



Fact Sheet about the Rights of the Bedouin in the Negev

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2017

Pre-State Historical Background

- x Most Bedouin tribes in Israel can trace their ancestry to migration from Saudi Arabia via the Sinai, and most can trace their presence in Palestine/the Land of Israel as far back as the founding of the Ottoman Empire¹ (1299 AD), though some trace it back even further.
- x Over a process that took centuries, the Bedouin transitioned from a nomadic to a semi-nomadic lifestyle, moving to permanent settlements and practicing agriculture.^{2 3} In 1931, 89% of the Negev/Naqab's residents said they made their living from farming.⁴ Scholars estimate that the Bedouin owned between 1.8-2.7 million dunams, of which 900,000 was used for agriculture.⁵
- x The Bedouin had their own system of land ownership based on oral law. This system was recognized by the Ottoman Empire, which founded the city of Beer Sheva on land that they purchased from the Bedouin and collected taxes from Bedouin land owners. The British also recognized this system. Both Winston Churchill and Herbert Samuels made formal promises in 1921 to respect traditional Bedouin law, and they also collected taxes from them.^{6 7 8 9}
- x In 1921, the British Mandate gave all land owners two months to register their lands; most Bedouin did not, for many reasons, including: a tradition of not cooperating with foreign governments, a lack of information about the registration system, and fear of taxation and military conscription based on registration records.¹⁰ In light of the failure of this policy, the British started a north-to-south land ownership survey of all of Mandate Palestine. Israel continued this survey in some parts of the country, but in the 1970's the survey was halted in the Negev completely, at a time when more 3,200 Bedouin had submitted Bedouin land claims.¹¹
- x Another proof that Bedouin land ownership was widely recognized is that the Jewish National Fund and other organizations bought more than 100,000 dunams of land from Bedouin owners in the 1920's and 1930's. The land for Kibbutz Mishmar Hanegev, for example, was purchased from the Al-Turi Bedouin tribe in 1926. As Professor Ismael Abu-Saad writes: "How can it be, the Bedouin ask, that in the 1920s and 1930s the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency purchased land in the Negev from its Bedouin owners, and today the Bedouin are not the owners? What has changed?"¹²
- x On the eve of the 1948, there were between 65,000-90,000 Bedouin in the Negev,¹³ though some estimate that that number was higher.

The 1948 War and Military Rule

- x During Israel's War of Independence in 1948, the vast majority of Bedouin living in the Negev fled or were forced to areas in present-day Egypt and Jordan; only about 11,000-18,000 Bedouin remained in the Negev.¹⁴
- x The new Israeli government considered the remaining Palestinians in its borders to be a potential security threat, including the Bedouin. They enacted military rule on the country's new Palestinian citizens, and used military force to order the remaining Negev Bedouin to relocate to a small area that became known as the "Siyag" (Hebrew for the "Fence"), located between Beer Sheva, Arad, Dimona,

effectively isolating them from the rest of the country and making it impossible for them to find work or access any lands they had owned beyond the Siyag.¹⁶ All land beyond the Siyag was declared a closed military zone to prevent people from returning to their former lands.¹⁷ The Siyag is only 7% of the Negev and represents 20% of the arable land that had been available to the Bedouin before 1948.¹⁸

- x Most Bedouin land was confiscated¹⁹ using the 1950 Absentee Property Law and the 1953 Land Acquisition Law, which states that all lands not *held* by their owners on April 1, 1952 and which are required for “settlement, security or development,” can be unilaterally expropriated by the state. However, the state also denied that any confiscation took place – arguing that the Bedouin did not own any land in the Negev before 1948.
- x Despite moving thousands of Bedouin into the Siyag, the government did not recognize Bedouin land ownership there either, nor did it give legal permission for any housing or infrastructure construction. Since the state argued that all land in the Negev is “state land,” any Bedouin who wanted to practice agriculture had to apply for a seasonal land lease which would have to be renewed each year, even for land that they had owned before 1948. Jewish farmers, on the other hand, had access to 49 year land leases which would renew automatically from year to year.²⁰ Furthermore, not a single Bedouin locality appeared on any official regional master plans or maps until the 1960’s, and many are still absent.
- x 50 Jewish towns, moshavim and kibbutzim were founded on Bedouin land in the next few years,²¹ including Kibbutz Shuval, partially located on the lands of the residents of present-day Umm Al Hiran.²² A great deal of Bedouin land was also transferred to the Jewish National Fund.

The End of Military Rule (1966), Forced Urbanization, and House Demolition

- x Though military rule ended in 1966, and though the Bedouin received Israeli citizenship, the Israeli government continued to relate to the Bedouin as a separate category of people rather than as equal citizens: for example, a separate “Bedouin Authority” without any Bedouin representation (under the Israel Lands Administration and the Ministry of Agriculture) was established to manage Bedouin affairs separately from other civil matters. The Bedouin are the only community in Israel that has a special governmental body responsible for their “development,”²³ what Bedouin activists have called “a state within a state.”²⁴
- x In the early 1960’s, the Israeli government began a process of relocating the Bedouin to “townships” in order to put an end to Bedouin land claims in the Siyag and “free up” the land for the state.²⁵ Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Agriculture at the time, said, “We should transform the Bedouin into an urban proletariat... this phenomenon of the Bedouin will disappear.” The idea that the Bedouin should be able to choose a rural, agricultural life, like the kibbutzim and moshavim that were sprouting up in the Negev, was off the table.²⁶ This relocation was accomplished by offering to compensate Bedouin for the land claims if they agree to relocate. Nevertheless, most Bedouin refused the meager compensation for the loss of their lands and traditional lifestyle, and more than 3,000 land claims remain unresolved.
- x Over the next two decades, between 50-70% of the Negev Bedouin population relocated into seven urban townships: Tel-Sheva, Rahat, Kseife, ‘Ar’ara, Segev-Shalom, Hura, and Laqiya, while the rest continue to live in “unrecognized” villages.²⁷
- x These townships were not planned to have adequate employment opportunities or industrial zones. Average salaries in the townships are half of the Israeli average salary, and unemployment around

infrastructural problems, partly due to their tiny municipal areas, which lower the amount of taxes they can collect.³⁰ Importantly, the townships lack sufficient space in which to practice agriculture and animal husbandry. Townships also experience severe discrimination in every type of resource allocation, including water, sewage and electric infrastructure, education, healthcare, and public transportation. Lastly, townships lack the necessary capacity to house all the people who live there, thus forcing people to build houses illegally.

- x Women have been negatively impacted by relocation to the townships. In townships, Bedouin families must make due with living in apartments or small plots of land that are not large enough to allow for many forms of productive labor traditionally associated with women, such as weaving and some forms of animal husbandry and agriculture. Consequently, women have turned from being producers to being consumers, undermining their status and independence in society.³¹
- x The rest of the Bedouin continued to live in “unrecognized” villages that have limited to nonexistent access to the water grid, the sewage system, electricity, healthcare, public transportation and public education.
- x Close to half of all Bedouin population, or around 100,000 people, live in housing that the government considers illegal, which means that they live under constant threat of demolition. In 2013-2015 alone, the Israeli authorities destroyed 2,752 Bedouin structures, many of them homes.³² The government has even established a special unit to carry out demolitions in the Negev, the Yoav Unit.³³ This policy is intended to force Bedouin into the Bedouin townships, or to “enter into negotiations” regarding land claims. Tens of thousands of people live under extreme uncertainty, whereas those whose houses are demolished experience long-term consequences to children’s health, psychological health, and economic wellbeing.³⁴
- x In contrast, between 1961 and 2015, Israel established 126 Jewish settlements and 60 Jewish family farms in the Negev/Naqab, oftentimes located nearby “unrecognized” Bedouin villages. This despite the fact that the Bedouin comprise 30% of the Negev’s population and have only 18 official settlements.³⁵ Most Jewish settlements in the Negev have admissions committees that keep Bedouin out de facto, while others have financial and social barriers, such as a lack of basic services in Arabic.³⁶
- x The government’s policy of non-recognition has drastic socioeconomic, health and educational consequences. In 2007, one study found that 66% of the Bedouin population lives below the poverty line;³⁷ the rate of Bedouin who have 8 years of school or less is five times greater than the general rate, and only 1.1% of Bedouin have academic degrees, as opposed to 14.4% in the general population; the Bedouin high school matriculation rate is 30-40% lower than the Jewish-Israeli rate;³⁸ in 2006, Bedouin infant mortality was three times the Jewish-Israeli rate.³⁹

The Praver Plan: Institutionalizing Displacement

- x Since the 1950’s, the Israeli government has tried to force the Bedouin to accept state ownership of lands that they claim as their own and to relocate of their own volition. One mechanism, introduced in the 1970’s, was to allow Bedouin to file land ownership claims in Israeli courts, then offer the Bedouin compensation on a “humane” basis. “Humane” here means that the claim is being compensated for humanitarian reasons, and that awarding the compensation does not comprise an acknowledgment that they ever owned the land to begin with.⁴⁰ Any compensation is conditioned on their leaving the land they are claiming.

- x By 2002, only 14% of Bedouin land claimants agreed to receive the meager compensation offered to them and to relocate to the townships.⁴¹ This has led to a stalemate, where most Bedouin do not accept compensation while the government cannot “go back to 1948” and forcibly displace tens of thousands of people. The stalemate has been fertile ground for politicians seeking to demonize the Bedouin for “illegal construction,” for “taking over state land,” for being a “demographic threat”⁴² and calling for a resolution to “the Bedouin problem.” Many leading politicians in Israel continue to see the Bedouin as a security threat and as such feel that it is imperative to drive physical wedges between them and other Bedouin and Palestinians by building new Jewish towns. As recently as June 2017, Yoav Galant, the Israeli Construction and Housing Minister, said that “there's an unruliness by the Bedouin population, which intends to take control on the ground and do whatever they want.” He went on to say that Jewish settlements in the southern West Bank are necessary to separate between the Bedouin and West Bank Palestinians.⁴³
- x Though the Bedouin are not drafted into the IDF, the IDF has sought to encourage Bedouin to volunteer for the IDF, particularly as trackers, given their in-depth familiarity with the land. The IDF has set up a special administration to recruit Bedouin youth, and established the Reut High School, a high school operating in an army base that targets Bedouin high school drop outs. Nevertheless, very few Bedouin volunteer for the IDF. Most Bedouin political and religious leaders oppose it, and many Bedouin have family members in the West Bank and Gaza. Exact numbers are unavailable because the IDF keeps them secret, but it is estimated that from 1995-2000 only about 200-300 Bedouin joined the IDF each year, making up a tiny percentage of eligible Bedouin youth. In contrast, 65% of all Israelis of draft-age enlist in the army each year.⁴⁴ The Second Intifada and the events of October 2000, in which 13 Palestinian citizens of Israel were shot dead, led to a dramatic drop in the number of Bedouin recruits, and the ensuing military operations and increased house demolitions have further increased opposition to IDF enlistment.⁴⁵
- x In 2007, the government appointed the Goldberg Commission to recommend possible solutions to the “problem.” Surprisingly, the Commission affirmed that the Bedouin “did not invade these lands,” recommended that most of the Bedouin villages be recognized and that a committee be established to hear and settle traditional land claims.⁴⁶
- x The government ignored these recommendations and established the Praver Commission to make additional recommendations. The Praver Commission proposes no “path to recognition” for the “unrecognized” Bedouin villages. Instead, it proposed that if Bedouin in these villages refuse to accept compensation and move to the townships, they would be implicitly giving up all land rights and will be moved forcibly. The Praver plan also calls for the institution of sweeping “administrative” powers that would remove house demolitions from the realm of judicial review and institute imprisonment of up to two years for refusing to comply with a demolition order. Civil society organizations estimate that this policy would result in the forcible displacement of between 40,000-80,000 Bedouin, and is expected to cost the Israeli taxpayers 6 – 8 billion shekels. The Praver plan became the Praver Bill, which was retracted in 2013 following mass protests, but it remains on the agenda of major politicians in government.⁴⁷
- x But the government is not waiting for new legislation. Several new Jewish settlements have been approved, some of which are slated to be built in place of existing Bedouin villages. The most infamous example is the Jewish town of Hiran, slated to be established on the ruins of present-day Umm Al Hiran, but other examples include the Jewish town of Daya to be built on the ruins of the Bedouin village of

- x There is another way. In the Galilee, the government recognized several Bedouin villages in the 1990's, which are now flourishing in comparison to the Negev Bedouin. In the 2003, the government also recognized 11 Bedouin villages in the Negev, as a result of Bedouin activists' pressure and a Supreme Court ruling requiring planning authorities to include the Bedouin villages in their master plans. Though these villages are still discriminated against and still lack essential services and sufficient land area, the risk of demolition has been removed from thousands of homes.⁴⁹
- x Bedouin land claims currently only involve 650,000 dunams⁵⁰, 5% of the Negev's 13,000,000 dunams, and can be easily resolved without destroying their communities and way of life. The Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages along with planning and human rights NGOs proposed an alternative plan to recognize and provide social services and public infrastructure to the unrecognized villages, rather than relocate them.^{51 52}

Human Rights Law

- x All major binding human rights treaties that Israel has ratified insist on equality and freedom from discrimination. Many of these treaties include articles guaranteeing the right to adequate housing.
- x The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Housing defines this right as: "The right of every woman, man, youth and child to gain and sustain a safe and secure home and community in which to live in peace and dignity."
- x Additional human rights standards for indigenous people are covered by the non-binding United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While the State of Israel does not accept the classification of its Bedouin citizens as an indigenous people, local human rights groups have argued, along with the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, that Bedouin Israelis should be recognized as an indigenous group.

¹ "Bedouin Arab tribes have lived in Palestine since at least the fifth century, though large-scale migration of Bedouin tribes into the rest of the Middle East and North Africa began during the centuries of Islamic expansion in the seventh century." (163) Meir, A. (1997). *As Nomadism Ends: The Israeli Bedouin of the Negev*. Boulder: Westview Press (as cited in Amara, Ahmad, et al. "The Bedouin Arabs: Historical Background and Lifestyle." *Indigenous (in)Justice: Human Rights Law and Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev*, Harvard Law School, 2013, pp. 163–166.

² "During the Ottoman period (sixteenth to twentieth centuries), the Bedouin tribes of southern Palestine and the Sinai developed territorial regions within which they grazed their herds." Amara, Ahmad, et al., *Indigenous (in)Justice: Human Rights Law and Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev*, pp. 21.

³ "By the middle of the twentieth century, an estimated 95% of the Naqab Bedouins were settled agriculturalists, with only 5% exclusively dependent on a pastoral livelihood." Amara, Ahmad, et al., *Indigenous (in)Justice: Human Rights Law and Bedouin Arabs in the Naqab/Negev*, pp. 164, citing Maddrell, P. (1990). *The Bedouin of the Negev*. Report No. 81. London: Minority Rights Group.

⁴ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pp. 85-86; Falah, Ghazi. 1985. "How Israel Controls the Bedouin in Israel." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14, (2): 35-51.

⁵ Hasson and Swirski, *Invisible Citizens*, pg. 10; Porat, Chanina. 1997. "Development Policy and the Negev Bedouin Issue In the Years 1948-1953." In *Iyyunim BiTekumat Israel*, 7: 389-438. (In Hebrew); Porat, Chanina. 2000. "Israel's Policy on the Bedouin Issue and Left-Wing Alternatives, 1953-1960." In *Iyyunim BiTekumat Israel*, 10: 420-476. (In Hebrew).

⁶ Yiftachel, Oren, et al. "Debunking the 'Dead Negev Doctrine'." Haaretz.com, 1 Jan. 2014, www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.566357.

⁷ Aref al-Aref, *Jurisprudence among the Bedouin*, Beit al-Maqdes Press, 1933, p. 35 (Arabic).

⁸ Oren Yiftachel, Expert Opinion, 2010, pp. 13-14; Aref al-Aref, *Jurisprudence among the Bedouin*, 1933, p. 62.

⁹ Oren Yiftachel, Expert Opinion (response to expert opinion by Prof. Ruth Kark) on the claim of the heirs of Suleiman al-Uqbi to ownership of plots in al-Araqib and Zahirliqiya, in Civil Case (CC) 7161/06, February 2010, p. 10 (Hebrew), available at: http://toibillboard.info/Yiftah_3.pdf

¹⁰ Boteach, Elana. *The Indigenous Bedouins of the Naqab-Negev Desert in Israel*. Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, 2006, pp. 13; Yiftachel, O. (2002). "Bedouin Arabs and the Israeli State: State Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance." *The Future of*

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- Indigenous Peoples: Strategies for Survival and Development. Eds. Champagne, D. and Saad, A. Los Angeles: UCLA American Indian Studies Center.
- ¹¹ Yiftachel et al., "Debunking the 'Dead Negev Doctrine'."
- ¹² Rudnitzky, Arik, et al. *The Bedouin Population in the Negev*. Abraham Fund Initiatives, 2012, pg. 107; Abu-Saad (2003), "The Bedouins' complaint: How can we be defined as intruders when we and our forefathers have lived in the Negev for thousands of years?" (Hebrew) *Karkah*, Vol. 57, pp. 31-34.
- ¹³ Before 1948, it is estimated that between 65,000 and 90,000 Bedouins lived in the Negev area. Falah, G. (1989). Israel State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 19 (2), pp. 71-90.
- ¹⁴ Boteach, Elana. *The Indigenous Bedouins of the Naqab-Negev Desert in Israel*. Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality, 2006; Shlomo Swirsky and Yael Hasson, "Invisible Citizens: Israeli Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin," *Information on Equality*, vol. 14, Adva Center, February 2006, which states that the number of residents who remained in the Naqab ranged from 11,000 to 18,000 persons. See also Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, Cambridge University Press, 1989; and Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949-1956*, Oxford University Press, 1993. According to Morris, the Bedouin residents were expelled in stages between 1948 and 1952.
- ¹⁵ Salman Abu Sitta, *The Denied Inheritance*, 2009, p. 25; Shlomo Swirsky and Yael Hasson, "Invisible Citizens", 2006, p. 4.
- ¹⁶ Swirski et al. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 87.
- ¹⁷ Footnote 13: "A document entitled "The Situation of the Bedouin in Israel", found by Adalah in the Israeli military archives and classified as "top secret" that was submitted to the Military Governor of the Beer el-Sabe District on 17 March 1952 states, "The continued execution of the transfer [of the Bedouin residents] depends on a number of factors. The transfer last year was mainly achieved by persuasion and economic pressure, since we had no legal basis and there was even an explicit order not to use force. There was therefore a need to exercise the utmost caution in the transfer operation to avoid entangling ourselves in legal problems. We made a number of attempts to contact lawyers and made appeals to the Knesset. We had asked for the northern area [of the Naqab] to be declared a security zone. I do not see a practical possibility of executing and fully completing the transfer without doing so." Document dated 22 February 1952, File No. 405/54/20, signed by Michael Hanegbi, then-Military Governor of the Negev." - Bishara, Suhad, and Haneen Naamnih. *Nomads Against Their Will: The Attempted Expulsion of the Arab-Bedouin in the Naqab: The Example of Atir-Umm Al Hieran*. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2011, 8, footnote 13. See also Shlomo Swirsky and Yael Hasson, "Invisible Citizens", 2006, p. 4. The State of Israel later expropriated much of this land through various laws, such as the Absentees' Property Law – 1950, the State Property Law – 1951, the Land Acquisition Law (Validation of Acts and Compensation) – 1953, and the Negev Land Acquisition Law (Peace Treaty with Egypt) – 1980.
- ¹⁸ In the Siyag area, cultivable land amounted to some 400,000 dunams, or about 20% of the tillable area available to the Bedouin before their expulsion and displacement from the northwestern Negev. In: Porat, Chanina. 2000. "Israel's Policy on the Bedouin Issue and Left-Wing Alternatives, 1953-1960." In *Iyyunim BiTekumat Israel*, 10: 420-476. (In Hebrew). Pg. 421.
- ¹⁹ Yiftachel, Oren. and Kedar, Sandy. (2000) "Landed Power: the Making of the Israeli Land Regime," *Teorya U'Vikkoret* , 16: 67-100 (In Hebrew). Cited in Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 10.
- ²⁰ Meir, Avinoam. 1999. *Tension Between the Negev Bedouin and the State: Policy and Practice*. The Floresheimer Institute For Policy Studies. Jerusalem. (In Hebrew). Pg. 22. Cited in Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 89.
- ²¹ Yiftachel, Oren. 2003. "Bedouin Arabs and the Israeli Settler State: Land Policies and Indigenous Resistance." In Champagne, Duane and Ismael Abu-Saad (eds). *The Future of Indigenous People: Strategies for Survival and Development*. UC Press, Los Angeles. Pg. 33. Cited in Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 11.
- ²² Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 10.
- ²³ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 39.
- ²⁴ Hasson, Nir. May 20, 2005. "Recommendation: Responsibility for the Bedouin Sector to Move from Israel Land Administration to Two New Bodies." *Haaretz*. (In Hebrew).
- ²⁵ Bauml, Yair. 2002. *The Attitude of the Israeli Establishment to the Arabs in Israel: Policy, Principles and Action*. The Second Decade, 1958-1968. Ph. D. Dissertation. University of Haifa. (In Hebrew). Pg. 313-4.
- ²⁶ "We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat... Indeed, this will be a radical move which means that the Bedouin would not live on his land with his herds, but would become an urban person... His children would be accustomed to a father who wears trousers, does not carry a Shabaria [the traditional Bedouin knife] and does not search for vermin in public. This would be a revolution, but it may be fixed within two generations. Without coercion but with governmental direction... this phenomenon of the Bedouins will disappear". Moshe Dayan. *Ha'aretz* interview 31/7/63; cited in Ismael Abu-Saad: Education as a Tool for Control vs. Development Among Indigenous Peoples: The Case of the Bedouin Arabs in Israel, *HAGAR International Social Science Review*, 2 (2) (2001). pp 241-259.

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- ²⁷ Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 9.
- ²⁸ Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 21.
- ²⁹ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 95
- ³⁰ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 59
- ³¹ Fenster, T. (1995). "Planning and Development in the Bedouin Localities according to Gender and Space." *Mivnim*, Vo. 158, pp. 68-83 [Hebrew]. Kassem, A. (2002). "Making Breakthroughs, Paying the Price." *Panim*, Vol. 22, pp. 72-83 [Hebrew]. Abu Rabiha-Queder, Sarab. "Between Tradition and Modernization: Understanding the Problem of Female Bedouin Dropouts." *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2006, pp. 3-17., doi:10.1080/01425690500376309.
- ³² Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 14
- ³³ According to a Freedom of Information Request submitted by the Negev Coexistence Forum to the Ministry of Public Security on 11/17/2015, the Yoav Unit is under the jurisdiction of the commander of the police south region and its goal is to "assist the enforcement bodies in the issue of lands in the Negev." The unit escorts various enforcement bodies in the Negev while they issue orders and carry out demolitions while working in full coordination with the Directorate." – Rotem, Michal, and Ben Fargeon. *Enforcing Distress: House Demolition Policy in the Bedouin Community in the Negev*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2016, www.dukium.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/HDR_2016_ENG-1.pdf. Pg. 21.
- ³⁴ *Off the Map: Land and Housing Violations in Israel's Unrecognized Bedouin Villages*. Human Rights Watch, 2008, www.hrw.org/reports/2008/ipt0308/. PP. 86-89; Almi, Orli, *The Ramifications of House Demolitions in Israel on the Mental Health of Children* (Tel Aviv: Physicians for Human Rights Israel, January 2006).
- ³⁵ Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 11.
- ³⁶ Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 13.
- ³⁷ Sinai, Ruth. "66% Of Negev Bedouin Live Below Poverty Line." *Haaretz*, 15 Jan. 2007, www.haaretz.com/66-of-negev-bedouin-live-below-poverty-line-1.210067.
- ³⁸ Rotem, Michal. *Discrimination in Numbers: Collection of Statistical Data -- The Bedouin Community in the Negev/Naqab*. Negev Coexistence Forum, 2017. www.dukium.org. Pg. 18.
- ³⁹ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 70.
- ⁴⁰ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 19.
- ⁴¹ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 95; Israel State Comptroller. 2002. *Annual Report* No. 52 [b]. (In Hebrew).
- ⁴² "According to Shamir, by 2035 the Bedouin will constitute half a million people. "Only a suicidal country doesn't recognize the Bedouin problem; the blindness is terrible," he said. "We are working by a different method than the Praver Committee [which previously dealt with Bedouin resettlement]; I lean more toward an economic approach than a legal one." - Seidler, Shirly. "Minister: Israel Looking at Ways to Lower Bedouin Birthrate ." *Haaretz*, 29 Sept. 2014, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-1.618119.
- ⁴³ Lis, Jonathan. "Israeli Cabinet Minister Lashes Out at 'Unruly' Bedouin Citizens." *Haaretz*, 6 June 2017, www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-1.794058.
- ⁴⁴ Cohen, Gili. "IDF Statistics: One in Six Israeli Men Doesn't Complete Full Military Service." *Haaretz*, 9 June 2013, www.haaretz.com/1.528589.
- ⁴⁵ Rudnitzky, Arik, et al. *The Bedouin Population in the Negev*. Abraham Fund Initiatives, 2012, pp. 85-87.
- ⁴⁶ Abu Rabiha, Rawia. *Principles for Arranging Recognition of Bedouin Villages in the Negev*. The Association For Civil Rights in Israel, Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, The Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages, 2011, *Principles for Arranging Recognition of Bedouin Villages in the Negev*, www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Praver-Policy-Paper-May2011.pdf. Pg. 10.
- ⁴⁷ Bishara, Suhad. *Adalah's Position Paper on "Praver II": The Israeli Government's New Plan to Forcibly Displace and Dispossess Palestinian Bedouin Citizens of Israel from Their Land in the Naqab (Negev)*. Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2017, www.adalah.org/uploads/uploads/Adalah_Position_Paper_Praver_II_23.1.2017.pdf.
- ⁴⁸ *Are Only Jews Allowed to Live in Settlements in the Negev?* The Association for Civil Rights in Israel ACRI, 22 Nov. 2015, www.acri.org.il/en/2015/11/22/are-only-jews-allowed-to-live-in-settlements-in-the-negev/.
- ⁴⁹ Karny, Gil, director. *Israeli Policy toward the Bedouin: the Flourishing North vs. the Furious South*. Israeli Policy toward the

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4LDRwvbkVKk>. For a section of the documentary with English subtitles:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg2YIzBsaCk&feature=youtu.be.

⁵⁰ Swirski, Shlomo, and Yael Hasson. *Invisible Citizens: Israel Government Policy Toward the Negev Bedouin*. Adva Center, 2006, pg. 20.

⁵¹ Yiftachel, Oren, et al. *Alternative Master Plan for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev*. Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights; The Regional Council of Unrecognized Bedouin Villages, 2012, *Alternative Master Plan for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev*, bimkom.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/Bedouin-Negev-Alternative-Master-Plan.pdf.

⁵² "A Just and Practical Solution for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev." *A Just and Practical Solution for the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev*, The Association For Civil Rights in Israel, Bimkom: Planners for Planning Rights, 27 Nov. 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=10_pcJ3u8oU.