09151999_9909152.html; and Craig A. Collier, "A New Way to Wage Peace: U.S. Support to Operation Stabilise," *Military Review* (January-February 2001), <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JanFeb01/coll.pdf>.

34. See, for example, Gayle S. Purtrich, "U.S. Deploys Radar, Troops to Israel," *Defense News*, September 26, 2010, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3744319>.

35. See, for example, Steven R. Vina, *Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations and Restrictions* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2006), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homsec/RS22443.pdf>; and Bruce M. Lawlor, "Military Support of Civilian Authorities—A New Focus for a New Millennium," www.journal/articles/lawlor.htm.

relatively small-scale and range from days to months. On the other hand, U.S. enabling operations in support of partner/coalition all-arms conventional operations or extended opposed stabilization or peacekeeping missions may require a more comprehensive, substantial, and lengthy deployment of combat support and combat service support assets, complemented by limited U.S. combat forces focused on defensive tasks. The duration of enabling missions like this might be long to extremely long—months to years—by comparison.

Enabling Operation: Operation Desert Falcon (1991)

Beginning in October 1991, U.S. air defense assets deployed to Saudi Arabia, after the Saudi government requested U.S. assistance in facing the continued threat of ballistic missile attack from Iraq. The United States immediately sent two Patriot air defense battalions to the region. Four sub-units were set up in Saudi Arabia, with additional locations in Kuwait and Bahrain. The deployed forces were tasked with protecting Gulf Allies from Iraqi ballistic missiles and aircraft.³⁶

Most enabling operations would likely involve U.S. forces operating either under an alliance or international organization's mandate or, in the case of a foreign disaster or homeland security scenario, under the command and control or coordinating authority of U.S. civilian agencies. Also, in enabling operations other nations are likely to maximize use of their operational assets first and, by definition, would be conducting operations in some ways on the back of U.S. ground force support architecture.

In foreign enabling operations, host nation or local partner capability to govern and secure their sovereign territory varies significantly. In the event of response to state failure or natural disaster, for example, host nation control may be nonexistent or severely degraded. In the case of more conventional military support to allies, however, local control over security and essential public services may be challenged but nonetheless still quite effective.

Enabling Operation: Operation Jump Start (2006)

Under Operation Jumpstart, National Guard troops deployed to support the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in securing the United States-Mexico border. From 2006 to 2008, nearly 6,000 National Guardsmen dispersed along the four states sharing the border with Mexico. Utilizing air and ground FLIR and other long range detection equipment, National Guard forces provided detection of cross-border activities to the CBP, including illegal crossings and drug smuggling. Other Guardsmen worked to establish fence lines along the border.³⁷

36. Operation Desert Falcon,” Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/desert_falcon.htm.

37. “National Guard Support to the Southwest Border,” National Guard, December 2006, http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2006/12/121106-OJS_success.aspx.

Adversaries in foreign enabling operations also vary depending on circumstances. They might range from unsophisticated, sparsely armed criminal or insurgent groups to, in a very limited number of cases, highly organized, lethal and sophisticated regular or irregular forces.³⁸ Obviously, enabling operations in support of allied combat action, opposed stabilization, or post-conflict peacekeeping might see opponents or potential opponents trending toward the more dangerous end of the spectrum. In reality, given limited allied capabilities and interests, enabling operations involving combat, stabilization, and peacekeeping are more likely to see relatively small criminal, insurgent, and/or militia forces, and perhaps, at the most extreme, modest military adversaries. Potential adversaries in enabling operations involving foreign or domestic humanitarian assistance or support to domestic law enforcement would likely only be criminal, and even then most violence would be indirect and limited.

The operating environment for enabling operations also varies, ranging from permissive to nonpermissive. It is, however, reasonable to expect that support to domestic partners would occur in permissive environments, whereas contingencies abroad would range from permissive and benign to nonpermissive and extremely violent. Among the operational types, this is the only one where weighting the various subordinate tasks (i.e., combat, security, stability, and security force assistance operations) is not applicable, as these tasks would be performed by the lead partner.

Illustrative Enabling Operation: Unified Protector II Libya (2012)

In late 2011, as Libya's nascent transitional government attempts to restore some semblance of order to Libyan society, deep rifts develop in the governing coalition. The political split occurs largely along tribal and regional lines, and results in a disruptive struggle for political power and control over Libya's natural resources. With the end of Operation Unified Protector, NATO has largely disengaged from Libya. What remains of Libya's security forces disintegrate as individual soldiers and policemen fall back on familial, tribal, and regional loyalties. Mass violence and revenge killings soon erupt in Benghazi and Tripoli. More generalized criminality and insecurity erupt along Libya's Mediterranean coast. Ultimately, by mid-March 2012 hundreds of thousands of Libyans are displaced by violence, plunging the nation into disorder and creating a humanitarian crisis that proves graver than the Libyan government crackdown that precipitated the original NATO intervention. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy co-sponsor an initiative for a unified European intervention and request U.S. noncombat military support.

The range of circumstances under which U.S. authorities might consider enabling operations is almost limitless. Therefore, there is at a minimum a high probability that the United States will confront circumstances appropriate to them over the next 10 years. In the case of a catastrophe or sudden spike in international tensions, strategic warning of the potential need for an enabling operation is extremely short to short; whereas warning would range from moderate to long for enabling operations in support of allied/partner conventional military or peacekeeping operations.

38. It is unlikely, however, that a partner of the U.S. would contend with a sophisticated enemy force without a substantial commitment on the part of the United States.

It is very difficult to predict with any certainty where future enabling operations might occur, largely because of wide variety of contingency events that might trigger them. That said, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen are candidates for enabling operations involving limited allied/partner combat, opposed stabilization, and/or peacekeeping operations. Lebanon, Gaza/West Bank, Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Sudan, the South Caucasus and Cuba are areas where the U.S. might anticipate underwriting other partner-led stabilization or peacekeeping efforts. Finally, ground force leaders might anticipate an extremely high probability of small- to medium-scale defensive enabling operations in support of GCC states and/or Israel should tensions between Iran and its neighbors increase. This kind of defensive enabling operation might also be necessary in support of states on the periphery of the Russian Federation, as well as in Asia (e.g., Japan, Taiwan, or Vietnam), as they find themselves challenged to counter sophisticated air and missile threats from larger regional powers. In addition to these foreign contingencies, there is an extremely high probability that domestic agencies like FEMA will require significant military support in the event of disaster and a high probability that capabilities like ISR (which could be provided by ground forces) will be in high demand along the southern U.S. border to back up the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, especially if violence in Mexico intensifies.

Illustrative Enabling Operation: Iraq (2014)

The 2014 provincial elections in Iraq result in a major consolidation of Shi'a dominance over the Council of Representatives. Iraq's Sunni parties feel increasingly isolated. Emboldened by their electoral victories, Shi'a leaders implement a number of reforms that enrage Sunnis living in Baghdad, Samarra, and other cities throughout the country. Growing frustration leads to massive public protests. These protests are met by strong police action. The demonstrations soon turn violent. Renewed attacks by dormant Sunni insurgent groups become increasingly frequent. Iraq is again on the verge of an uncontrolled sectarian civil war. With arms and fighters flowing through Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia to an expanding Sunni insurgency, the Iraqi government prepares to launch a new counterinsurgency campaign and asks the United States for logistics and transportation assistance and ISR assets.

6. Noncombatant Evacuation Operation

Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) involve the orderly evacuation from foreign territory of U.S., host nation, and designated third country nationals under the protection of U.S. military forces. These operations are initiated when identified populations face the threat of imminent harm, and may be undertaken for a variety of reasons, including interstate war, internal violence and instability, or natural catastrophe.³⁹ They may be reactive, occurring after adverse circumstances have emerged to endanger innocent lives, or anticipatory, occurring in advance of an impending conflict or natural disaster.⁴⁰ NEOs generally begin with rapid introduction—routinely by air or sea—of sufficient ground forces to secure key areas and routes necessary for the safe evacuation of target populations. They end with the equally rapid withdrawal of all U.S.

39. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, December 2010, p. I-1, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf.

40. *Ibid.*

forces upon completion of their mission.⁴¹ NEOs have occurred over the past twenty years in Somalia and Sierra Leone (1991), the Central Africa Republic and Liberia (1996), Sierra Leone (1997), Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau (1998), Sierra Leone (2000), Central African Republic and Ivory Coast (2002), Liberia (2003), and Lebanon (2006).

If recent history is a guide, noncombatant evacuations over the next decade will range in scale from a special operations team to employment of a MEU, Army BCT, or MEB. Time constraints and operational considerations often limit the deployment of a larger force. Due to the unique nature of the mission—a swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of a limited territory, and quick withdrawal after the mission—the minimum force necessary to accomplish essential evacuation

tasks is most ideal. Another significant factor limiting force size is that of the security situation in the country where the evacuation is to be conducted in the first place. Circumstances may be such that the introduction of U.S. ground forces could be more destabilizing to the environment, mandating a smaller U.S. footprint.

This does not preclude positioning a larger force nearby that can rapidly reinforce deployed forces should the situation deteriorate. Again, due to the unique nature of the mission, NEOs are typically very short or short in duration, lasting several hours to several days. In more extreme cases (e.g., in the case of an opposed evacuation of a large number of evacuees), they may last several weeks and require a larger than typical ground contingent. In addition, depending on the anticipated number of evacuees and transportation means/facilities available, more ground forces may be required to secure and service remote evacuation sites, and/or to provide logistical support and medical care for evacuees.

NEOs are typically conducted unilaterally and according to the authority derived from the responsibility of all states to provide for the reasonable protection of their citizens abroad. Thus, command and control is likely to reside solely with U.S. commanders. It should be noted, however, that although NEOs are unlikely to occur under the control of an international coalition, other states may be conducting similar operations at the same time.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operation: Operation Assured Response, Liberia (1996)

Operation Assured Response was conducted to protect and evacuate U.S. citizens from Liberia when civil war and general violence escalated in April 1996. The NEO resulted in over 2,500 U.S. citizens and third country nationals being evacuated from Liberia. The JTF was led by Special Operations Command--Europe and conducted by U.S. Air Force and Army Special Operations forces, as well as U.S. Navy and U.S. Marines when command of the JTF was transferred to the Commander, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. Although evacuation operations were essentially completed in just over a week in mid-April, the operation continued until early August.⁴²

41. Ibid.

42. "Assured Response," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/assured_response.htm.

**Noncombatant Evacuation Operation:
Lebanon (2006)**

In July 2006, Hezbollah guerrillas kidnapped two Israeli soldiers along the border between Israel and Lebanon. Israel responded the next day, bombing the airport, roads and bridges and blockading ports. Ultimately, 15,000 Americans were evacuated from Lebanon between mid-July and early August with the USS *Iwo Jima* Amphibious Ready Group/24th Marine Expeditionary Unit moving them to Cyprus for subsequent transportation to follow on destinations.⁴³

During noncombatant evacuations, the U.S. ambassador serves as the senior U.S. government authority for the evacuation and, as such, is ultimately responsible for the successful completion of the evacuation and the safety of the evacuees.⁴⁴ Under many circumstances necessitating evacuation, control by local authorities over public order and security is severely challenged. The capability, capacity, and organization of adversaries in the theater range from unsophisticated criminal threats to militias and rogue elements of affected state's armed forces. However, there are conditions (e.g., in the case of conventional conflicts) where NEO occurs under threat of more sophisticated military threats.

In spite of the great potential for violence, NEOs routinely occur in permissive or semi-permissive environments. That said, anticipating the nature of the environment is particularly difficult in most of these operations given the speed with which they occur and the potential response that introduction of U.S. forces may provoke. Thus the environment in most evacuations can best be characterized as uncertain and potentially hostile.

Illustrative Noncombatant Evacuation Operation: Nigeria (2016)

An expanded Boko Haram, having cultivated ties with other regional Islamist extremists, intensifies its bombing campaign targeting U.S. and Western interests in the Nigerian capital of Abuja and makes threats to kidnap U.S. citizens in Nigeria. The Nigerian military's Joint Task Force responds with a heavy handed show of force. Running battles ensue in the streets of the capital and key northern cities. The U.S. ambassador orders closure of the U.S. embassy and the recently opened U.S. consulate in Kano, more than 350 miles inland. An evacuation of U.S. nationals is ordered after several Americans are killed in uncontrolled street violence in Kano.

In execution, noncombatant evacuations are weighted heavily in favor of security operations first. However, once underway, the U.S. force charged with executing the evacuation may have to set conditions for success through offensive combat operations or by assuming an offensive posture once established on the ground. The latter enables rapid transition to combat operations should that become necessary. As these missions are extremely short to short in duration and

43. "Evacuation of American Citizens from Lebanon," GAO Report to Congress, June 7, 2007, <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07893r.pdf>.

44. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, December 2010, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf, p. I-1.

often severely limited in scope, U.S. ground forces should anticipate no stability operations or security force assistance responsibilities attendant to the evacuation itself.

There is an extremely high probability that U.S. decisionmakers will face circumstances over the next decade calling for consideration of noncombatant evacuations. The strategic warning associated with noncombatant evacuation range from extremely short to short, as military support to these operations are a last resort. While prudent military planning may occur based on growing instability or tension, conditions on the ground may deteriorate very rapidly with insufficient notice, limiting decision space. Further still, political and diplomatic factors involved in military support of NEOs make them different from other military operations. The decision to order evacuation of a U.S. embassy, for example, is highly political and therefore may be taken at the last available moment to avoid actions that may be construed as tacit admission of political failure.⁴⁵ Warning of the need for evacuation in the case of more traditional conflicts between states might be moderate, as there may in fact be more indicators of a gathering hazard. Potential theaters of operation include a number of states in the Middle East (including North Africa), Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South America and the Caribbean Basin, and Northeast and Southeast Asia.

Illustrative Noncombatant Evacuation Operations: Venezuela (2017)

Growing desire by the state of Zulia to separate from Venezuela has led President Hugo Chavez to declare martial law, resulting in a violent crackdown on all political activity. Coincidentally, U.S. relations with Iran sour even further, and Chavez encourages harassment of U.S. citizens living in Venezuela as a show of support for his Iranian ally. Under the auspices of the nation-wide crackdown, police forces now target U.S. interests, incarcerating U.S. citizens throughout the country and detaining U.S. diplomats and State Department employees without cause. In response, the United States quickly initiates an evacuation mission that includes liberating U.S. citizens from illegal detention.

7. Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are generally sanctioned by an international organization (e.g., the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, etc.) and undertaken with the consent of all the major parties to a conflict (as defined here, however, an explicit international sanction is not required). Peacekeeping operations involve positioning forces between warring states or factions to monitor their activities, dissuade resumption of hostilities, and support implementation of a negotiated end to conflict. In most cases U.S. participation will occur within the context of a larger international force, though the degree of others' contributions could vary substantially. Recent historical examples of major U.S. peacekeeping operations include Operations *Joint Endeavor*, *Joint Guard*, *Joint Forge* and *Joint Guardian* (various iterations of allied peacekeeping in the Balkans), as well as the United States' long-standing participation in the *Multi-National Force of Observers* (MFO) mission in the Sinai.

45. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, January 23, 2007, p. I-3, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf.

Peacekeeping: Operation Joint Endeavor (1995)

From late 1995 to 1996, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to uphold a cease-fire and maintain order. Under Operation Joint Endeavor, the United States deployed 24,000 troops for the peacekeeping effort, including the 1st Armored Division.⁴⁶ Along with logistical, intelligence and civil affairs support, U.S. forces under Task Force Eagle set out to maintain peace and order. U.S. troops dispersed through the region, manning checkpoints at key bridges and roads and conducting persistent, aggressive patrolling. Task Force Eagle frequently confiscated weapons inside the cease-fire zone and demonstrated a credible military capability to deter any escalation of violence by warring factions. U.S. units also worked to clear the numerous minefields strewn across the area of operations.⁴⁷

Future peacekeeping operations could vary widely in scale, ranging from very small to large —deployment of individual observers, an Army battalion task force, a MEU or a larger MAGTF, or an Army or Marine division headquarters and multiple combat brigade equivalents and their associated support assets. Peacekeeping operations generally are long to very long in duration; in most cases they last at least a year, and many continue for a decade or more.

Peacekeeping operations might take place under a variety of operational circumstances. The authorities under which specific missions are undertaken are more likely than not -- in spirit or in fact -- to derive from Chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter,⁴⁸ though this may not always be the case.

Command and control arrangements will, in almost all instances, be some type

of coalition arrangement that may or may not be U.S.-led. The composition of the peacekeeping force too will most likely have a decidedly international character. Therefore, the United States can expect allied and partner military contributions, as well as significant levels of involvement by U.S. and foreign civilian government agencies and international and nongovernmental organizations.

In peacekeeping missions initiated to prevent resumption of civil conflict, local authorities may have lost the capacity to secure or govern all or significant portions of their sovereign territory. Indeed, there may be no government authority at all, or there may be new and competing centers of power exercising claims to sovereign authority regionally or nationally. In such instances the peacekeeping force would serve as the *de facto* governing authority while local institutions develop and mature, presumably with international assistance. In cases of peacekeeping involving two warring states or more sophisticated warring factions in a civil war, the capacity of local authorities to secure their territory and govern their populations might be more robust. In these cases, the role of peacekeepers would be more limited to monitoring and policing the cease-fire.

46. Larry Wentz, "Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience," Command and Control Resource Program, Department of Defense, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Wentz_Bosnia.pdf.

47. "Kosovo and Macedonia: U.S. and Allied Military Operations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress, July 8, 2003, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ib10027.pdf>.

48. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes; and Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and *acts of aggression*, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.

By definition, peacekeeping operations should not involve violent opposition, as the peacekeeping force is present to serve as an impartial third party under the explicit agreement of the former combatants. However, in all cases of peacekeeping there is at a minimum latent potential for resistance, whether directly targeting the peacekeeping force or aimed primarily at reinstating hostilities between the original warring parties. Potential adversaries could range from unsophisticated criminal opponents and organized sub-national militias up to and including, in some cases, very sophisticated military forces. At the outset of operations, however, entry is assumed to occur under permissive conditions.

Throughout the duration of peacekeeping operations, U.S. and foreign forces can expect to conduct a variety of stability and security actions. Both will play a vital role in overall mission success, especially in peacekeeping operations that might follow civil conflict. The extent of the stability operations undertaken will depend on the scope of the international mandate and the missions assigned to U.S. forces.

Strictly speaking, peacekeeping missions are expected to involve no (or very limited) combat operations, although U.S. forces should be prepared to transition to offensive or defensive combat operations should security conditions deteriorate.⁴⁹ There may be occasions where peacekeeping forces undertake limited offensive actions to restore local order or bring war criminals or spoilers to justice in the absence of competent and cooperative local security authorities. As a peacekeeping mission in response to civil conflict matures or in a peacekeeping operation where a separatist movement gains independence, U.S. ground forces might anticipate some—perhaps significant—responsibilities for security force assistance.

Illustrative Peacekeeping Operation: South Asia (2015)

Lakshar-e-Taiba (LET) militants conduct a series of coordinated attacks across New Delhi and Mumbai. Hundreds are killed as the terrorists strike Parliament, rail centers, Western hotels, and an important Hindu temple. Following the arrest of several ISI agents in Delhi, India confirms that Pakistan's active support for the operation is far more significant than any previous incident. With immense domestic pressure to respond, the Indian government undertakes a series of preemptive military actions against Pakistan, occupying eastern Punjab Province in a large-scale ground assault and conducting an extensive precision bombing campaign against suspected Pakistani WMD facilities nationwide. Pakistan retaliates with its own unsuccessful ground offensive into Indian-controlled Kashmir and publicly authorizes nuclear release. India reciprocates. The U.S. Secretary of State and Russian Foreign Minister rush to Karachi and Delhi respectively, brokering a cease-fire contingent on the deployment of an international peacekeeping force that will monitor withdrawal of Indian forces from Pakistan, police the cease-fire and guarantee secure cantonment of both countries' nuclear arsenals.⁴⁹

49. Portions of this illustrative scenario are inspired by unpublished work done by the author on behalf of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

50. U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Dictionary of Military terms*, "Peacekeeping Operations," http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

Over the next decade there is a high probability that the United States will face circumstances where participation in peacekeeping operations would be considered.⁵¹ This includes possible leadership of these missions. However, given the experience of the last decade, U.S. officials may be more favorably disposed to conducting limited humanitarian assistance and human security operations, shows of force, or enabling operations in support of ally or partner-led peacekeeping missions. But, as suggested in the report above and will be highlighted in Appendix C, the ability of allies to commit substantial resources to any future contingencies is increasingly in doubt.

The strategic warning associated with most peacekeeping operations is projected to be moderate to long, ranging from several weeks to several months, given the unique linkages between peacekeeping operations, diplomatic negotiations, and conflict resolution. Possible areas where future peacekeeping operations might be considered include Africa (North, Sub-Saharan, and the Horn), Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Gaza/West Bank, Cuba, Mexico, India/Pakistan, the Baltic States and the South Caucasus.

8. Seize and Secure

U.S. forces would undertake a rapid seize and secure operation in the event that critical foreign infrastructure (e.g., ports, pipelines or canals), dominant terrain (e.g., strategic choke points like the Suez Canal), and/or dangerous capabilities (principally chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and/or their delivery systems) were actively threatened by intrastate conflict, instability, or illegitimate seizure. The key feature of this operational type is its very limited scope.

In lieu of full-scale invasion or occupation, these operations are designed to control only what is necessary to either ensure the continued security of or deny hostile access to key strategic objectives. Seize and secure operations might be necessary to ensure friendly access to critical regions and resources, underwrite freedom of navigation, or to deny an adversary access to critical resources or capabilities upon which they rely. Indeed, denying opponents access to the facilities, infrastructure, capabilities, and territory that they specifically rely on to gain and maintain leverage and advantage may be an increasingly attractive option short of regime change.

This mission is somewhat more speculative and less immediately intuitive than some other types. Historical examples do exist, however; the most obvious of which is *Operation Musketeer*, the Anglo-French seizure of the Suez Canal in 1956. *Operation Musketeer* as an operational archetype, not its political motivations or historical setting, is germane in this regard.

The scale of seize and secure missions would likely range from a single MEU or Army BCT through a corps/MEF headquarters and some combination of MEBs and up to a maximum of perhaps 20 Army BCT equivalents. The duration of seize and secure operations is assumed to fall somewhere between moderate to extremely long. A more precise estimation would be heavily dependent upon the specific mission, the character and endurance of the threats putting mission objectives at risk, and the capacity and/or cooperation of local authorities. Seize and secure operations will be often undertaken unilaterally, under the auspices of an ad hoc coalition of the willing, or alongside one or more treaty allies. Broad international support and/authorities may be more problematic.

51. Whether such activities would actually be undertaken, however, is a separate matter. A number of working group participants argued that the experience of the last decade would temper the appetite of U.S. leaders to commit any significant number of U.S. forces to extended peacekeeping missions.

Seize and Secure: Operation Musketeer (1956)

In July 1956, Egyptian President Gama Nasser nationalized the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company. Given the strategic importance of the Canal, British and French troops conducted a rapid strike and seized control of the area in early November. The attack began with an aerial bombardment of airfields, crippling Egypt's air force and its air defenses.⁵² British paratroopers then landed at El Gamil airfield, positioned to the west of the Suez Canal, and secured the position. With heavy air support, the British force moved east along the Mediterranean and pushed Egyptian forces into the city center of Port Said. Meanwhile, French paratroopers landed further inland along the Canal, and the following morning secured key bridges and ports fifty miles south of Port Said. Royal Marines also landed on the next day, bypassing major Egyptian defenses in a rapid rush to secure Port Said. In the face of multiple points of attack, Egyptian defenses in Port Said and in the northern Suez area collapsed. After just 48 hours, British and French forces had seized and secured a majority of the Suez Canal zone.⁵³

A key factor in this regard is strategic warning. Warning of circumstances that might require a seize and secure response ranges from extremely short to moderate, placing a high premium on speed and leaving very little time to marshal an international mandate.

The likeliest seize and secure operations will occur under circumstances where local authorities have lost or forfeited their authority or are unwilling to secure critical infrastructure, geography, and/or dangerous military capabilities. Thus when they exist, U.S. partners may be local rather than national. The need for speed and pursuit of very limited objectives suggest that U.S. ground forces could expect limited allied support and would require relatively small

Illustrative Seize and Secure Operation: Egypt (2013)

Since the fall of the Mubarak regime, there has been no clear political resolution. Elections were delayed and then, when held, widely viewed as illegitimate. Various factions continue to jockey for power, large street protests have continued, and small acts of terrorism have been increasing, leaving Alexandria, Port Said, and a number of urban centers near the Suez Canal essentially ungoverned. As Egypt's Army fractures following infighting between senior military officers, many conscripts desert and the control of Egypt's highly capable military arsenal becomes uncertain. As the world remains mired in recession, the effects of the grassroots civil conflict in Egypt begin to affect world oil markets. Various factions attack commercial ships transiting the Suez Canal, as well as the Suez-to-Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline in order to discredit the central government, deny it essential sources of cash, and ultimately force it from power. The United States begins to develop options to secure the Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline to calm anxiety in world oil markets.

52. Laurie Milner. "The Suez Crisis." BBC, March 13, 2003, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/suez_01.shtml.

53. "Suez Crisis 1956," Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, <http://history.state.gov/milestones/1830-1860>.

Illustrative Seize and Secure Operations: Iran (2015)

In the spring of 2015, U.S. intelligence detects a crude nuclear explosion at an Iranian test facility. While deemed only a partial success, it is clear that Iran has passed an important milestone and has moved much closer to a fully functional weapon. Given the recent fall of the Syrian regime and ongoing ambitions in Tehran to bolster their regional assertiveness, Western nations are especially concerned about the test's impact on regional security. Meanwhile, the Iranian state increasingly resorts to violence to quell domestic disturbances, and also encourages Shia groups to utilize more violent tactics against the Bahraini government. With these developments drawing the ire of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar conduct major naval exercises to demonstrate their resolve. Angered by these naval movements, Iran initiates a mine-laying operation in the Straits of Hormuz, culminating in series of naval altercations and the loss of a Saudi frigate to a land-based Iranian missile. Saudi forces look to the United States to eliminate the multitude of military forces now positioned on Iran's islands and sea-based oil rigs in the Persian Gulf. NATO leaders also suggest seizing key Iranian military installations and key oil export facilities in order to limit the threat to Gulf shipping and cut Teheran's principal source of financial support.⁵⁴

Illustrative Seize and Secure Operations: Russia (2020)

A sustained decline in oil prices plunges the Russian economy into depression, mandating major government austerity measures that enrage the public and spark major riots. As tax hikes continue, fewer periphery states see the benefit of Moscow's central rule. Politicians in Amur Oblast and Primorsky Krai call for autonomy and a closer alignment with China, now viewed as a superior benefactor when compared to the bankrupt Federation. Emboldened by the degradation of Russia's senior military leadership and its unified command structure, a number of dissident officers in the Eastern Operational Strategic Command (EOSC) publicly back the move. The deputy EOSC commander arrests the loyalist EOSC commander and orders immediate dispersal of the 800-plus tactical nuclear warheads thought to remain in the command's area of responsibility. He and the separatist politicians view this move as insurance against a countermove by Moscow. U.S. intelligence detects extensive preparations for the movement of nuclear materials from the national-level storage facilities at Malay Sazanka. The President asks the Secretary of Defense to present options for the immediate seizure of the weapons, either with or without a Russian request.

contributions from other U.S. government agencies, the most obvious of which might be State Department, the intelligence agencies, and potentially some Coast Guard expertise.

At initiation, seize and secure operations could occur in the face of a variety of opponents ranging from insurgents and militias to sophisticated military forces. Once established on the ground U.S. forces might expect a more complicated series of adversaries, to include criminals, hostile elements of the local population, and nationalist spoilers. Seize and secure missions are

54. Similar to potential future scenarios described by other defense experts. See Harding, "Strategic Defence and Security Review."

offensive combat actions at the outset and will likely occur in nonpermissive or uncertain environments. However, once targets or objectives are secure, ground force operations will rapidly assume a more defensive posture focused on consolidating and securing gains. In some situations some limited stability operations might also follow, though (with the possible exception of some infrastructure repair) they would not be essential to overall mission success.

There is a moderate likelihood that U.S. decisionmakers will face circumstances appropriate to seize and secure responses over the next decade. Indeed, seize and secure operations may become more likely as political events sweeping the Middle East and violence in places like Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan highlight the potential vulnerability of critical infrastructure and resources to unexpected seizure or disruption. Likewise, there are grave concerns about effective and responsible control over nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities as well, particularly as such capabilities proliferate around the globe.

There are key areas around the world where U.S. planners might anticipate seize and secure operations. Critical choke points like the Panama Canal, Straits of Hormuz, Straits of Malacca, and Bab al Mandeb are all candidates. The nuclear arsenals of fragile states like North Korea and Pakistan are likewise important planning candidates for seize and secure missions. And, finally, seize and secure operations may become unavoidable in instances where the unhindered export of critical resources like oil is threatened by instability and foreign war.

9. Human Security

U.S. ground forces conduct human security operations when large numbers of innocent civilians are threatened by civil conflict. In response, U.S. ground forces conduct operations at the invitation, agreement, or acquiescence of host nation authorities (commonly in accordance with an international mandate) in order to establish and maintain a secure environment and assist in temporarily providing for the basic security needs of at risk populations. Human security operations include but are not limited to halting mass atrocities and/or preventing predations against vulnerable populations by armed groups. Clear examples of past human security operations include Operation *Restore Hope* (1992-1993) in Somalia and Operation *Uphold Democracy*, the 1994 U.S. intervention in Haiti.

Human Security: Operation Restore Hope (1992-1993)

Widespread famine in Somalia, exacerbated by feuding warlords and resulting civil strife, led the United Nations to authorize an operation to provide protection and security for relief efforts. Upwards of 38,000 UN forces conducted primarily security operations, setting the conditions for the distribution of food in various parts of the country. At its height the operation involved 25,000 U.S. forces, mostly Marine, Army and SOF forces, who deployed for a period of approximately five months.⁵⁵

The scale of human security operations likely ranges from small to large—potentially calling for deployment of a single MEU or BCT-equivalent for more modest operations to a much larger multi-brigade-sized task force. The latter larger commitment is more likely to occur in the event of missions verging on peace enforcement (as described by UN Chapter VII), where U.S. forces

55. Kenneth R. Rutherford, *Humanitarianism Under Fire: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia* (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008).

fight to protect vulnerable populations. Duration of human security operations can be expected to range from long to very long.

As in the case of humanitarian assistance/consequence management, foreign partner and interagency contributions in human security operations are expected to be significant, particularly if operations are initiated under an international mandate. By definition, however, host nation forces are incapable or unwilling to contain the violence, and thus host nation capacity is assumed to be limited. Adversary capabilities will vary by situation. Some parties to the conflict may be indifferent or hostile to U.S. presence; many of these lacking the means to conduct sustained lethal resistance. In other situations, there may be openly hostile parties. These could range from criminal actors and armed gangs to militias and rogue military formations. Therefore, the environment could range from permissive and nonviolent, but tense to semi-permissive and locally or regionally violent. (Higher levels of violence would likely be associated with a different operational type, e.g., opposed stabilization or a major combat campaign.)

Like HA/CM operations, human security missions would have a dual focus on security and stability operations initially. In this instance, however, security would take precedence over stability. To the extent combat actions are required, U.S. forces would presumably seek to limit it to self-defense and the defense of vulnerable populations under immediate threat of violent attack. Some very rudimentary security force assistance may occur in human security operations or on the margins of other operations that are more central to the outcomes.

There is a high probability that civil conflict will encroach on U.S. interests over the next decade. Therefore policymakers will face circumstances under which they will weigh decisions about whether to intervene on behalf of innocent populations threatened by violence. Strategic warning for such circumstances would likely fall in the moderate to long range, as there would presumably be some forewarning and diplomatic activity preceding any military deployment. Prospects for situations in which human security missions might be considered are highest in Africa—Sub-Saharan and North Africa, Syria, Iraq, Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, and Indonesia, amongst other countries.

Illustrative Human Security Operation: Somalia (2013)

Ever-increasing al Shabaab influence in Somalia results in yet another sustained humanitarian catastrophe. In spite of some protection from African Union forces, Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has yet to take root and cannot compete effectively with al Shabaab for control over the central and southern portions of the country. Al Shabaab militants control two thirds of the country's territory, at least two million famine-ravaged Somali citizens, the cities of Mogadishu and Kismayou, and all the transportation routes into the country's interior. As a consequence, by late 2012 all external aid efforts are effectively shut down by al Shabaab violence and intimidation. Kenya, overwhelmed by the cumulative burden of refugees, has shut its border with Somalia. Recalling experiences from the early 1990s, world leaders hesitate to reengage in Somalia, even as its people endure even harsher conditions from both an inhospitable natural environment and the predations of more organized and lethal militants. In January 2013, the UN secretary general asks the United States to consider leading an intervention under a mandate limited to securing lines of communication and creating humanitarian sanctuaries.

10. Opposed Stabilization

U.S. forces conduct opposed stabilization (OS) when a partner or adversary state has lost control over security in all or part of its sovereign territory and the associated disorder and internal strife puts core U.S. interests at risk. The minimum essential objective for opposed stabilization is the establishment of “an environment orderly enough that most routine civil functions [can] be carried out.”⁵⁶ This is a lower bar than the full menu of stability tasks suggested in joint doctrine.⁵⁷ Comprehensive stabilization may be warranted in some cases. In others, it will be unnecessary, too costly, or infeasible. In cases like this, intervention might pursue more limited objectives.

Opposed Stabilization: French Intervention in Zaire (1978)

On May 11, 1978, 3,000 to 4,000 fighters of the Congolese National Liberation Front (FNLC) infiltrated Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and seized the mining town of Kolwezi. Once in control of the city, the guerillas ransacked Kolwezi and violently attacked Europeans residing in the area.⁵⁸ The city became a sanctuary for FNLC activity and a hub for stockpiled arms. Responding to the ongoing threat to its citizens and the risk of further destabilization in the region, Belgium and France deployed paratroopers to defeat FNLC rebels and reestablish order. On May 19, France’s 2nd Parachute Regiment dropped into the heart of Kolwezi, securing the city and the surrounding area over the next 24 hours. The following morning, more French paratroopers as well as a Belgian para commando brigade landed in the city to support the evacuation of European nationals and clear the remaining area of FNLC guerillas. The remaining rebels retreated to their home bases in eastern Angola, while French and Belgian forces turned over their positions to Zairian troops.⁵⁹

Opposed stabilization might occur at the request or with the tacit agreement of the legally-recognized government of the victim state—should that government remain intact. However, the most difficult opposed stabilization operations might be those conducted in states where what remains of the legal government and the indigenous population harbor anti-American sentiments and actively oppose U.S. presence. The opposed stabilization category includes, but is not limited to, counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Beyond COIN operations, however, opposed stabilization is (like seize and secure operations) more speculative than some of the other operational types. Close examination of the opposed stabilization operational type indicates that military operations could occur in the face of significant, localized high-intensity combat action (e.g., in response to the failure of a large and important state possessing significant military

56. James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters* (Winter 1995/1996), p. 60.

57. U.S. Army, Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008: 3-1-3-22, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>. Stability tasks include establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development.

58. “Inside Kolwezi: Toll of Terror,” *Time Magazine*, June 5, 1978, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,916174-1,00.html>.

59. Thomas Odom, “Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978,” Command and General Staff College, April 1993, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/odom2/odom2.asp#31>.

capabilities), where U.S. forces simultaneously fight an intense 360-degree offensive military campaign while also securing vulnerable populations and conducting traditional stability operations. There are some historical examples of opposed stabilization. They include the U.S. COIN response to Iraq's sectarian civil war in 2007 and the French and Belgian intervention in Zaire in 1978.

While aspects of opposed stabilization and some human security operations are similar, there are significant differences between them as well. In opposed stabilization operations, the primary focus is establishing and maintaining broad stability and security through a range of activities that include quite intense combat action, while human security operations are limited to protecting innocent civilians exclusively. Other differences include the expected level and types of violence intervening forces can expect to encounter on entry (higher and more varied in opposed stabilization operations); the likely sophistication, strength, and persistence of that violence and resistance over time (all greater in opposed stabilization operations); and the corresponding level of U.S. forces required to reestablish and maintain order as a consequence (again, greater in opposed stabilization operations). For example, in opposed stabilization missions, persistent violence is expected to fundamentally complicate the conduct of stability operations. And, under unique circumstances—again, as in failure of or civil war in a large state—the level and sophistication of the violence and the environment's lethality may approach that commonly associated with major combat campaigns.

Opposed Stabilization: the Iraq Surge (2007)

As a first step in altering strategic priorities following rising violence levels, U.S. forces and their Iraqi counterparts established small joint security stations throughout Baghdad during Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon, which began in February 2007. This dispersion enabled Coalition forces to consistently engage with the population, thereby enhancing local security and denying the enemy access to safe havens. As the surge of five additional brigades arrived, U.S. commanders expanded their efforts into a Corps-level offensive that would ultimately disrupt the networks of al Qaeda and other insurgents groups throughout Iraq. Beginning in June 2007 under Operation Phantom Thunder, Coalition and Iraqi forces simultaneously targeted insurgent strongholds in Diyala province and the Sunni outskirts of Baghdad. Follow-on operations included Phantom Strike in August 2007 and Phantom Phoenix in January 2008.⁶⁰ These efforts further dismantled insurgent networks but also began shifting focus towards reconstruction assistance, the improvement of local governance and the maintenance of constant security for the population.⁶¹

The scale of opposed stabilization missions varies significantly by the affected state's size and population, as well as adversary capacity and sophistication. However, because the level of on-going violence is high, coupled with the need to bring that violence rapidly under control, the scale of U.S. ground force response will be significantly larger than response to internal instability

60. "Phantom Phoenix' Operation Targets al Qaeda in Iraq," American Forces Press Service, January 8, 2008, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=48601>.

61. Linda Robinson, *Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).

under more benign circumstances. In addition, the composition of deployed forces will often initially favor offensive combat capabilities.

**Illustrative Opposed Stabilization Operation:
Northern Arabian Gulf (2020)**

A separatist Shi'a movement based in Iraq's Basra province (the Imam Ali Army of Iraq—IAAI) initiates a second, more violent Arab Spring by declaring independence from Baghdad and claiming sovereign rights to Iraq's southern three provinces. IAAI fighters drive off Iraqi security forces, seizing control of both Basra City and the port of Um Qasr. Local police and military formations, facing split loyalties, are complicit in the uprising. Shortly after the Iraqi insurrection, another underground Shi'a movement operating in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia—the Guardians of the Holy Shrines (GHS)—mortally wound the Saudi and Bahraini kings in an assassination attempt tied to the opening of the 2020 GCC summit in al Manama. As the Saudi King slowly succumbs to his wounds, a secession crisis unfolds. Factions within the royal family, powerful tribal alliances, and Sunni religious elites begin coalescing around various contenders for the throne. Violence in Riyadh and Jeddah between the Saudi regular army and National Guard forces spreads eastward, triggering widespread intra- and inter-communal violence in and around key petroleum extraction and port facilities. Heavy fighting within and between GHS fighters, Sunni irregular/tribal formations, and government force the shutdown of a number of Saudi Arabia's main seaports. Part of a key east-west pipeline is destroyed in the midst of the fighting. Violence also spills into Shi'a neighborhoods in al Manama. Looking to help stabilize Basra Province, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, the United States considers various military operations to include intervention.⁶²

The minimum number of forces required for the stabilization of all or even part of a modest-sized state could approach or exceed a Corps/MEF headquarters, two MEBs, and up to 20 Army BCT equivalents with associated command and control and support architecture. The length of any U.S. commitment to opposed stabilization will range from long to very long. However, the duration of any opposed stabilization mission will ultimately depend on the subordinate missions assigned to U.S. forces, the scope of the desired ends to be pursued, and the resources committed to achieve them. Given growing concerns about future resources, U.S. forces might anticipate disengaging from an opposed stabilization after forcing violence down to manageable levels but not necessarily delivering a decisive and definitive end to the conflict itself.

U.S. forces are likely to engage in opposed stabilization operations with at least some superficial level of coalition participation, for political if not practical reasons. Nonetheless there are clearly circumstances when unilateral intervention would be considered (uncontrolled violence or instability in the Western Hemisphere may be one example in this regard). The quality and durability of foreign partner support will vary significantly based on the capabilities of the participating allied or partner governments and the extent to which their interests coincide with U.S. interests.

62. Portions of this illustrative scenario are inspired by unpublished work done by the author on behalf of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

In an opposed stabilization response, the vast majority of stability operation tasks—establishing civil security, establishing civil control, restoring essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development—fall within the purview of civilian rather than military actors.⁶³ Thus the demand for meaningful participation by the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and other Departments will be substantial.

Opposed stabilization missions are by definition undertaken when local authorities are no longer able to secure or govern all or part of their sovereign territory and have lost the ability to provide basic public goods—including security to their population. The degree to which this is true varies by circumstances. It may be total, as in the case of a collapse or civil war in a large and important state. Under these conditions, U.S. forces may have little or no local political authority with which to cooperate upon arrival. In other situations, U.S. participation in COIN operations is more likely to occur alongside a foreign partner who is seriously impaired but still functioning.

In any opposed stabilization, including COIN, adversaries could include some combination of criminal actors, terrorists, insurgents, militias and free-riding foreign agents. In the case of state collapse or civil war, these forces could be joined by breakaway elements of the state's security forces. In all cases, adversaries will likely have access to highly lethal capabilities—including sophisticated military hardware. All of these forces may be working against U.S. intervention and each other simultaneously. In addition, they may be enabled by an indifferent or hostile indigenous population.

In the case of U.S. intervention in state collapse or civil war, conditions on the ground are apt to be nonpermissive and violent from the outset, whereas entry of U.S. forces into a theater with an on-going insurgency will normally be permissive or semi-permissive (because the U.S. intervention would presumably occur at the behest of legitimate host nation political authorities). Irrespective of conditions upon entry, however, once there, U.S. forces can anticipate operating throughout the area of operations in the face of varying levels of permissiveness and violence.

Depending on the degree and persistence of enemy resistance and the number and variety of adversaries, opposed stabilization may favor equal balance between combat and security operations initially as U.S. forces enter the theater and attempt to seize the initiative. Over time, relative weighting will shift to a near equal balance among combat, security, and stability operations. Later stages in the operation may involve equal focus on security, stability, and security force assistance operations, with less emphasis on limited combat actions.

There is moderate likelihood that circumstances will emerge where opposed stabilization is an appropriate response. There may only be short to moderate strategic warning associated with entry into an opposed stabilization having to do with state collapse or civil war. Warning associated with an opposed stabilization operation limited to COIN might be more substantial—ranging from moderate to long—as insurgencies take longer to emerge, gain traction, and threaten central authorities. However, among potential opposed stabilization scenarios, classical COIN may be the least likely variant.

Given the experience of the past decade, U.S. decisionmakers will be cautious about where and when they consider undertaking opposed stabilization. Core U.S. interests are likely to drive their calculations. Thus while the circumstances warranting an opposed stabilization operation

63. U.S. Army, Headquarters, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008: 3-1-3-22, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

could arise in multiple areas around the globe, actual missions are most likely to occur in states of key strategic importance. These include those nations home to large amounts of major resources like petroleum, those that possess weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weapons), states with dominant geographic, economic, political, or social leverage, or large states adjacent to the United States or one of its key allies.⁶⁴ Unlike circumstances where U.S. interests face less compelling direct threats and humanitarian assistance or human security operations may be more appropriate, there will be greater urgency attached to conditions where civil conflict threatens fundamental harm to important U.S. interests (i.e., incidents of uncontrolled violence where U.S. intervention might be the only viable option available to prevent escalation).

11. Sanctuary Denial

The United States would undertake sanctuary denial operations to address a threat or redress grievous harm to core U.S. interests, preclude terrorist or serious criminal activity posing persistent hazards, and/or disrupt or destroy adversary leadership, networks, and capabilities that enable hostile or illegal actions. The principal objective of sanctuary denial operations is to control and occupy territory in order to preclude its use as a safe haven by adversaries.

Sanctuary Denial: U.S. Invasion of Cambodia (1970)

Though part of a larger military campaign, the U.S.-led invasion of Cambodia is one example of sanctuary denial operations. From April to June of 1970, U.S. and South Vietnamese ground forces conducted a swift offensive into Cambodia's border regions, which harbored an entrenched North Vietnamese logistical network supporting insurgent activities throughout South Vietnam. Despite resistance to the war's expansion, U.S. leaders looked to destroy enemy sanctuaries in areas of Cambodia less than 80 miles from Saigon. Previous efforts to eliminate supply routes through bombing campaigns yielded limited success.⁶⁵ However, a coup in Cambodia that brought a pro-U.S. government to power provided an opportunity for U.S. commanders to deploy ground forces into a border area of Cambodia's Kampong Cham Province. With armored cavalry and air assault units spearheading the incursion, 25,000 U.S. and South Vietnamese forces sought to envelop Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces operating in the area. Although many enemy fighters did escape, the offensive eliminated safe havens and supply hubs, thereby impeding North Vietnam's ability to conduct insurgent activities in the South.⁶⁶

Sanctuary denial operations might occur in response to an extremist attack, an organized criminal or insurgent threat to an important foreign government, or in the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. or international law. These operations are intended to be decisive only in the near-term. Their objectives are limited to the near-term disruption or destruction of immediate

64. Nathan Freier, "Known Unknowns: Unconventional Strategic Shock in Defense Strategy Development," U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, November 2008, p. 29, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=890>.

65. Donald V. Phillips, "Across the Border: The Successes and Failures of Operation Rockcrusher," U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 4, 1999, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA367998>.

66. John M. Shaw, *The Cambodian Campaign: The 1970 Offensive and America's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005).

threats to U.S. interests, acknowledging that the precipitating challenge may resurface in a different location or form. Sanctuary denial is a more conservative alternative than is extended COIN operations and might be considered a “management” approach to persistent irregular threats like insurgency and terrorism.

Relative to other operational types, sanctuary denial operations are generally larger and more comprehensive than raids (described later) but less time- and resource-intensive than opposed stabilization operations. In sanctuary denial operations, U.S. ground forces initiate simultaneous, often geographically dispersed offensive actions for the purpose of destroying or mortally degrading an opponent’s capacity to inflict additional near-term harm. A sanctuary denial operation may in fact begin with a classic *coup de main*.⁶⁷ They further involve some level of sustained operations in order to prevent immediate reconstitution of enemy capabilities.

Historical examples of sanctuary denial operations include Pershing’s 1916 punitive expedition into Mexico, the 1970 U.S. invasion of Cambodia, Operation *Peace for Galilee*, Israel’s 1982 attack into Southern Lebanon, and the initial phases of Operation *Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan. Sanctuary denial operations may be quite small, involving only a handful of special operations forces and lasting a matter of days. However, while intended to pursue very limited objectives, they could also be significantly larger in scope and longer in duration as well, involving up to an Army Corps or MEF headquarters and a combination of up to eight Army or Marine combat brigade equivalents and their associated command and control and support forces. Duration of larger-scale operations like this might stretch from long to extremely long, lasting from several months to a year plus.

Sanctuary Denial: Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)

Despite a cease-fire and diplomatic efforts to curb violence, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forces in southern Lebanon continued to raid northern Israeli towns throughout 1981 and 1982. With the PLO receiving supplies of heavy weapons and a recent attempt to assassinate Israel’s ambassador to the U.K., Israeli leaders deployed a 76,000-strong force to eliminate PLO sanctuaries in Lebanon. Through a three-pronged ground attack and air campaign in June 1982, Israeli forces quickly isolated and routed PLO forces in southern Lebanon. The offensive also utilized amphibious landings to amass combat power deep behind enemy defenses. Following the initial offensive, Israeli forces also destroyed captured PLO heavy weapons and occupied a 40 kilometer zone to prevent any infiltration of guerilla forces back into southern Lebanon. Within a week, Israeli forces reached eastern Beirut, where they surrounded PLO guerillas and Syrian forces stationed in the area. In August, a cease-fire was established and the remaining PLO forces were removed from Lebanon.⁶⁸

67. The Department of Defense defines *coup de main* as an offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. See U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms, “Coup De Main,” http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.

68. Paul Regan, “Operation Peace for Galilee,” U.S. Naval War College, June 1995, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA293847&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

Sanctuary denial operations are most likely to occur under unilateral U.S. and/or treaty ally command and control arrangements. By definition, sanctuary denial operations are necessitated by a failure on the part of local authorities to demonstrate either the capability or willingness to establish and maintain functioning order inside their sovereign territory. Prospective opponents in these operations range from sophisticated criminal cartels and paramilitaries to terrorist and insurgent networks. In many cases, these adversaries will have access to some sophisticated military capabilities and will be able to create access problems for U.S. forces. Thus, this contingency type will principally occur in violent, nonpermissive environments.

Illustrative Sanctuary Denial Operation: Yemen (2017)

Concerned by Saudi interference in Yemeni affairs, Houthi rebels increasingly reach out to Tehran for support. Not only does Iran provide multiple shipments of sophisticated weapons, including SA-7 MANPADs, but U.S. intelligence also confirms that dozens of Quds Force personnel are operating in Yemeni towns near the Saudi border. Reports that Houthi militias are selling their SA-7s abroad raises major concerns for U.S. leadership, while a recent shoot-down of a Saudi transport helicopter prompts Riyadh to launch a ground offensive into northwestern Yemen. Well-equipped and led by Quds Force advisers, Houthi guerillas destroy dozens of Saudi tanks as they enter urban centers. Missiles allow the rebels to deny Saudi air forces the ability to operate safely in the region. After successive setbacks, Saudi forces pull back and are unable to resume their offensive action. Meanwhile the Yemeni government weakens further, enabling the Houthis to gain more power in the northwest while al Qaeda forces continue to operate at training camps in the southeast. With the Yemeni government unable to challenge these two sanctuaries and Saudi Forces still regrouping, the United States considers taking immediate and decisive action to eliminate both Houthi and al Qaeda networks. Options include coordinated air strikes and ground raids against suspected training camps and Quds Force operating areas, a series of amphibious raids into of northwestern Yemeni ports suspected of trafficking arms, and lower-visibility direct action by Special Forces teams against rebel and terrorist leadership throughout Yemen.

Though a mix of combat, security, and stability actions could be necessary in sanctuary denial operations, this operational type heavily favors offensive action. Security operations would be limited in most cases to the local defense of affected civilian populations, and any stability operations would be limited in scope and persist only until the conclusion of military action. There would also be no appreciable security force assistance requirement associated with sanctuary denial operations. However, for the duration of U.S. operations, some cooperation with indigenous regular or irregular forces aimed at improving their interoperability with U.S. forces could occur. While probable in the conduct of sanctuary denial operations, the latter three tasks are not decisive to a favorable outcome.

There is a moderate probability that U.S. decisionmakers will face circumstances where a sanctuary denial operation would be an appropriate response. While the precipitating event necessitating it may be a surprise, it is likely that U.S. ground forces would have moderate to long strategic warning of the possible need to conduct one. Prospective theaters of operation include but are not limited to Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, and Somalia.

12. Raid

Raids are small-scale, short-duration military operations undertaken in pursuit of a set of very specific objectives. Raids target specific opponent information, personnel, or material in order to sow confusion; seize, disable, or destroy dangerous military assets; or capture or kill high value opponents. Raids may also be conducted to secure the safe return of noncombatants or military personnel held against their will by armed opponents of the United States. Raids are brief operations that begin with the rapid introduction of U.S. forces and end with the equally rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces once they have satisfactorily met or exceeded mission objectives. Historical examples of raids include Operation Prime Chance, a series of actions against Iranian assets in the Persian Gulf; Operation Barras, a British rescue operation in Sierra Leone; and Operation Neptune Spear, the recent raid by U.S. SOF that killed Osama bin Laden.

Raid: Operation Prime Chance (1987)

Despite the presence of U.S. Naval vessels escorting oil tankers in August 1987, Iranian fast attack boats continued to harass Persian Gulf commerce. In response, the United States deployed an Army Aviation and Naval Special Operations force to thwart Iranian mine-laying and small boat attacks. Based aboard surface vessels and two converted oil servicing barges, the team of SEALs, EOD technicians, Marines and Army pilots detected and engaged hostile Iranian vessels, which often hid in Iranian waters during the day and sailed at night. U.S. forces utilized a combination of air attack and Special Forces insertion to halt further Iranian harassment of maritime commerce. In one instance in September 1987, the Special Operations team monitored an Iranian vessel laying mines, subsequently raiding and boarding the ship. Once on board, the Special Forces team gathered intelligence and interrogated captured crewmembers.⁶⁹

The size of a typical raid will range from a small special operations team to a forward-deployed MEU or Army Ranger, Airborne, or Air Assault battalion. Their duration will vary from extremely short in most cases to short in a limited number of instances where the raiding force requires days to accomplish their objectives. The demand for speed typically precludes insertion and sustainment of a larger force; should a larger contingent be required, this would likely cause the activity to fall into a different operational category (e.g., seize and secure or sanctuary denial).

Given the enormous success of raids against terrorists and insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the wider war on terror, a reduction in the appetite for such operations in the near future seems unlikely. Based on their low visibility, relatively low cost, and perception of their effectiveness, the application of raids may soon transcend counter-terrorist operations. Raids could, for example, become a new tool for the extraterritorial exercise of U.S. or international law. Typically, the sensitivity or security of raid operations necessitates unilateral action, justified under the authority of the inherent right to self-defense. However, access, basing, or overflight requirements might require some allied or partner participation, cooperation, or notification.

Raids are typically necessitated by the inability or unwillingness of a foreign government to extend its authority over its territory. States within which raids are conducted may be any

69. John Partin, *Special operations forces in Operation Earnest Will/Prime Chance*, U.S. Special Operations Command, History and Research Office, 1998.

combination of friendly or unfriendly, capable or incapable, and willing or unwilling (with the exception of friendly, capable and willing, in which case they would presumably address the perceived problem themselves). Any of these situations may require the United States to take matters into its own hands.

Alternatively, raids might be needed in situations where a more traditional state presents a threat to the United States or its interests, and use methods or possesses military capabilities that can only be attacked in an effective, discriminating, and verifiable way by inserting U.S. forces on the ground. In all cases, raids will occur in complex threat environments where both the targets of the raid and threats to the raiding force range from organized criminal cartels and militias to sophisticated state militaries. By definition, raids occur in nonpermissive, violent environments.

Raid: Operation Barras (2000)

In August 2000, eleven British peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were taken prisoner by a rebel group, named the West Side Boys. Although five of the captured were released within a week in exchange for medical supplies, negotiations stalled and the rebels threatened to kill the remaining soldiers.⁷⁰ British leaders authorized a raid on the rebel base camp and quickly inserted forces. Supported by an attack helicopter and small reconnaissance element already positioned near the camp, one special forces team quickly secured the prisoners and another directly engaged the rebel stronghold. The captured soldiers were extracted immediately while the remaining force assaulted the enemy positions, capturing the rebels.⁷¹

Raids require rapid forced entry or entry under uncertain conditions where speed itself is a form of security. And because, from the outset, raids seek only to disrupt, destroy, eliminate, or seize a discrete target or target set, they are exclusively offensive combat actions. In all cases, U.S. forces achieve their objectives in the shortest possible time and then quickly withdraw, obviating the need for any appreciable level of security, stability, or security force assistance tasks.

There is an extremely high probability that circumstances calling for raids will emerge over the next decade. The strategic warning associated with raids will be extremely short to short, relying, in large measure, on the development of actionable intelligence and the establishment of the right foundational conditions. As is the case with a number of the other operational types, likely locations for future raids are almost too numerous to specify. However, there are multiple prominent potential candidates. In the greater Middle East, raids could be reasonably anticipated against extremists in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, the GCC states, Egypt, Libya, or Afghanistan over the next decade. In the same region, Iran and Pakistan are more complicated. Raids into Iran to capture or kill extremists, neutralize WMD facilities, disable dangerous military capabilities are well within the realm of the possible. A similar set of raid-related tasks might emerge in Pakistan, especially if security conditions in Pakistan deteriorate further. In Africa, Somalia remains a sanctuary for both extremists and criminal pirates; countering them with raids is a possibility. In the Asia-Pacific region, raids against North Korean nuclear facilities are clearly possible in the

70. Peter Padley, "Operation Barras," <http://www.hmforces.co.uk/training/articles/2111-operation-barras-sierra-leone---part-2>.

71. William Fowler, *Operation Barras: The SAS Rescue Mission, Sierra Leone 2000* (London: Cassell, 2005).

event of a loss of control or heightened tensions, and Indonesia and the Philippines could again harbor terrorist and criminal actors that are of great interest to the United States. Finally, in the Americas, if Mexican violence continues to increase unchecked and begins breaching U.S. borders, that too could become a candidate for future U.S. raids. This is true for a number of narcotics-producing or transporting states in the Americas and around the world.

Raid: Operation Neptune Spear (2011)

On May 2, 2011, U.S. Special Operations Forces flew 120 miles into Pakistan in order to raid the compound housing Osama bin Laden. After months of intelligence gathering and weeks of rehearsal, two modified Blackhawks carrying Navy SEALs descended into Abbottabad. A quick reaction force on Chinook helicopters waited nearby. As one SEAL element provided security around the building, the main group stormed inside, killing Bin Laden. Remaining on the ground for only 40 minutes, the team searched the house for documents and information and then departed with bin Laden's body and a trove of vital intelligence. Despite the loss of one helicopter, within four hours the team returned to their base in Jalalabad.⁷²

13. Counter-network Campaign

A counter-network campaign (CNC) is a decentralized effort comprised of multiple discrete military actions with the specific purpose of systematically disrupting or dismantling hostile non-state networks. Although these efforts have to date been focused principally on terrorist groups, their success, coupled with the increasing nexus between terrorist and various criminal networks, suggests that they may become more broadly utilized in the future. The intent of counter-network operations is to put adversaries under relentless pressure, employing low-visibility capture or kill methods using a variety of specialized instruments including special operations forces, covert U.S. agents, and manned and unmanned aerial surveillance and attack systems. U.S. ground forces employ these methods in order to identify and neutralize high value network targets, with the aim of persistently forcing enemy actors to suspend or halt their criminal or terrorist activities.

Counter-network campaigns may occur within a specific country, across a targeted region, or worldwide, depending on the scope of the targeted network. These operations are routinely conducted in unique civil-military partnership, marrying clandestine U.S. special operations capabilities and covert operators from the U.S. intelligence community. In the future, given the increasing influence and reach of international criminal networks, U.S. forces may expand upon current counter-drug efforts currently conducted alongside U.S. federal and foreign law enforcement agencies and target a broader range of foreign criminal enterprises whose activities pose unique hazards to U.S. national security (e.g., proliferation and weapons trafficking). The most obvious contemporary example of a counter-network campaign is the global effort since 9/11 against al Qaeda and its affiliates.

72. Nicholas Schmidle, "Getting Bin Laden," *New Yorker*, August 8, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/08/08/110808fa_fact_schmidle?currentPage=all.

The scale of individual actions within counter-network campaigns will be limited (e.g., raids by small special operations teams). The principal characteristic that distinguishes this operational type from raids, however, is its overall scope, which is much more significant. As a sustained campaign, these operations involve several hundred to several thousand direct action operators and support personnel, as well as intelligence and law enforcement specialists. The effort is underwritten by thousands – sometimes tens of thousands, of military and civilian assets involved in the collection and analysis of intelligence to support the campaign. Duration of a counter-network campaign will range from long to very long.

**Illustrative Counter-network Campaign:
Nuclear Proliferation Network, Southeast Asia (2015)**

As its economy tumbles further, North Korea increasingly resorts to black market activities to finance the regime. This includes narcotics and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, and deliberate export of sensitive nuclear and biological weapons technology and knowhow. At the same time, individuals within Pakistan's nuclear community seek to sell technology for significant financial benefit as well. The confluence of North Korean and Pakistani criminal interests leads to the emergence of a sophisticated and dangerous illicit network operating in Southeast and South Asia. U.S. intelligence determines that this powerful new criminal cartel is set to satisfy black market demands for a range of lethal capabilities. Given the clear proliferation threat, the United States develops a robust interagency and international plan to counter the cartel. The U.S. military's roles in this effort include extensive cyber operations, special operations forces raids, and drone strikes against cartel leadership and covert operating facilities throughout Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, and Pakistan.

Future counter-network campaigns are likely to be initiated unilaterally or with the limited participation of the United States' closest allies and usually under exclusive U.S. command and control. The authorities for the conduct of counter-network campaigns will derive from the inherent right of self-defense or redress of violations of U.S., foreign, or international law. Foreign and interagency partners will participate in counter-network campaigns, but their participation will be primarily in the supporting activities leading up to individual missions, with the conduct of those missions limited only to those absolutely essential to success. An exception in this regard is the U.S. clandestine service.

Counter-network campaigns are routinely necessitated because nations upon whose territory the networks are operating are either unable or unwilling to preclude such activities. Either way, the environments in which individual counter-network campaign operations occur vary substantially based on specific targets and their locations. Opponents will generally be organized and sophisticated terrorist, criminal, or insurgent actors. They may not pose the only threat, however. Within any given mission, getting to and departing from the target area may involve resistance from anything ranging from hostile populations and crowds to organized state military forces, some of whom could be well-equipped and sophisticated.

Some counter-network targets will reside in nations friendly to the United States, some will find refuge in hostile states, and still others will exploit un- or under-governed territory to find sanctuary. Regardless of the relationship between the host nation government and Washington,

the operating environment for individual counter-network actions will only be fully permissive for U.S. ground forces if they operate in cooperation with or with the approval of local security officials. This is expected to be the exception rather than the rule. Routinely, therefore, the operating environment is much more likely to range from uncertain and ambiguous to nonpermissive, hostile, and violent.

Counter-network campaigns are limited to support or conduct of offensive combat actions. Thus there are no associated security, stability, or security force assistance missions. Clearly all three of these latter tasks have utility in shaping whether the conditions that might necessitate a counter-network campaign may evolve or persist, but operations with those goals in mind are captured in other operational types (e.g., opposed stabilization, FID, or SFUF).

The probability of U.S. forces confronting circumstances appropriate to another counter-network campaign in addition to on-going operations against al Qaeda and its affiliates is high. Strategic warning of the demand for a future counter-network campaign will be long to very long. Potential theaters of operation include the greater Middle East (including North Africa and South Asia), Central and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeastern Europe and Caucuses, and the Americas.

14. Major Combat Campaign

Major combat campaigns (MCC) are large-scale military operations focused on the defeat of an enemy state's conventional and irregular military capabilities and methods. Major combat campaigns may pursue limited objectives like the restoration of some previous order, coercing an adversary to cease dangerous or threatening behaviors, or limiting an adversary's future options.⁷³ Aims can also be more expansive, to include overthrow of an adversary regime. Instances of the latter will likely combine significant combat, security, stability, and security force assistance operations over an extended period of time in order to secure a durable end to hostilities.⁷⁴

Whereas some of the operational types are defined by their desired outcomes (e.g., peacekeeping, foreign internal defense, sanctuary denial, etc), major combat campaigns are defined most by their character. Their size, methods, and the extent of objectives pursued can vary widely. The characteristic common to all, however, is that they involve extended high-intensity combat operations between the military forces of the United States and those of a competitor state (although irregular forces and/or methods could be employed as well). Much of the military action in a major combat campaign occurs according to the conventions of traditional warfighting. Operation Desert Storm (Kuwait/Iraq, 1991) is the clearest recent example of a more limited major campaign. Others include Operation Just Cause (Panama, 1989) and Operation Corporate, the British operation to recapture the Falkland Islands after their seizure by Argentina in 1982. Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn is the best contemporary example of the more comprehensive version of a major combat campaign.

73. See Department of Defense, "The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America," March 2005, p. 25, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nds/nds2005.pdf>. In the 2005 NDS, "swiftly defeat" operations were defined as missions with a "(C)ircumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary's behavior or policies [and] denying an adversary's strategic or operational objectives." The authors found this useful for scoping different MCCs.

74. Ibid. The 2005 NDS similarly defines "win decisive" campaigns as those where undertaken to "bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They may entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations."

Major Combat Campaign: Operation Corporate, Falkland Islands (1982)

In early April 1982, Argentina invaded and occupied the British territory of the Falkland islands. The United Kingdom hastily assembled an expeditionary force to retake them and reestablish British sovereignty. The United Kingdom deployed a naval task force, supporting air forces, and a substantial land force, as well as special operations forces, to regain control of the Islands. With the exception of the sinking of one Argentine warship, British Forces limited their combat operations to a 200 mile “total exclusion zone” they established around the Islands. Within months the United Kingdom successfully accomplished its objectives, returning the Islands to their previous status without further hostilities.⁷⁵

Major Combat Campaign: Operation Just Cause, Panama (1989)

Facing violent harassment of U.S. service members by an increasingly hostile Panamanian regime led by Manuel Noriega, the United States conducted a major assault to topple Noriega and ensure the security of the Panama Canal. On December 20, 1989, airborne landings targeted Panamanian military barracks and two airports while Navy SEALs destroyed Noriega’s private jet and military patrol boats. Other U.S. troops moved to secure urban centers and engaged remaining enemy personnel. Through swift and decisive movement, the 26,000-strong U.S. force ceased major combat within 72 hours, shifted to maintaining tight security around the Canal Zone and focused on capturing Noriega. After seeking refuge in the Vatican Embassy, Noriega surrendered to U.S. authorities on January 3, 1990.

Major Combat Campaign: Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991)

Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, provoking an international outcry and a subsequent coalition response by more than 20 countries. The United States rapidly deployed joint forces—including a large ground contingent—to demonstrate resolve and deter further Iraqi advances. In Operation Desert Shield, coalition forces initially arrayed themselves to defend Saudi Arabia. As international forces built-up sufficient military capabilities, they began preparations for offensive operations. The coalition undertook ground combat operations as part of Operation Desert Storm on February 23, 1991 to begin the liberation of Kuwait. The initial plan called for deep penetration into Iraq, with the intent of unhinging Iraqi forces from Kuwait rather than occupying Iraqi territory. Even after overrunning Iraqi forces and sending many fleeing north in disarray, the United States and its allies strictly limited their goals to the liberation of Kuwait, eschewing a forcible change of the Iraqi regime.⁷⁶

75. Duncan Anderson, *The Falklands War, 1982* (Oxford: Osprey, 2002).

76. Tom Clancy, with Fred Franks Jr., *Into the Storm: A Study in Command* (New York: Putnam, 1997).

As past examples illustrate, the scale of major combat campaigns is highly dependent on the size and capability of the military opponent and the demands of post-conflict stabilization. However, as a general rule most major combat campaigns could be handled by commitment of a single Army corps headquarters and five Army divisions, as well as a Marine MEF and its entire complement of ground maneuver, aviation, and support capabilities. Major combat campaigns could involve significantly smaller forces, again depending on the overall mission and the opponent's capabilities. Duration of the ground force commitment ranges from moderate (several weeks), through long (several months) to very long (one to several years).

Major combat campaigns in the future will be prosecuted under a variety of authorities. Indeed, "peace enforcement" operations (as described by UN Chapter VII) in which U.S. ground forces, with the consent and support of an international organization (e.g., UN, EU, NATO, etc) and international partners apply force against one or both sides of an active interstate conflict to forcibly end active hostilities can fall within this operational type.⁷⁷ While major combat campaigns will most often occur in a coalition or alliance context, allied contributions are likely to be small when compared to U.S. forces and the command and control arrangements will be dominated by U.S. leadership as well. In instances in which the United States comes to the aid of a foreign partner threatened by external aggression (e.g., South Korea), host nation military contributions might be more substantial and could be expected to endure throughout the operation.

Illustrative Major Combat Campaign: Sudan (2014)

Although the Sudanese North-South civil war ended in 2005 and South Sudan achieved independence in July 2011, the intervening decade has been marked by an uneasy peace. The still-disputed Abyei region continues to serve as a flash point for violence. Provocations by China in the South China Sea focus the world's attention on defusing tensions in Asia and, sensing an opportunity, North Sudan decides to annex Abyei with the rapid insertion of motorized columns. It continues its advance into South Sudan. North Sudanese aligned militias engage in indiscriminate violence in the south as well. With UN Security Council authorization, the United States launches strikes from an aircraft carrier in the Red Sea against advancing North Sudanese forces. The strikes succeed in dispersing North Sudanese forces, stopping their advance. An unsteady stalemate results, with North Sudanese forces still occupying parts of both Abyei and South Sudan. As part of a UN mission, the United States deploys a combined joint task force—with significant U.S. and coalition ground forces—to remove North Sudanese Forces from Abyei and South Sudan, stem cross-border raiding, and enforce a durable peace.

Though major combat campaigns are focused on adversary states and their militaries, enemy forces will likely employ an amalgam of irregular and traditional capabilities and methods focused on offsetting recognized U.S. strengths.⁷⁸ Opposing states' forces, some of which could be very advanced, might also be augmented by the efforts of a wide spectrum of adversaries; such groups

77. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07.3: *Joint Tactics, techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*, February 12, 1999, p. viii, [www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_3\(99\).pdf](http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_3(99).pdf).

78. Frank G. Hoffman, "Hybrid vs. Compound War: The Janus Choice: Defining Today's Multi-Faceted Conflict," *Armed Forces Journal* (October 2009), www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/.

may or may not share the hostile state's interests or aims. Nonetheless, their simultaneous resistance to U.S./partner efforts will have a synergistic effect, complicating military operations. They could include criminals and proxy irregulars, terrorists, and/or militias. Conditions will be nonpermissive and extremely violent after initiation of combat operations, and they will remain so for an extended period of time thereafter, stretching well into post-conflict stabilization. In some cases U.S. forces may enjoy permissive entry into theater, depending on the condition and disposition of regional partners.

If a major combat campaign is preceded by a show of force, initial combat action would be weighted heavily toward defensive combat operations until such time that U.S. forces could transition to the offensive. If, on the other hand, U.S. forces intervene after hostilities have already begun or, if the United States is initiating a preemptive campaign, combat operations will be offensive in nature from the outset. Under such circumstances, the United States would likely face an opposed entry into the theater of operations.

There is a low likelihood of circumstances emerging over the next decade that necessitate a major combat campaign. The strategic warning associated with major campaigns is generally long, as U.S. conventional superiority precludes most adversaries from openly challenging the United States in a conventional conflict. Potential theaters of operation for major combat campaigns include the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Levant, and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

Illustrative Major Combat Campaign: North Korea (2018)

In 2018, North Korea continues to field one of the largest armies in the world, retains extensive stockpiles of WMD, and maintains an aggressive stance towards South Korea. As the North Korean economy continues to contract, its population becomes increasingly beset by famine and, as a result, becomes restive. In an attempt to maintain national cohesion, the North Korean regime takes an increasingly belligerent stance towards its neighbor to the south, and begins to conduct frequent raids and strikes. Initially exercising restraint, the South Korean government eventually takes limited acts of retaliation following an increase in public pressure. These limited operations in turn provoke a full-scale invasion from the North. Although U.S. forces permanently stationed on the peninsula have been reduced in recent years, those remaining are immediately drawn into hostilities to shore-up the South's defenses, repel North Korean forces, and ensure positive control of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. The United States implements its warplans in accordance with its treaty commitments, racing to deploy additional forces to the Peninsula and embarking on the largest mobilization of its reserve components since the end of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.



APPENDIX B

KEY TASK DEFINITIONS

This appendix offers additional detail on the 19 key tasks introduced in Chapter 2.

1. Conduct distributed mission-oriented military operations.

Stunning advances in computing power and electronics have enabled previously unimagined levels of networking and decentralization of military operations, from individuals to large-scale formations. Sustained, diffuse operations over the past decade have established a U.S. force that is characterized by the most competent small units in its history. Unlike most of the rest of the world, this force is further distinguished in its ability to aggregate these units into large-scale military formations as needed, a flexibility that allows it to effectively conduct the full range of operational types outlined above.

In contingency operations, U.S. forces will need to engage in a variety of tasks simultaneously. The ability to conduct discrete small unit actions and sustained larger-scale operations at the field army, corps, MEF, division, and MEB levels provides U.S. ground forces with clear competitive advantages over adversaries and provides senior U.S. decisionmakers with a unique scalable capability with which to respond to a variety of contingency needs worldwide.

Going forward, U.S. ground forces will need to operate over great distances, often semi-autonomously, with sufficient freedom of action to exercise initiative, control tempo, and achieve the theater commander's overall intent with minimal oversight. Ideally, operations will involve foreign military forces as well as civilian agency representatives (who in some cases may be responsible for the overall direction of the effort). Successfully integrating U.S. ground forces with this range of potential partners will not only require adequate equipment to support effective command and control and interoperability, but also the requisite knowledge in ground force leaders essential to leverage each component part of the deployed force most effectively.

2. Exploit all-source intelligence, information, reconnaissance, and surveillance.

Ground force commanders' information requirements will transcend the bounds of classical military intelligence. Success in every operation will depend to some extent on the ability of ground forces to exploit all-source intelligence, information, reconnaissance, and surveillance. Many operations will be marked by ambiguity and limited information. Therefore, U.S. forces should be ready to either fight or probe for information through offensive action and gain knowledge by working within and among indigenous populations.¹ Leveraging the relative advantages of each component of the joint force (and other agencies) in the areas of intelligence collection, process-

1. See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The Army Operating Concept*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, August 19, 2010, p. 18, <http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf>. The Concept describes the idea of fighting for information this way: “[e]ffective reconnaissance requires the ability to fight

ing and analysis will become increasingly important. Thus, commanders will need to employ the full suite of intelligence- and information-gathering and analysis assets. Beyond traditional intelligence and reconnaissance tradecraft, this also involves drawing relevant information from the lowest levels in the field and calling on experts from outside the military and/or intelligence communities to help develop and continuously update a comprehensive picture of the relevant operating environment.²

3. Gain and exploit information advantages.

Expert employment of information keeps relevant populations informed, serves to advance the U.S. strategic and operational narrative, and can effectively undermine an inaccurate and harmful adversary information campaign. Thus, gaining and exploiting information advantages, early and continuously is essential to the success across all operational types. In some ways, reality is less important than perceptions of that reality, and the proliferation of cheap communications equipment has democratized the ability to shape perceptions worldwide. Thus, successfully performing this task is a function of equipment, but as importantly, professional development and individual mastery in the use of information.

4. Defend networks, conduct operations in a degraded information environment, and exploit advantages in the electromagnetic spectrum.

The cyber domain, to include the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) more broadly, is an increasingly critical operating environment for U.S. forces. Technical advances have enhanced U.S. offensive possibilities, but as or more importantly have created vulnerabilities that adversaries can exploit. Therefore, future ground force operations will all require equipment and know-how that enable the effective defense of networks, the continuation of operations in degraded information environments, and the creation and exploitation of advantages in the cyber domain.

Many U.S. opponents will try to disrupt access to information and complicate U.S. command and control. The main avenue to achieving both objectives is successfully attacking U.S. networks. Therefore, U.S. ground forces will need to shield networks from attack and disruption. Failing that they will need to be prepared to fight through enemy or natural cyber/EMS disruption and conduct operations effectively when information systems are disrupted, damaged, or destroyed.

U.S. ground force commanders will also need to master exploitation of the EMS/cyber domain to their offensive advantage as well, whether conducting enabling operations and humanitarian assistance or much more intense major combat actions. As all opponents—state and non-state—increasingly rely on cyberspace, U.S. forces need to master and manipulate the cyber environment to degrade and/or exploit an opponent's cyber capabilities. Beyond cyber operations, commanders will need to understand and anticipate the wider EMS spectrum's offensive and defensive implications as well.

5. Project forces over strategic and operational distances.

Increasingly, U.S. forces rotationally or permanently positioned in key regions are insufficient in both numbers and material capabilities to fight or operate effectively without significant reinforce-

for information in close contact with populations and enemies, constant vigilance, and available reserves to reinforce units once they gain contact with the enemy.”

2. Ibid., p. 15.

ment from outside of the theater. In addition, growing global “inter-connectedness”—economic, social, and political—implies a similar expansion in the complexity of potential U.S. interests. These two realities indicate that the United States will risk success in foreign contingencies if it is unable to project ground forces into distant theaters either from forward stations or from the United States.³ Power projection requires rapid movement of sea-based forces ashore from littoral areas, and/or insertion of land-based forces wherever required from distant staging bases.

Speed will be required in many instances. And, a speedy response relies on timely power projection. This will require that U.S. forces increase their capability to deploy from afar—often from the continental United States—directly into operational theaters to conduct high-tempo ground operations immediately upon arrival with minimal requirement to stage and reconfigure. As discussed here, power projection includes the ability to establish adequate theater support architecture, large-scale deployment of general purpose ground forces, and the lower visibility insertion or infiltration of more specialized ground forces like SOF.

Power projection is enabled by four elements: forward deployed forces (permanently stationed or rotational), pre-positioned stocks (ashore or afloat), strategic lift (both air and sea) and modularity. Forward deployed forces provide U.S. presence and immediate response capability, pre-positioned stocks enhance the quality and size of early deploying U.S. ground forces, strategic lift is critical to rapidly projecting and sustaining ground forces over significant distances as they conduct a variety of expeditionary missions, and finally, modularity ensures the efficient employment of the right forces for the right contingencies. Further, the ability to project forces is predicated on successfully opening the theater, setting the conditions for follow-on forces to arrive, receiving those forces, and, finally, securing their onward movement.

6. Conduct deliberate theater entry and opening.

The concept of theater entry introduced above is likely to occur under a variety of circumstances—permissive, nonpermissive, or uncertain. In operations where permissive circumstances are expected, United States forces would conduct deliberate theater entry and opening. Deliberate entry implies arriving in a foreign operational areas and conducting reception, staging, and onward movement without an immediate threat from enemy action.

7. Conduct forcible entry and theater opening.

In hostile environments where entry will be opposed, forces will have to overcome anti-access and area denial threats as they arrive and deploy. These may be advanced, highly sophisticated military capabilities directed specifically at denying entry, less sophisticated adversary capabilities and forces that are present and prone to challenge entry, or some combination of the two. This task relies on the same set of capabilities that support deliberate theater entry and opening, but also requires capabilities that enable U.S. forces to seize a lodgment in the face of certain resistance via amphibious, airborne, or helicopter assault and expand the lodgment to enable the arrival and employment of follow-on forces.⁴

Forcible entry could focus on one location or could involve multiple simultaneous, geographi-

3. Ibid., p. 46. This task is derived from a list of “Refined Army Capstone Concept Required Capabilities.” The original Army capability is described as the ability to “project forces to positions of advantage.”

4. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-18: Joint Forcible Entry Operations*, June 16, 2008, pp. I-4, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_18.pdf.

cally dispersed and mutually supportive offensive actions and it could face opposition in a single area or theater-wide. Thus the set of capabilities to support this task are varied in both scale and content—they could range from conventional combat capabilities to specialized irregular warfare needs. Forcible entry could take place in almost any physical environment, which places additional demands on equipment in terms of its ability to withstand heat, moisture, air density and other key factors that affect its effectiveness.

8. Conduct entry under uncertain or ambiguous conditions.

Unfortunately, in a majority of operational types U.S. forces will conduct entry under uncertain or ambiguous security conditions. While there is a temptation to minimize risk by assuming fully hostile conditions all the time, realistically this may be undesirable or impractical. From a capability perspective, successful execution of this task could involve most of the same capabilities as forcible entry, but could also require tools that allow for greater discrimination and/or that project forces with a much lower profile.

9. Employ combined arms forces in combat.

As mentioned above, all future operations will involve one or more of four unique key tasks—the conduct of combat, security, or stability operations, or security force assistance. Often one or two of these functions provides specific military operations with their overall “theme.” Employing combined arms forces in combat involves all offensive and defensive actions in an active theater of conflict that are specifically focused on defeating armed opponents and securing U.S. and/or partner forces against enemy action.⁵ In addition to standard offensive and defensive operations against conventional, hybrid, and unconventional opponents, combat operations also includes routine force protection and defeating adversary indirect fire, missile, and air attacks.⁶

Successfully conducting combat operations includes the capacity for effective maneuver as well. The capacity to securely maneuver and reposition forces rapidly in response to operational needs is essential. This aspect of the task requires the capacity to leverage air (both fixed and rotary wing), sea, and protected land transport assets to rapidly shift to the point of greatest need within a theater of operation. While described here under the rubric of combat operations, the requirement for protected maneuver applies to security, stability, and security force assistance operations as well (see below).

10. Employ combined arms forces in security operations.

Employing combined arms forces in security operations involves the deliberate use of U.S. ground forces to protect and control critical infrastructure, vital territory, and/or vulnerable populations from threat of seizure, destruction, or harm.⁷ As discussed above, it does not incorporate the concept of force protection, which is an element of combat operations.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, V3.0*, pp. 15–16.

6. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, *The Army Operating Concept*, pp. 47–48. Defeat indirect fire, missile and air attack was inspired by the discussion of “protection.”

7. See *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), V3.0*, p. 16. Security here includes but is not limited to the activities described under the category of the same name in the CCJO.

11. Conduct stability operations.

Some operations will require forces to conduct stability operations. Stability operations involve providing for the emergency restoration and temporary delivery of essential services and basic public goods as a result of catastrophe or conflict.⁸ Stability operations are undertaken—often in conjunction with host nation civil authorities and other U.S. government agencies to ameliorate adverse conditions in one or more of five “stability sectors”—security, justice and reconciliation; humanitarian assistance and social well-being; governance and political participation; and economic stabilization and infrastructure.⁹

12. Improve capability, capacity, and performance of foreign security and paramilitary forces.

Successful completion of some foreign contingency missions will involve efforts to improve the capability, capacity, and performance of foreign security and paramilitary forces; also referred to as security force assistance or SFA. The ability to improve the quality of foreign security and paramilitary forces or build new foreign security capabilities from whole cloth may relieve U.S. forces of some future contingency demands. It may also speed the departure of U.S. forces from a foreign theater. This task encompasses both improving the capability, capacity, and performance of a foreign partner’s military and paramilitary forces and performing similar functions in support of foreign irregulars threatened by or at war with an adversary of the United States.

13. Conduct operations in permissive environments.

Much like the different conditions encountered by U.S. ground forces affecting entry to a foreign theater, future military operations will occur under a variety of operational conditions once those forces are in place as well. These environments will range from permissive, benign, and non-violent to nonpermissive, hostile, and extremely violent. The various operating conditions require adjustments in how U.S. ground forces apply different capabilities and methods.

In most humanitarian assistance and enabling operations, U.S. forces can expect to conduct operations in permissive environments. In reality, some military operations occur entirely in benign environments where there are no anticipated threats (beyond minor harassments) to deployed U.S. forces. This does not relieve commanders of the responsibility for prudence, but it suggests that force size can be smaller, equipment less robust and/or protected, and training less advanced, for example, than would be the case under more violent conditions.

14. Conduct operations entirely in contested or denied territory.

Opportunities to deploy under the more favorable conditions described above, however, may be diminishing. The nature of contemporary threats—increasingly irregular and/or hybrid—and the growing challenge of un-, under- and irresponsibly-governed territory suggest that future military operations will increasingly occur ‘in the round’ with no discernable rear area that can be presumed safe from hostile action. Therefore, in most future operations U.S. ground forces must be

8. U.S. Department of Defense, *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, “Stability Operations”; and U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*, October 2008, <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

9. U.S. Army, *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*, October 2008, pp. 2–5.

capable of conducting operations entirely in contested or denied territory. Under these conditions, the potential for violence is geographically unbounded and populations can shift between indifferent, uncooperative, and openly hostile.

15. Conduct operations under uncertain security conditions.

With respect to operating conditions, realistically the most dominant set of circumstances will be those in which conditions are neither completely benign nor obviously hostile. As in the case of entry, in a great number of the operational types, U.S. ground forces will conduct operations under uncertain security conditions, where the need to transition to a more aggressive posture can emerge with very little warning. An example of such “permissive but tense” circumstances might be those where a fragile peace is constantly under pressure or where local populations or forces are hostile to U.S. presence but also consider themselves unprepared to engage U.S. ground forces in a direct confrontation. Under these circumstances U.S. forces need to have all the mechanisms in place appropriate to operating in nonpermissive, denied, or contested territory while demonstrating restraint in employing them so as to avoid unnecessarily pushing potential opponents in unfavorable directions.

16. Conduct an opposed egress or egress under uncertain security conditions.

The spread of the capacity to do harm, previously the province of state actors but now in the hands of small groups or even “super-empowered individuals,”¹⁰ suggests that U.S. forces can no longer assume that the adversaries that might have precipitated a given operation and/or been the focus of a given engagement will remain the only threat. Even if they do, adversaries may increasingly engage in deception, eschewing steps to contest U.S. presence initially, then attacking as they attempt to leave. Thus, U.S. forces cannot assume that lack or elimination of opposition in an operation implies that these conditions will endure through departure. Indeed, most operational types involve at least some chance that opportunists or more organized foes might attempt to strike U.S. forces as they withdraw. Forces must therefore possess some level of capability to conduct an opposed egress or egress under uncertain security conditions.

17. and 18. Operate against and recover from a large-scale biological hazard and operate against and recover from a large-scale chemical or nuclear hazard.

The trends underpinning enhancements to the capability of smaller groups and individuals also contribute to the growing potential for biological, chemical, and nuclear attack. Further, recent experiences with avian flu, salmonella and the Japanese earthquake and subsequent reactor damage illustrate that biological, nuclear, and even chemical hazards can emanate from purely natural or accidental causes as well. This report considers biological threats and nuclear and chemical threats separately. However, they share some key response characteristics that will be highlighted below. While the resources required to develop the capability for a large-scale chemical or nuclear attack remain the primary province of states, the bar is much lower for biological weapons, and multiple potential adversaries, both state and non-state, have enough money to buy, if not autonomously develop, a biological weapons capability.

10. Adam Elkus and Crispin Burke, “WikiLeaks, Media, and Policy: A Question of Super Empowerment,” *Small Wars Journal*, September 29 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/558-elkus.pdf>.

While the need to conduct operations in environments contaminated by biological, nuclear, or chemical hazards is relatively unlikely in the aggregate, it could arise in the vast majority of potential operational types. Thus, ground forces must have the capability to first operate against and recover from large-scale biological hazards, as they can be very difficult to detect and contain. Second, ground forces must also be able to operate against and recover from wide-spread chemical or nuclear hazards. This requires that U.S. forces maintain the ability to sense, warn of, defend against, and recover from any of these hazards without losing the ability to continue performing their assigned military missions.¹¹

In all cases, beyond a need for the capabilities essential to functioning effectively in contaminated environments, these two tasks may also involve the establishment and/or enforcement of large cantonment areas and quarantines, facilitating the provision of large-scale medical and/or engineering support, and the capacity to render nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons safe under a variety of exigent circumstances.

19. Sustain distributed military operations for extended periods under austere conditions.

Finally, as an extension of power projection and in order for U.S. ground forces to succeed in a variety of contingency operations, most of the operational types involve sustaining large, geographically dispersed military operations with significant logistical support. Capabilities to sustain distributed military operations for extended periods under austere conditions will be crucial in many situations, though how it is provided could vary substantially, from unimproved bases on the ground to groups of ships at sea to relatively developed commercial facilities close to the areas of major activities. This task includes providing security for logistical activities as well, which could be a significant draw on manpower and some equipment. This task aligns closely with enabling operations (which are dominated by activities for this purpose), but capabilities to sustain logistical support over time and vast areas are likely to be crucial in multiple other future operations as well.

11. U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command, *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*, pp. 47–48. The “sense, warn, defend against, and recover from” construct was in part derived from the discussion of “protection” located in the Army Operating Concept.

APPENDIX C

THE SUPPLY OF FUTURE GROUND FORCE CAPABILITIES

The U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and special operations forces provide the vast majority of U.S. ground force capabilities. The U.S. Army is the United States' largest ground force. Its principal contribution to joint contingencies is large-scale, sustained ground operations across the range of military activities and spectrum of threats. The United States Marine Corps is smaller than the U.S. Army. It too operates across the range of military operations. The Marine Corps provides U.S. decisionmakers with a responsive and scalable ground-air capability for smaller contingency events, early entry and theater opening, and, with significant support from joint enablers and theater support architecture—typically provided by the Army, sustained ground operations as part of a bigger joint military action. U.S. special operations forces (SOF) are by definition joint capabilities. SOF forces are drawn from the four services. However, the vast majority are still provided by the Army. SOF provides U.S. decisionmakers with specialized, low-visibility capabilities for missions ranging from foreign internal defense to strategic reconnaissance and lethal direct action.

Many partner and allied nations maintain significant ground force capabilities as well, and have made substantial contributions to past coalition ground operations. However, like the United States, most of them are also entering a period of significant defense austerity. Finally, there has been an increasing recognition of the critical role various civilian agencies play in operations, though these capabilities too are vulnerable to significant near-term reductions. Together, these elements represent a reasonable approximation of the aggregate supply of ground force capabilities that U.S. decisionmakers might expect to be able to leverage today and over the next decade. What follows is a more detailed survey of aggregate ground force supply.

U.S. Army

As of today, there are 1.1 million soldiers in the U.S. Army, comprising approximately 570,000 active duty members, 362,000 in the Army National Guard, and 205,000 in the Army Reserve.¹ Although historically the Army has traditionally characterized itself in terms of corps or divisions, more recently it has begun to describe its combat capability in terms of Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). These BCTs, roughly 3,600 soldiers depending on type, represent the main ground combat unit of the Army, with the bulk of the remaining forces organized into brigade or smaller units that provide various types of supporting functions (such as aviation support, transportation, and sustainment). Currently, the U.S. Army has 24 Heavy BCTs, 40 Light BCTs (includes light infantry, airborne, and air assault), and 9 Stryker BCTs.² In short, the Army constitutes a blend of light, me-

1. This includes “temporary” endstrength increases first authorized by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in 2009.

2. The latter BCT type is based around the wheeled, light armored Stryker Combat Vehicle.

dium and heavy capabilities. The cyclical Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process is used to provide force packages that are tailored to specific missions.³

Based on its current size and expected demands from commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army's goal is to be able to provide one corps headquarters (about 800 soldiers), five division headquarters (c. 760 soldiers), 20 BCTs, and about 90,000 soldiers providing "enabling" functions on a sustained basis. By 2015 and beyond (when operational demands have presumably declined), the Army is considering plans to provide one corps headquarters, four division headquarters, 15 BCTs, and about 72,000 enablers to support both routine and contingency needs activities. An additional 10 BCTs and 41,000 enablers are available for surge contingency demands.⁴ With increasing reductions in forward deployed forces, the Army relies on strategic air and sealift to deploy its forces to distant theaters.

In addition to providing for its own forces during military operations, the Army is charged with maintaining the capability to provide ground logistics support for the other military services as well. While the Air Force and Navy provide the bulk of the strategic lift to move equipment, supplies and people to an operational theater, most of the follow-on distribution of goods or people once they have arrived in foreign theaters falls to the Army. The Army is further charged with establishing and maintaining theater-level infrastructure (bases, communications and transportation networks, etc.) for the joint force during operations as well.⁵ The Army has additional tasks on behalf of the joint force that include managing force-wide chemical and biological defense programs and support to United Nations missions.⁶

As of this writing, the Defense Department plans for the Army to eliminate the 22,000 "temporary" soldiers authorized to support ongoing operations by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. In FYs 2015-16, depending on operational demands in Afghanistan, the Army has been directed to cut an additional 27,000 soldiers, bringing active duty endstrength to 520,400 by October 2016. The Army has not yet identified how it plans to implement those reductions, though they may have some impact on the numbers of units available for sustained operations. Recent press reports indicate, for example, that the Department of Defense (DoD) may be considering eliminating a large number of active duty BCTs, though the size and fighting capability of the remaining BCTs might be enhanced.⁷

During the course of our workshops and interviews, there was a broad consensus that Army endstrength and force structure will be reduced beyond currently projected levels, but by how much is unclear. Defense leaders will have to determine the overall size of further reductions, how they will be distributed between Active, Guard and Reserve forces, and whether reductions will be

3. U.S. Army, Headquarters, *2010 Army Posture Statement, Addendum F, "Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) The Army's Core Process,"* February 19, 2010, [https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_army-posturestatement/2010/addenda/Addendum_F-Army%20Force%20Generation%20\(ARFORGEN\).asp](https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_army-posturestatement/2010/addenda/Addendum_F-Army%20Force%20Generation%20(ARFORGEN).asp).

4. John Bonin, "Modular Army and Doctrine Overview," presentation at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2011.

5. U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive Number 5100.0: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, December 21, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf>.

6. U.S. Department of Defense, *Directive 5160.05E: Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program (CBDP)*. October 2010, <http://www.oaa.army.mil/FetchFile.ashx?DocID=276>.

7. "BCT cuts eyed," *Inside the Pentagon*, September 1, 2011, p. 7. This media source indicated that BCT reductions could be as high as 15.

focused on reducing the numbers of personnel within existing units, eliminating units, or some combination of both.

U.S. Marine Corps

The past decade in particular has illustrated that the Marine Corps provides substantial ground force capabilities to major combat operations, in addition to its more traditional forward deployed crisis response and engagement roles.⁸ In the context of joint operations, the Marine Corps is optimized to provide rapid response to any potential contingency, filling the gaps between the tradeoff of force size and speed of response that exists for the other military services. When employed in the field, Marine Corps forces are task-organized as a Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF).

MAGTFs vary in size and capability, based on mission, and consist of four core elements—command, ground combat, aviation, and logistics. MAGTFs range (largest to smallest) from Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), the principal warfighting organization, to Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), and Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTFs), the latter being tailored with specific capabilities for a unique mission like security force assistance. The Marine Corps leverages various combinations of amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioning and inter-theater airlift to conduct its core expeditionary missions.

At present there are 202,100 active duty and 39,600 Reserve Marines. Collectively Marine end-strength supports the provision of eight infantry regimental headquarters, 27 infantry battalions, eleven artillery battalions, 10 armor companies, and a number of aviation squadrons and combat logistics entities. This, however, is expected to change. The Corps recently concluded a major review of its force structure, the main outcome of which was to continue positioning the Corps as a “middleweight force—light enough to get there quickly, yet heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival.”⁹ The force is designed to provide timely crisis response for all types of operations, as well as support one major combat campaign. Because the Marine Corps is optimized for short-notice, small to medium sized operations, occurring largely in littoral regions, it does not have all the capability or capacity necessary for large-scale sustained operations ashore.¹⁰ Thus, operations that require larger commitments and/or longer duration will likely include a combination of Army and Marine ground capabilities. And, Marine forces, in particular, may require augmentation from the Marine Corps Reserve, the U.S. Army, and/or multinational partners.

In keeping with its purpose—the refinement of organization, posture and capabilities in a Post-OEF security environment—the 2011 review recommended a reduction in active duty endstrength to 186,800 (beginning in FY2015). This reduction includes the elimination of 12 General Officer and Colonel Commands, to include the elimination of one infantry regimental headquarters, three infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, and two armor companies. The Marine Corps also plans to eliminate the Marine Wing Support Group headquarters within their three Marine Aircraft Wings, and they will reorganize their logistics groups. Some of these cuts will support additional investments in key areas such as special operations and cyber capabilities.

8. The Corps also conducts amphibious operations (not all of which would be considered here) and provides a global crisis response capability.

9. U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters, *Reshaping America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness*, Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, March 14, 2011.

10. In this report, the scale of operations are described as very small (up to a battalion), small (smaller than a brigade/MEU), Medium (brigade/MEU to division), and large (bigger than a division).

As with the Army, the Marine Corps plans to eliminate the temporary increases in endstrength associated with the Iraq and Afghan wars by the end of FY2013, and are also feeling intense pressure to reduce endstrength below the desired 186,800 level.¹¹

U.S. Special Operations Forces

In addition to the so-called general purpose forces in the Army and Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces (SOF) from all of the services provide additional ground force capabilities. Collectively, there are approximately 60,000 SOF personnel from all components (Active, National Guard and Reserve), from each of the four services.

Army SOF includes approximately 21,600 active and 6,900 National Guard and Reserve personnel.¹² They are organized into seven Special Forces Groups (5 active, 2 National Guard); the 75th Ranger Regiment, comprised of over 3000 soldiers in three battalions; the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade of over 900 soldiers; the 4th Military Information Support Group; and the 528th Sustainment Brigade, which provides logistics, maintenance, medical and communications support to SOF units.¹³ In addition, the Army provides much of the Joint SOF community's rotary wing aviation requirements with the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The Marine Corps also has a substantial and growing special operations capability. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is authorized approximately 2,600 personnel under three organizations; the Marine Special Operations Regiment, Support Group and School. The Marine Special Operations Regiment contains the primary ground combat force and has three subordinate battalions. The Support Group contains combat support Marines in specialties such as joint terminal air control, intelligence, multi-purpose canines, and explosive ordnance disposal. The Marine Corps' recent review group recommended 1,000 additional MARSOC personnel to enhance its enabling capabilities, bringing MARSOC end strength to over 3,800 by FY2017.¹⁴

Navy SOF falls under Navy Special Warfare Command, which is authorized over 8,800 personnel organized into four Naval Special Warfare Groups (NSWGs). Each NSWG consists of 10 Sea Air and Land or SEAL Teams, three Special Boat Teams, and two SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams.¹⁵ SEAL Teams have six assigned platoons of 18 SEALs each, for a total of sixty SEAL platoons.¹⁶ Although they conduct a number of naval-focused missions, SEALs are also responsible for many land-based actions, to include special reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional warfare, combating terrorism, foreign internal defense, information warfare, security assistance,

11. Gina Cavallaro and Dan Lamothe, "A Smaller Corps Sooner?" *Marine Corps Times*, August 22, 2011, p. 16.

12. U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *Deputy Chief of Staff G1 Smart Book*, June 20, 2011.

13. Association of the United States Army, Torch Bearer National Security Report, *U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint Force*, March 2010, http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/TB_SpecialOperationsForces.pdf.

14. U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command, "Information Paper, Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)." Briefed to General Officer Symposium, May 16, 2011 (Provided by Gary Oles, MARSOC Dep G3 on August 15, 2011).

15. U.S. Special Operations Command, "Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command," February 2011, p. 21.

16. Andrew Feickert and Thomas K. Livingston, *US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2011), p. 4.

counterdrug operations, and personnel recovery. Air Force SOF are least focused ground-based operations, though they do provide transportation, search and rescue, medical, weather, and logistics and intelligence support to joint SOF.¹⁷

Unlike the general purpose forces, SOF is projected to continue expanding. At present, USSOCOM projects annual growth of approximately three to five percent for the next five years.¹⁸ As the Services reduce their overall size, however, this may affect continued SOF expansion.¹⁹ This may ultimately result in less robust SOF growth than is currently envisioned.

Coalition Forces

Throughout its history, the U.S. military has acted in concert with allies, both formal and informal, for both practical and political reasons. While every Administration reserves the right to take unilateral action, each also affirms the value of involving multiple nations' forces whenever possible in military operations. Since World War II, the United States' most frequent and substantial allies have included fellow NATO countries, particularly the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Canada. While the United States recognizes the growing dispersion of power and the rise of important regional players like Australia, Brazil and South Africa, over the next 10 years it seems likely that the aforementioned four nations will remain among the first from whom the White House would seek military contributions, irrespective of the nature of the operation or its location.²⁰ These calls will no doubt be augmented with outreach to rising regional powers, both out of desire but also increasingly out of necessity. At least in the immediate future, however, appeals to regional powers will more likely be on a case-by-case basis and be focused on potential operations within the partners' immediate neighborhoods.

The reliance on NATO allies, particularly those of Western Europe and Canada, is not solely due to shared history and common interests. It is also because they bring substantial capabilities to bear. From a ground force perspective, the United States has by far the largest inventory of modern main battle tanks (6,242, compared to China's 2,450 and Russia's 1,300). But the United Kingdom and France are fifth and sixth globally, with 325 and 254 tanks, respectively. They are similarly fifth and sixth in the world when it comes to modern infantry fighting vehicles—the United Kingdom has 526 and France 232 (compared to the United States' 6,452).²¹ Further, the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany were four of the top eight defense budgets globally in 2010.²² And the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Canada, together with Italy, offered the largest troop commitments after the United States to operations in Afghanistan in 2010-2011.²³

17. U.S. Air Force, Special Operations Command, *Factsheets 720th Special Tactics Group*, January 25, 2007, <http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6856>.

18. Admiral Eric Olson, "Posture Statement, U.S. Special Operations Command," Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2011, <http://www.socom.mil/Documents/2011%20SOCOM%20Posture%20Statement.pdf>.

19. Andrew Feickert, *U.S. Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2011), p. 20, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf>.

20. The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), p. ii.

21. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), "Aggregate Combat Power: Manoeuvre," in *The Military Balance 2011* (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 34.

22. IISS, "Global Top Ten Defence Budgets," in *The Military Balance 2011*, p. 469.

23. IISS, "Non-UN Deployments 2010-2011," in *The Military Balance 2011*, p. 460.

While no ally can ever be taken for granted, these four nations have repeatedly shown a willingness to deploy their professional forces in support of global operations. However, the political will to train, equip, deploy, and employ these forces on foreign contingency operations may come into question as European nations face increasing budgetary constraints and associated political pressures. Most are reducing their militaries as a result of austerity measures.

Thus, while the United States is likely to continue to seek contributions from these countries over the next decade, the ability of the Europeans both to maintain sufficient military readiness and support United States calls for ground force contributions are likely to grow increasingly suspect. Pressure for them to participate in some form or fashion will remain intense, but the nature and extent of that participation will likely differ from past experiences. An exception, in this regard, may be allied SOF, who vary in capability but have shown a strong willingness to participate in recent operations. Given the priority that U.S. policymakers place on coalition participation, such changes are important to consider as a factor in decisions about U.S. force size and shape going forward.

Canada

Canada is one exception among traditional U.S. allies in that it is increasing its defense investments, suggesting that it may be better able to continue active participation in various global military operations. Canada's ground forces consist of approximately 40,500 Regular Army forces and 15,500 Reserves. Canada has 1,500 SOF forces as well. The Regular Forces are organized into three brigade groups while the reserves are composed of 12 to 15 battalion groups.²⁴ They have been repeatedly engaged in multiple U.N. and NATO operations, from the Balkans to Egypt to Afghanistan and elsewhere. In part driven by their experiences in Afghanistan, the Canadian government is continuing to move forward with an ambitious defense program.²⁵ For example, despite slow-downs in planned increases to defense spending, the Canadian Army is moving ahead with the purchase of 138 Close Combat Vehicles and the expansion of its force by 3,000 soldiers.²⁶

As outlined in *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations* and validated in the 2008 Canada First Defense Strategy, the Canadian Army has developed a broad plan for modernization. The main thrust of the changes is to enhance Canada's ability to operate more broadly across the spectrum of conflict and to improve its capability to operate effectively in more hostile environments. The three-stage plan includes upgrade to and replacement of existing equipment, but also development of new force employment concepts based not only on enhancing homeland defense capabilities but conducting operations in both permissive and nonpermissive theaters. Some of these missions are explicitly expected to be in support of coalition operations.

Canada's previously announced plans to implement an ambitious overall defense modernization program have been slowed somewhat by budget reductions. At present, however, the Canadian government plans to continue forging ahead but on a slightly longer timeline. Further, budget reductions are likely to have a more significant effect on future plans for the Canadian Air Force and Navy, which are realized further in the future than many of the Army investments.²⁷

24. Jane's World Armies, *Canada*, July 12, 2011; and IISS, "Canada," in *The Military Balance 2011*, p. 55.

25. Jane's Defence Weekly, *Annual Defense Report 2010—The Americas*.

26. Jane's World Armies, *Canada*, July 12, 2011.

27. Discussions with CSIS study team, July 2011.

Regional Powers' Ground Force Contributions

As the capabilities of many traditional allies shrink, the United States may increasingly rely on states who may have limited desire or ability to project forces globally but can make substantial contributions to contingencies within their own neighborhoods (to include leading them). Indeed, many regional powers are expanding their ground force capabilities while the United States' traditional global partners are cutting back. Two key examples with whom the United States may operate more routinely in the future are Australia and Brazil.

Australia: Australia is a staunch U.S. ally but is increasingly focused on its ability to project power in its "primary operational environment" of surrounding ocean and islands. Toward that end, Australia is making major investments across its defense portfolio, to include the construction of two amphibious ships.²⁸ Committed to a three percent annual growth rate in real defense funding through 2018, recent investments also include a new fleet of armored vehicles. With a current force structure of 30,000 active and 16,000 reserves, the Army is projected to grow slightly in order to establish two additional battalions by 2015.²⁹ Three combat brigades compose the ADF, whose goal is to sustain two simultaneous and separate operations, one at the brigade and the other at the battalion level.³⁰

Brazil: As its economy grows, Brazil seeks to transform its military and defense policies to match its expanding clout in the region. Outlined first in its 2008 National Defense Strategy, Brazil has committed to major re-posturing and upgrades for its armed forces. This includes efforts to reposition its ground forces closer to the Amazon River, better train its soldiers for asymmetrical warfare, and invest heavily in new weapons systems. In addition to major plans to modernize its naval and air forces, Brazil has standardized its tank fleet and ordered 2,000 new Armored Personnel Carriers. Brazil also seeks to expand its force from 27 to 35 brigades, in order to establish a force of 240,000 soldiers. Brazil continues to provide significant contributions to peacekeeping operations as well.³¹

28. Other acquisitions include a fleet of twelve new submarines for the Navy and 100 F-35 Lightning II combat aircraft for the Air Force. See Government of Australia, *Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*, 2009, pp. 50–51, 70, 77, 78.

29. Jane's World Armies, Australia, August 12, 2011.

30. U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Australia," August 10, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm>; and John E. Angevine, "Australia's Dangerous Luxurious Defense Hedge," Brookings Institution, June 1, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0601_defense_angevine.aspx.

31. Jane's World Armies, "Brazil," www.janes.com; and "Brazil's Military," *The Economist*, September 9, 2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2010/09/brazils_military.

France

France's 2008 White Paper on defense outlined a significant reduction in forces over the following six to seven years.³² The White Paper reflected a shift in strategic focus from southern Africa to the Middle East, as well as a renewed commitment to homeland defense and security.³³ It also initiated a move to further professionalize the military, make it more responsive, and better prepare it for overseas operations.³⁴

Overall, French ground forces are becoming “lighter”—infantry units remain unchanged, but 33 armor and support units are being eliminated (with some “savings” being reinvested into enhanced intelligence and WMD-related capabilities).³⁵ By 2014, France expects to have an Army of 101,000 organized into eight combined arms brigades of approximately 5,000 soldiers and four specialized brigades (including one amphibious brigade). This force is intended to be able to provide command and control for a limited conventional campaign, to conduct theater entry operations, and to sustain a long-term operational commitment of up to eight battalion task forces totaling 10,000 soldiers. It is also intended to surge larger forces when needed. Whether France will be able to meet these goals, however, is under some question, particularly as the Army faces the possibility of further cuts.³⁶

Germany

Like its European neighbors, Germany's military is undergoing a significant transformation. Currently, the armed forces are organized into an Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Support Service, and Joint Medical Service. The German Army numbers just over 105,000 active and 15,000 Reserves, with another 57,000 active and almost 13,000 Reserves in the Joint Support Service.³⁷ The Army has 12 brigades, including one Special Forces brigade and four stabilization brigades.³⁸ German leaders recently announced that the overall size of the force will be reduced to between 175,000 and 185,000, though how those cuts will be allocated across the services has not yet been determined.³⁹

The bulk of these reductions are expected to be achieved through the elimination of conscription, which was approved in late 2010. While a professional force should in theory enhance its effectiveness, there is some question about whether it will be able to attract sufficient recruits to meet planned force levels. Based on the current and expected population of military-eligible Germans, approximately 10 percent will have to apply for service, and close to four percent will

32. Government of France, *The French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Paris: Government of France, 2008).

33. In 2010, France opened a military base in Abu Dhabi, the first base to be opened in the Middle East by a Western country other than the United States. Paul Belkin, *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2011).

34. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: France,” May 27, 2011, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm.

35. J.A.C. Lewis, “French Defence Spending to Fall in Effort to Reduce National Deficit,” *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 1, 2010.

36. Jane's World Armies, *France*, March 3, 2011.

37. IISS, “Germany,” in *The Military Balance 2011*, p. 111.

38. “German Armed Forces Cut by One Fifth in New Shake-Up,” *German Radio*, May 23, 2011, <http://www.defencetalk.com/german-armed-forces-cut-by-one-fifth-in-new-shake-up-34364/>.

39. Expert discussions with CSIS study team, July 2011.

actually have to be recruited in order to man planned force levels.⁴⁰ As might be expected by this very ambitious plan, shortfalls have already emerged, calling the viability of the plan into great question. Thus Germany's ability to continue to field competent ground forces over the next 10 years is a serious concern.⁴¹

United Kingdom

Structurally, the British Army is moving toward a configuration aimed at providing a more scalable and modular capability. Under currently announced plans, U.K. ground forces plan to be able to provide a force that could support three assumed contingency scenarios: a sustained stabilization operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime and air support as required; a short "complex intervention" requiring up to 2,000 personnel; and a short "simple intervention" of up to 1,000 personnel.⁴² However, whether these goals can be satisfied in practice is unclear given that they were developed prior to the announcement of additional force reductions.

Among U.S. allies, Britain has been hit hardest by the financial crisis, and austerity measures have led to large reductions in defense capabilities. Britain's 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) outlined defense spending cuts of about 8 percent. The Navy and Air Force bore the brunt of these reductions, but ground forces were affected as well. The SDSR directed cuts of 7,000 Army and 600 Marine personnel, leaving a force of approximately 95,000 manning five deployable multi-role Army brigades,⁴³ one air assault brigade, and one marine commando brigade of approximately 1,800 Marines to conduct amphibious operations.⁴⁴ On the equipment side most of the Army's reductions affected the heavy forces, with cuts of 40 percent to the Challenger 2 main battle tank fleet and 35 percent to the 155 mm AS90 artillery inventory.⁴⁵ Reports of additional cuts have indicated that within 18 months the following systems will be retired: 1,200 tracked reconnaissance vehicles, 1,400 armored personnel carriers and 198 mine-protected vehicles.

The SDSR's planned reductions, while substantial, were soon superseded. In July 2011, the United Kingdom announced additional reductions that will bring the Regular Army to 84,000 by 2020, offset (at least in part) by additional investments in the Territorial Army (TA), a reserve force.⁴⁶ The TA is now planned to grow to approximately 120,000 by 2020, and will receive additional training so that it can be used more readily for front-line operations.⁴⁷ While the

40. Expert discussions with CSIS study team, July 2011.

41. Juli Zeh, "Forget the Wehrmacht—Germany May Soon Have No Army at All," *The Guardian*, March 16, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/german-army-international-obligations.

42. Government of the United Kingdom, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and Security Review*, p. 19.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

44. House of Commons Library, *UK Defense and Security Policy: A New Approach?* Research Paper 11/10, January 21, 2011, p. 34.

45. Discussions with CSIS study team, July 2011; see also Jane's World Armies, *United Kingdom*, August 2, 2011.

46. "Defence cuts to reduce British Army to smallest size for more than 131 years as 17,000 regulars are laid off" *The Daily Record*, July 18, 2011, www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/2011/07/18/defence-cuts-to-reduce-british-army-to-smallest-size-for-more-than-131-years-as-17-000-regulars-are-laid-off-86908-23279062/.

47. "UK Reservists to Receive £1.5bn Training Funding" BBC News, July 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-14181145>.

government has stated its intention to maintain the goals written in the SDSR, it is unclear how force structure will be maintained with the new cuts announced in July.⁴⁸ Furthermore, no plans have yet been developed on how the Territorial Army will be trained or will be integrated into the Regular Army force structure to achieve the SDSR's stated goals.

Interagency Capabilities

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy devotes almost three pages to emphasizing the importance of strengthening a “whole of government approach”⁴⁹ to national security issues. Operationally, the Defense Department has become increasingly cognizant of the need to better integrate with other agencies overseas. From a ground force perspective, this most directly involves the Department of State, the Agency for International Development (AID), elements of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Department of State

In military operations, the State Department's role ranges from providing senior level leadership in the form of an ambassador and/or other senior representative to staffing regional or local outposts within an operational area. State Department personnel can lead or participate in inter-agency staffs at all levels, bringing substantial expertise in diplomacy, the role of international institutions, governance, and other key areas. Structurally, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has assumed responsibility for directing the government-wide Civilian Response Corps, a cadre of “active duty” and “reserve” civilian volunteers intended to rapidly deploy overseas to provide functional expertise across a wide range of focus areas relevant to stability operations.

The State Department's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) laid out Secretary of State Clinton's vision for reorganizing and expanding State's capabilities. There were two key components that relate specifically to ground force operations: (1) a 25 percent expansion of the Foreign Service corps by 2014 and (2) a bolstering of the size and responsibility of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).⁵⁰ However, budgetary pressures have caused these plans to be extended.⁵¹ In FY2011, Congress cut State Department funding by almost 10 percent from FY2010 levels. Within that overall total, the Civilian Response Initiative was cut by over 70 percent from the previous year, indicating weak Congressional support for the program. As a result, the State Department has slowed planned growth of the Foreign

48. Richard Norton-Taylor, “Army Chief Warns of ‘Sobering’ Impact of Further Defence Cuts,” *The Guardian*, July 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jul/25/army-chief-defence-cuts-letter> (quoting Army Chief, General Peter Wall).

49. The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), pp. 14–16.

50. U.S. Department of State, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading through Civilian Power* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), pp. 76, 121–52.

51. State figures refer to Title I (State Department Administration of Foreign Affairs) within the State-Foreign Ops Appropriations bills. Susan B. Epstein and Marian Leonardo Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 4, 2011), p. 20, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/170494.pdf>.

Service, and Civilian Response Corps activities have been curtailed.⁵² Funding for FY2012 has not yet been finalized, but in July 2011 the House Appropriations subcommittee responsible for State cut 17 percent from the FY2012 request, including an over 60 percent cut to the Civilian Response Initiative.⁵³

Coupled with the reductions in discretionary spending agreed to in August 2011 as part of the debt ceiling debate, the House action suggests that the State Department will likely see substantial cuts this year as well. This trend may continue for at least the next few years, as the Budget Control Act requires additional savings from “security” accounts, of which the State Department is one. The Act has the effect of pitting the “security” agencies against each other, which means State Department funding will compete against that of the Defense Department, intelligence community, the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs, and the National Nuclear Security Administration. How it fares is yet to be determined, but in general support for investments in diplomacy tends to be more diffuse than that for many of the other “security” activities.

Overall, then, the Defense Department’s desires to further expand its integration with the State Department are likely to be severely challenged. At the same time that greater familiarity and experience have increased appetites across all levels of DoD for additional Foreign Service officers to train and operate with, State’s efforts to increase its numbers to meet those demands are meeting with limited support. The initiative specifically aimed at bringing civilian expertise to bear both prior to and during potential military operations has met with even stiffer resistance, and State’s ability to recruit and train, let alone effectively employ, the Civilian Response Corps at desired levels (144 active full-time members and approximately 2,000 “reserves”) seems highly doubtful going forward. State may announce a new way ahead to revitalize this initiative, but given high levels of Congressional skepticism and the current budget environment, even if it meets with success, State’s contributions will likely continue to be limited in scale.⁵⁴

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID is another key partner in contingency response. AID directs a broad range of programs that are particularly relevant to humanitarian-focused, stabilization, and reconstruction efforts, including those aimed at supporting economic growth, agriculture, trade, health, democracy, and humanitarian assistance. AID personnel represent both functional knowledge and, frequently, regional expertise, and (importantly) can frequently tap into existing resources to initiate projects that complement U.S. ground force activities.

While AID’s expeditionary capability is small in scale relative to the military, the knowledge and resources AID brings to bear can be a significant force multiplier. That said, AID, like State, is under increasing budgetary pressure. In FY2011, USAID funding was cut by 8 percent (from \$1.7 billion to \$1.5 billion) from FY2010 levels.⁵⁵ The House Appropriations Subcommittee has recommended an additional 36 percent cut to the FY2012 budget request, which would take AID to \$1.1 billion.⁵⁶ Budgetary constraints will hinder the planned expansion of the Foreign Staff through the

52. Discussions with CSIS study team, July 2011.

53. Epstein and Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*, p. 20.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

55. Marian Leonardo Lawson et al., *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2011), p. 27.

56. Epstein and Lawson, *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs*, p. 23.

Development Leadership Initiative. Such personnel constraints will likely mean that many of the development projects begun by the military in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will either not be transitioned into civilian hands or will transition much more slowly than originally anticipated.⁵⁷ Furthermore, resource constraints will prevent the agency from meeting its QDDR goal of reducing reliance on contractors and improving accountability within the agency.⁵⁸

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Multiple agencies within the Department of Homeland Security partner with U.S. ground forces during contingency operations both inside the United States and its territories and overseas. These include the U.S. Coast Guard or USCG (which also conducts some overseas operations), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Customs and Border Patrol Protection (CBP), among others. As a Department, however, DHS is still maturing, and still lacks comprehensive information about the current and planned capabilities and their effectiveness for many of its components. This hinders its ability to assess the implications of planned reductions, for example, as well as to conduct robust strategic planning for the future.

Given these limitations, the study team was unable to develop a clear picture of how DHS capabilities might be expected to evolve over the next decade, and the subsequent implications of that evolution for U.S. ground forces. It is reasonable to expect, however, that this lack of information places DHS' resources at greater risk than some other elements of the "security" array of agencies in the current budget battles. While there are presumed political limitations to substantial reductions in activities that fall under the "homeland security" rubric, if cast artfully (e.g., as "efficiencies"), additional cuts—whose potentially damaging effects cannot be clearly articulated or demonstrated—are likely.

This may be of most immediate concern with respect to the United States' southern border. The continuing escalation of violence on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border has Congress worried of the potential for spillover into the United States.⁵⁹ DHS components—to include the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Coast Guard—continue to coordinate with Mexican law enforcement to control narco-trafficking and drug violence.⁶⁰ While empirical evidence suggests that drug-related violence has not yet spilled over into the United States,⁶¹ there is much concern that current DHS capabilities would be unable to handle a sudden escalation if it were to occur.⁶²

57. Lawson et al., *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs* (discussing DoD's expanded role in development over the past ten years).

58. Discussions with CSIS study team, June and July 2011.

59. Kristin M. Finklea et al., *Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 25, 2011).

60. Claire Ribando Seelke, *Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Report February 15, 2011).

61. Finklea et al., *Southwest Border Violence*, p. 24.

62. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *The Homeland Security Department's Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2011*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., February 24, 2010.

Intelligence Agencies

The other segment of the U.S. government that routinely interacts with military forces is the intelligence community, to include the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. An in-depth examination of these organizations was beyond the scope of this project, so for the purposes of this analysis we assume that while some budget cuts are likely for both of these organizations as well, they are unlikely to be substantial enough that they would have a significant impact on U.S. ground forces' operations over the next decade.

Summary

The above represents a brief overview of the inventory of ground force capabilities that U.S. leaders could consider drawing upon over the next decade. Collectively, by 2016 the United States and some of its key allies plan to cut their active duty ground forces by over 174,000, a 15 percent reduction from 2009 levels. Major changes, both quantitative and qualitative, are underway, and it is likely that the toolbox of today will look very different a decade from now. The United States has already determined that additional changes will be made, though the size and nature of those changes is not yet clear.

APPENDIX D

PARTICIPANTS IN WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS

Supply Workshop*

CSIS, Washington, DC

July 19, 2011

John Berry

U.S. Marine Corps

Colonel Ray Coia

U.S. Marine Corps

Colonel Vincent de Kytspotter

French Army

Matthew Driscoll

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Elfendahl

U.S. Army

Andrew Feickert

Congressional Research Service

Joanne Fitzgerald

U.S. Customs and Border Patrol

Nathan Freier

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Colonel Victor Hagan

U.S. Northern Command

Frank Hoffman

National Defense University

Colonel Gregory Jicha

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dr. Dave Johnson

RAND Corporation

Kim Kadesch

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Lieutenant Colonel Doug Keeler

U.S. Africa Command

Donna Kerner

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Doug King

U.S. Marine Corps

Dr. Maren Leed

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Major Mike Mayne

U.S. Marine Corps

Captain Mike Mohn

U.S. Coast Guard

Jay Moughon

U.S. Army

Lieutenant Colonel Eric Offermann

German Army

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis O'Hanley

Canadian Army

Major Don Porter

U.S. Marine Corps

Joseph Rogers

U.S. Special Operations Command

* Participation in the workshops or the listing of the individual names above does not represent an endorsement of the report or its findings by the aforementioned individuals or their affiliated organizations.

Colonel Walter Rugen
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Gary Russell
U.S. Department of State

Paul Scharre
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Terrence Smith
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Colonel Kath Stewart
Australian Army

Walter Vanderbeek
U.S. Army

Colonel J. Alex Vohr
U.S. Southern Command

Colonel Robert Waring
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Lieutenant Colonel John Wilwerding
U.S. Army

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Wright
British Army

Demand Workshop*

CSIS, Washington, DC
August 4, 2011

Colonel Vincent Alcazar
U.S. Air Force

Jim Ayers
Institute for Defense Analyses

John Berry
U.S. Marine Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Dan Bilko
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dr. Peter Bishop
University of Houston

Phillip Carter
Caerus Associates LLC

Bryan Clark
U.S. Navy

Colonel Ray Coia
U.S. Marine Corps

Rebecca deGuzman
ProSol

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Elfendahl
U.S. Army

David Fastabend
ITT Corporation

Colonel Kevin Felix
U.S. Army

Ben Fitzgerald
Noetic Group

Rosemarie Forsythe
Exxon Mobil

Evan Foster
U.S. State Department

Nathan Freier
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Colonel Victor Hagan
U.S. Northern Command

Ross Harrison
Georgetown University

Nathan Hodge
Wall Street Journal

Quentin Hodgson
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Dr. Dave Johnson
RAND Corporation

Josh Kerbel
Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Robert Killebrew
Center for a New American Security

Doug King
U.S. Marine Corps

Kenneth Knight
Centra Technology

Burgess Laird
Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Maren Leed
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Major Mike Mayne
U.S. Marine Corps

Kirk McConnell
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee

Alton McLendon
U.S. Pacific Command

Dr. Steve Metz
Army War College

Dr. Gautam Mukunda
Harvard Business School

Major Don Porter
U.S. Marine Corps

Hilary Price
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Joseph Rogers
U.S. Special Operations Command

Dr. Harvey Sapolsky
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Alfred Viana
U.S. European Command

Colonel J. Alex Vohr
U.S. Southern Command

Colonel Walter Rugen
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Lieutenant Colonel John Wilwerding
U.S. Army



BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Almandras, Sally, et al. *UK Defense and Security Policy: A New Approach?* House of Commons Library, January 21, 2011.
- Amos, James F. "2011 Report to Congress on the Posture of the United States Marine Corps." Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/cmc/Documents/FY-12%20USMC%20Posture%20Statement_Generic.pdf.
- Amos, James F. "Role of the United States Marine Corps." Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 1000 SIG, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, September 12, 2011.
- Angevine, John E. "Australia's Dangerously Luxurious Defense Hedge." Brookings Institution, June 1, 2011. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0601_defense_angevine.aspx.
- Association of the United States Army. *U.S. Army Special Operations Forces: Integral to the Army and the Joint Force*. Torch Bearer National Security Report, March 2010. http://www.ausa.org/publications/ilw/Documents/TB_SpecialOperationsForces.pdf.
- "BCT cuts eyed." *Inside the Pentagon* 27, no. 35, 2011.
- Belkin, Paul. *France: Factors Shaping Foreign Policy, and Issues in U.S.-French Relations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2011.
- Ben-Air, Guy, et al. *European Defense Trends: Budgets, Regulatory Frameworks, and the Industrial Base*. Washington, DC: CSIS, November 2010.
- Berg, Louis-Alexandre. "The EU's Experience with Security Sector Governance." U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report 265, January 2011. http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR265-EU's_Experience_with_SSG.pdf.
- Berteau, David. "Defense Contract and Budget Trends." Brief presented at the DLA Industry Conference & Exhibition, Columbus, OH, June 28, 2011.
- Birnbaum, Michael. "Cuts in European defense budgets raise concerns for U.S., NATO." *Washington Post*, February 14, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/14/AR2011021403542.html>.
- "Brazil's Military." *The Economist*, September 9, 2010. http://www.economist.com/blogs/americas-view/2010/09/brazils_military.

- Bonin, John. "Modular Army and Doctrine Overview." Presentation at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, July 2011.
- Brimley, Shawn, and Michele Flournoy. "The Contested Commons." U.S. Department of Defense, n.d. <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/flournoy-article.html>.
- Burton, Brian. "Looking Beyond the EFV." *Proceedings Magazine* 137/1/1,295, January 2011. <http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-01/looking-beyond-efv>.
- Cavallaro, Gina, and Dan Lamothe. "A Smaller Corps Sooner?" *Marine Corps Times*, August 22, 2011.
- Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Fact Book*, 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html>.
- Collier, Craig A. "A New Way to Wage Peace: US Support to Operation Stabilise." *Military Review* 81, January-February 2001.
- Cooke, Jennifer G., and Richard Downie. *Assessing Risks to Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington, DC: CSIS, June 2011.
- Cornwell, Susan. "Update1-Republicans in Congress Aim to Cut US Foreign Aid." Reuters, March 16, 2011.
- "Cuts Eyed in POM 12." *Inside the Pentagon* 26, no. 41, 2010.
- "Defence spending in a time of austerity." *The Economist*, August 26, 2010. <http://www.economist.com/node/16886851>.
- Elkus, Adam, and Crispin Burke. "WikiLeaks, Media, and Policy: A Question of Super Empowerment." *Small Wars Journal*, September 29, 2010. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/558-elkus.pdf>.
- Epstein, Susan B., and Marian Leonardo Lawson. *State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2012 Budget and Appropriations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 4, 2011.
- Erwin, Sandra I. "Pentagon Should Think Twice Before It Cuts Ground Forces, Historians Warn." *National Defense Magazine*, October 2011. <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/October/Pages/PentagonShouldThinkTwiceBeforeItCutsGroundForces,HistoriansWarn.aspx>.
- Feickert, Andrew, and Thomas K. Livingston. *US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2011.
- . *US Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 18, 2011.

- Feickert, Andrew. *US Special Operations Forces: Background and Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 15, 2011.
- Finkel, Meir. *On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011.
- Finklea, Kristin M., et al. *Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 25, 2011.
- Freier, Nathan. *DoD Leaders, Strategists, and Operators in an Era of Persistent Unconventional Challenge*. Washington, DC: CSIS, June 2009.
- . “Known Unknowns: Unconventional ‘Strategic Shock’ in Defense Strategy Development.” U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, November 2008.
- Friedman, George. *The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century*. New York: Doubleday, 2009.
- . *The Next Decade: What the World Will Look Like*. New York: Doubleday, 2010.
- Garamone, Jim, “‘Hundreds’ of Service Members Destined for East Timor,” *Armed Forces Information Service*, n.d. http://osd.dtic.mil/news/Sep1999/n09151999_9909152.html.
- Gates, Robert M. U.S. Military Academy Speech, delivered at West Point, NY, February 25, 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1539>.
- “German Armed Forces Cut by One Fifth in New Shake-Up.” German Radio, May 23, 2011. <http://www.defencetalk.com/german-armed-forces-cut-by-one-fifth-in-new-shake-up-34364/>.
- Goldman, Emily. *Power in Uncertain Times: Strategy in the Fog of Peace*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010.
- Government of Australia. *The Australian White Paper: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030*. Canberra, 2009.
- Government of France. *The French White Paper: Defence and National Security*. Paris, 2008.
- Government of the United Kingdom. *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: Strategic Defence and Security Review*. London, October 2010.
- Grissom, Adam, et al. “A New Division of Labor: meeting America’s Security Challenges beyond Iraq.” RAND, 2007.
- Harding, Thomas. “Strategic Defence and Security Review: four future scenarios and how they might play out.” *The Telegraph*, September 14, 2010. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8001936/Strategic-Defence-and-Security-Review-four-future-scenarios-and-how-they-might-play-out.html>.

- Hoffman, Frank G. "Hybrid vs. Compound War/The Janus Choice: Defining Today's Multi-Faceted Conflict." *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2009. <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/10/4198658/>.
- IHS. *Jane's Defense Weekly, Annual Defense Report*, 2010.
- IHS. *Jane's World Armies*. August 2011.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- . *The Military Balance*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- . *The Military Balance*. London: Routledge, 2011.
- Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. *Commander's Handbook for Security Force Assistance*. July 14, 2008. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materials/SFA.pdf>.
- Krepenovich, Andrew. "Why Air Sea Battle." Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, February 19, 2010. <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/02/why-airsea-battle/>.
- . *7 Deadly Scenarios*. New York: Bantam Books, 2009.
- . *Army at the Crossroads*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis, December 2008.
- Krepenovich, Andrew, Barry Watts, and Robert Work. *Meeting the Anti-Access and Anti-Denial Challenge*. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003.
- Kretchik, Walter E. *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011.
- Lawlor, Bruce M. "Military Support of Civilian Authorities: A New Focus for a New Millennium," *Journal of Homeland Security*, September 2001. <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/lawlor.htm>.
- Lawson, Marian Leonardo, et al. *State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2011 Budget and Appropriations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 22, 2011.
- Leed, Maren, and Benjamin W. Moody. *Touch Choices: Sustaining Amphibious Capabilities' Contributions to Strategic Shaping*. Washington, DC: CSIS, February 2011.
- Lewis, J.A.C. "French Defence Spending to Fall in Effort to Reduce National Deficit." *Jane's Defence Weekly*, October 1, 2010.
- Lewis, Peter. *Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington, DC: CSIS, June 2011.
- Lijn, Jair van der. "Sudan 2012: Scenarios for the Future." Clingendael Institute, September 2009. http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090914_cscplijn.pdf.

- “Looking Beyond the EFV.” *Naval Proceedings* 137, January 2011.
- Lyons, Terrence. *Ethiopia: Assessing Risks to Stability*. Washington, DC: CSIS, June 2011.
- McClintock, Michael. *Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990*. New York: Pantheon, 1992.
- McMaster, H.R., and John Harlow. “Army Capstone Concept balances winning today’s wars with preparing for future conflict.” U.S. Army TRADOC. http://www.bctmod.army.mil/news/capstone_concept.html.
- Mueller, John, and Mark G. Stewart. “Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security.” Presentation at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011.
- National Intelligence Council. *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008.
- Nelson, Rick “Ozzie,” and Thomas Sanderson. *Confronting an Uncertain Threat: The Future of Al Qaeda and Associated Movements*. Washington, DC: CSIS, September 2011.
- Olson, Eric T. “Posture Statement: U.S. Special Operations Command.” Statement before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, March 1, 2001. <http://www.socom.mil/Documents/2011%20SOCOM%20Posture%20Statement.pdf>.
- Ottaway, Marina. *Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: The Elusive Regional Policy*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Carnegie Papers, No. 105, November 2009.
- Quinlivan, James T. “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters*, Winter 1995–1996.
- “Raw Data: Democratic Fact Sheet on Reducing the Deficit, Raising the Debt Limit and Avoiding Default.” Fox News, July 31, 2011. <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/07/31/raw-data-democratic-fact-sheet-on-reducing-deficit-raising-debt-limit-and/>.
- Reese, Shawn. *Fiscal Year 2011 Department of Homeland: Security Assistance to States and Localities*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 26, 2010.
- Roughead, Gary. “Executing the Maritime Strategy.” U.S. Navy, October 2010. <http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202011.pdf>.
- Seelke, Claire Ribando. *Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 15, 2011.
- Serafino, Nina M. *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 4, 2011.

- Sharp, Jeremy M. *Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 8, 2011.
- Theis, Linda K. *Army Pre-Positioned Stocks (APS) Ready for Action*. Army AL&T, July-September 2008. http://asc.army.mil/docs/pubs/alt/2008/3_JulAugSep/articles/21_Army_Pre-Positioned_Stocks_Ready_for_Action_200807.pdf.
- UN Office of Drugs and Crime. *Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa*. New York: United Nations, November 2008. <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-as-a-security-threat-in-west-africa.html>.
- U.S. Air Force, Special Operations Command. *Factsheets 720th Special Tactics Group*. January 25, 2007. <http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=6856>.
- U.S. Army, Headquarters. *2010 Army Posture Statement*. February 19, 2010. https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/index.asp.
- . *2011 Army Posture Statement*. March 2, 2011. https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2011/addenda/Addendum_D.
- . *Field Manual -1*. June 2005. <http://www.army.mil/fm1/chapter2.html>.
- . *Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*. October 2008. https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_07.pdf.
- . *Field Manual 3-07.1: Security Force Assistance*. May 2009. https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_07x1.pdf.
- . *Field Manual 3-11: Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations*. July 2011. https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_aa/pdf/fm3_11.pdf.
- . *Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency*. December 2006. <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/KC.asp>.
- . *Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations*. December 1994. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/fm100_23.pdf.
- . *Training Circular No. 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*. November 2010.
- U.S. Army Special Operations Command, *Deputy Chief of Staff G1 Smart Book*. June 20 2011.
- U.S. Army Sustainment Command. “Fact Sheet.” August 23, 2011. <http://www.aschq.army.mil/supportingdocs/ASCMission2011.pdf>, accessed 15 September 2011.
- U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command. *The United States Army Operating Concept 2016-2028*. August 19, 2010. <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf>.

- U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Airland. “Current and Future Roles and Capabilities of U.S. Military Land Power.” 111th Congress, 1st Session, March 26, 2009.
- . Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. “The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for Fiscal Year 2011,” 111th Cong., 1st sess., February 24, 2010.
- . Title IV Military Personnel Authorizations (2011). http://www.dtic.mil/congressional_budget/pdfs/FY2012_pdfs/SASC_112-26_MILPERS.pdf.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Briefing with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, January 6, 2011. <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4747>.
- . *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Version 3.0*. January 15, 2009. http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov3.pdf.
- . *DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.
- . *Directive Number 5100.0: Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*. December 21, 2010. <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510001p.pdf>.
- . *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. February 2010. <http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf>.
- . *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. March 2005. <http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf>.
- . *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*. February 2010.
- U.S. Department of State. *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, 2010.
- . “Background Note: Australia.” August 10, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2698.htm>.
- . “Background Note: France.” May 27, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3842.htm>.
- U.S. Government, White House. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: White House, 2010.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations*. April 18, 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf.
- . *Joint Publication 3-07.3: Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*. February 12, 1999. [http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_3\(99\).pdf](http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07_3(99).pdf).
- . *Joint Publication 3-18: Joint Forcible Entry Operations*. June 16, 2008. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_18.pdf.

- . *Joint Publication 3-22: Foreign Internal Defense*. July 12, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_22.pdf.
- . *Joint Publication 3-68: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*. December 23, 2010. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_68.pdf.
- U.S. Marine Corps, Combat Development Command. *Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century*. March 18, 2009.
- . *Evolving the MAGTF for the 21st Century*. March 20, 2009.
- . *Marine Corps Operating Concepts: Assuring Littoral Access, Crisis Response*, 3rd ed. June 2010.
- U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters. *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations*. August 9, 2011. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/mcdp10.pdf.
- . *Prepositioning Programs Handbook*, 2nd ed. January 2009. <http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/Prepositioning%20Programs%20Handbook%20d%20Edition.pdf>.
- . *Reshaping America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness*. Report of the 2010 Marine Corps Force Structure Review Group, March 14, 2011.
- U.S. Marine Corps, Program Assessment and Evaluation Division. *U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs*. 2011.
- U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command. "Information Paper, Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC)." Briefed to General Officer Symposium, May 16, 2011 (Provided by Gary Oles, MARSOC Dep G3 on August 15, 2011).
- U.S. Special Operations Command. *Fact Book: United States Special Operations Command*. February 2011.
- "U.S. Support to African Capacity for Peace Operations: The ACOTA Program." *Peace Operations Factsheet Series*. Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, February 2005. http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ACOTA_BriefFinal_Feb05.pdf.
- United Nations. *Charter of the United Nations*. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>.
- Vaughn, Bruce. *Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S. Interests*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 31, 2011.
- . *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2009.
- Vego, Milan. "AirSea Battle Must Not Work Alone." *Naval Proceedings* 137, July 2011.
- Vina, Steven R. *Border Security and Military Support: Legal Authorizations and Restrictions*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2006.

Warner, Lesley Anne. "Pieces of Eight: An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa." *Naval War College Review* 63, no. 2, Spring 2010.

Wonson, Craig. "Forcible Entry from the Sea: Maintaining a Viable and Unique Capability." *Marine Corps Gazette* 94, no. 3, 2010.

Zeh, Juli. "Forget the Wehrmacht—Germany May Soon Have No Army at All." *The Guardian*, March 16, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/16/german-army-international-obligations>.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nathan Freier is a senior fellow in the New Defense Approaches Project at CSIS and a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. He joined CSIS in April 2008 after completing a 20-year career in the U.S. Army. His last military assignment was as director of national security affairs at the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Freier is a veteran of numerous strategy development and strategic planning efforts at Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA); the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); and on two senior-level military staffs in Iraq. Prior to joining SSI, he served in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. His principal responsibilities included development of the 2005 National Defense Strategy. Prior to that, he was a U.S. Army fellow/visiting scholar at the University of Maryland's Center for International and Security Studies (CISSM) and a strategist with DA's Strategic Plans, Concepts, and Doctrine Directorate. At CISSM, he examined strategic risk and terrorism. At DA, his duties included army preparation for, participation in, and response to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and army and joint strategic planning for the war on terrorism. Freier twice deployed to Iraq. From January to July 2005, he served in the Strategy, Plans, and Assessments Directorate of Headquarters, Multi-National Force–Iraq, and from May to August 2007, he served as a special assistant to the Commander, Multi-National Corps–Iraq.

Prior to his service as an army strategist, Freier held various leadership and staff positions as a field artillery officer in the United States, Europe, and the first Persian Gulf War. He continues to provide expert advice to the national security and defense communities on a range of issues. Among his research interests and areas of expertise are national security, defense, and military strategy and policy development; strategic net and risk assessment; “unconventional” security challenges and conflicts; terrorism; and the Iraq War. He has recently completed work on “strategic shocks”; the future mission of U.S. land forces; contemporary “unconventional” demands on Defense Department leaders and strategists; alternatives to the current Unified Command Plan; and key principles for future defense strategy. He holds masters' degrees in both international relations and politics and is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College.

CSIS | CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

1800 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006
Tel: (202) 887-0200 | Fax: (202) 775-3199
E-mail: books@csis.org | Web: www.csis.org

