Western Europe Action Agenda
Catherine Barnes and Stephen Pullinger,
16th January 2004
A. CORE PRINCIPLES AND PRIORITIES
B. ANNOTATED AGENDA
C: FULL POLICY DOCUMENT
1. A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR PREVENTION
1.1 CONFLICT PREVENTION WORKS
1.2 SECURITY FOR THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN LIFE AND DIGNITY
1.3 EXPANDED MULTILATERALISM:
CONSOLIDATING A NEW ‘PARTNERSHIP FOR PREVENTION’
1.4 SUSTAINING PREVENTION
1.4.1 Roles of West European CSOs in Conflict Prevention
2. GLOBAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT OF CONFLICT
2.1 GLOBALISATION
2.2 WAR ON TERROR AND RESPONDING TO ‘NEW SECURITY THREATS’
2.3 ARMED CONFLICTS IN EUROPE
3. BUILDING CAPACITY IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PREVENTION
3.1 INTERACTION WITH GOVERNMENTS
Recommendations for facilitating coherent interaction between CSOs and governments
3.2 UNITED NATIONS
3.2.1 UN System Reform
3.2.2 UN Security Council
3.2.3 UN General Assembly
3.2.4 UN Secretariat and specialised agencies
3.2.5 UN operational staff
3.3 EUROPEAN UNION
3.4 OTHER REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS
3.5 PRINCIPLES FOR CLARIFYING CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
4. CSO STRATEGIES FOR MOBILISING EFFECTIVE ACTION
TO PREVENT CONFLICT
4.1 PUBLIC CAMPAIGNS PROMOTING A CULTURE OF PREVENTION
4.2 ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES AND ENABLING FACTORS
THROUGH POLICYANDSTRUCTURALCHANGES.
4.3 RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO SPECIFIC CONFLICT SITUATIONS
5. RESOURCES AND CAPACITY BUILDING
5.1 CREATING THE SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR EFFECTIVE RESPONSES
5.2 GENERATING THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
AND INFORMATIONAL RESOURCES FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION
5.3 DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE AND EFFECTIVE FINANCIAL / MATERIAL RESOURCES
6. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CSO ROLES
IN CONFLICT PREVENTION
6.1 CONFLICT PREVENTION NGOS: ISSUES IN DEVELOPING THE FIELD
6.2 GUIDING PRINCIPLES / CODES OF CONDUCT
6.3 EVALUATION AND SYSTEMISED LEARNING WITHIN THE FIELD
7. ACTORS AND INTERVENTIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A: The Western Europe Action Agenda:
Core Principles and Priorities
(1st draft of consultation document, 13 January 2004, C Barnes version)
Goals
Our goal is to transform the potential causes of conflict and, short of this, to ensure that the capacity exists to prevent the emergence, escalation or recurrence of armed conflict. While we need to learn how to manage crises more effectively, we should give adequate priority to addressing root causes. We need to create effective multilateral partnerships for prevention that maximise the contribution of civil society organisations (CSO) within a strengthened international system for achieving human security and sustainable peace. We aim to institutionalise the involvement of CSOs in the conflict prevention partnership within each institutional setting through formal recognition of the roles of CSOs in peace and security and the development of formal mechanisms for their involvement in peace and security matters utilising their deliberative, consultative and implementing capacities. Furthermore, the Global Partnership for Conflict Prevention aims to strengthen a civil society network for peace and security by linking local and global levels of action, thus supporting the potential for solidarity work and global mobilisation to transform the causes of conflict and address at-risk situations.
Foundational principles
a) Security for people, as well as for states. We are committed to promoting the security of people: their physical safety, their socio-economic well-being, respect for the dignity and identity of people as individuals and as members of communities, and the protection and promotion of their human rights and fundamental freedoms. We affirm that the security of people is as important as the security of states. We believe that each has the potential to be mutually reinforcing: the satisfaction of the security of its people strengthens the national society and enhances the sovereign equality of every state.
b) A shift to prevention. Promoting peace and security in the twenty-first century requires a fundamental shift in how we respond to the challenge of conflict. Instead of focusing efforts on reacting to crises, when it is often too late to act effectively without the use of force, we must focus on addressing the root causes of conflict and the factors that enable them to become so deadly. Efforts to prevent armed conflict necessitate strengthening systems for peacefully managing competing interests and values and making concerted efforts to fulfil basic human needs. [We see some of the strategies deployed in the ‘War Against Terrorism’ as posing a threat to these efforts.]
c) Multilateralism. Fulfilling an expanded vision of human security cannot be accomplished by any single actor, regardless of how powerful. In an increasingly interdependent and integrated global system, human security has become indivisible: the breakdown of security in one area has the potential to reverberate throughout the world. Furthermore, policies and practices undertaken by one set of actors can have paradoxical consequences – intentional or inadvertent – on conflict dynamics elsewhere. An effective system for conflict prevention requires a strong multilateral framework that enables opportunities for well-informed, coordinated and systematic responses. Furthermore, multilateralism promotes equal adherence to international norms and standards and the need for consistency in adherence to agreed principles throughout the system to prevent the destabilising effects of unilateral self-interested action.
d) A new partnership for prevention. Partnership is therefore key to effective prevention. While governments have primary responsibility for making these efforts, it is rare that any single entity – whether government, international agency, private enterprise or civil society organisation – can address them fully. Effective conflict prevention requires that multiple entities and actors are mobilised to develop constructive and non-violent approaches to address conflicting interests and satisfy needs. An effective multilateral conflict prevention partnership involves governments, intergovernmental organisations, and civil society actors – who are able to undertake initiatives that officials cannot do and are well placed to mobilise societal support for prevention. This requires official acknowledgement of the legitimacy of CSOs in peace and security matters, recognition of their roles in the conflict prevention partnership, and mechanisms and resources to fulfil it operationally.
e) Primacy of national ownership. Primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments and other local actors. Without a sense of national ownership, prevention is unlikely to succeed. For outcomes to be sustainable, the people must feel that the process is ‘theirs’ and that it is not externally imposed. The international community – foreign governments, multilateral institutions, and international NGOs – should therefore see their primary role as creating spaces and supporting inclusive processes necessary to enable the diverse range of people directly involved in the conflict to make decisions about the specific arrangements for resolving it. For this to work effectively, international actors must avoid any actions that displace and undermine home-grown initiatives or that promote short-term objectives at the expense of long-term prevention.
f) Inclusion and equality. In seeking to promote and protect human security, it is important to be aware of the differential affects of policies and practices on different groups within a population. Governments, international agencies, and CSOs must ensure that their actions – either through commission or omission – do not contribute to the systematic exclusion or disadvantage of any set of groups. They should actively seek to promote the involvement and status of women as well as of men and to include people from diverse cultural and socio-economic backgrounds.
Elements in operationalising prevention
a) Institutionalising prevention. The key to fostering sustainable peace and security is to generate a shift towards a ‘culture of prevention’. This will require governments, regional organisation and the UN to institutionalize conflict prevention as the underlying rationale behind their policies as well as their security institutions and instruments. Historically, the emphasis has been on strengthening the institutional capacity for military response. Institutionalising conflict prevention is likely to require redirecting this emphasis towards preparedness for prevention and addressing basic human needs. Priority will need to be on developing the institutional capacity and human resources to implement it effectively. Furthermore, crisis management should be seen as a part of an overall policy of conflict prevention and not as a separate set of activities implemented principally by the military. The foundations for long-term peace and security are laid through effective peacebuilding initiatives. Recognition and support should be provided to CSOs that play important roles in bringing communities together, fostering improved communication and common action, and stimulating zones of peace.
b) The UN: necessity of a strong multilateral system. The UN remains the world’s premier institution for leadership of multilateral conflict prevention. Its ability to do so effectively will be as strong as its Member States enable it to be. CSOs have an important role to play both in advocating a strong UN system capacity for conflict prevention with their governments and in contributing directly to its implementation through the conflict prevention partnership. Yet this will require reform to both strengthen the UN’s institutional capacity for prevention and peacebuilding and the development of a range of effective mechanisms for interaction with CSOs in promoting peace and security.
c) Centrality of local and national CSOs. Civil society actors within the conflict-affected country often have high levels of legitimacy and credibility that enable them to spearhead initiatives that would be difficult for others. They can strengthen the long-term goal of peacebuilding through painstaking consensus-building amongst key social and political actors. They are, therefore, a vital part of any partnership for prevention. International actors, including West European CSOs, can contribute to their effectiveness through support for their initiatives. They can contribute needed resources, capacity building as appropriate, as well as strategic support and solidarity. Governments, the UN and European regional organisations need to mainstream methods for cooperation with CSOs from conflict affected societies into their instruments for conflict prevention so as to benefit from their knowledge and operational capacity. This should help to promote the appropriateness of response and strengthen local ownership of outcomes.
Key CSO strategies in mobilising support for conflict prevention
a) Public campaigns promoting a culture of prevention. A ‘culture of prevention’ and, indeed, a ‘culture of peace’ is underpinned by a shift in public awareness of the causes of conflict and their understanding of security and the methods to promote it. We aim to develop public constituencies for a culture of prevention by implementing campaigns to raise general public awareness of conflict prevention and security paradigms focused on promoting human life and dignity. The goal of these efforts is to generate greater understanding and support for conflict prevention rooted in a multilateral human security paradigm so as to strengthen the foundations for the ‘political will’ to act effectively.
b) Addressing root causes and enabling factors in the global system through policy and structural changes. Some CSOs will devote their energies toward identifying and analysing root causes (such as economic insecurity or participation in the ‘war economy’) and enabling factors (such as the proliferation of small arms and light weapons) of conflict in the global system though policy and structural changes. They can develop recommendations for change and strategies to promote them through policy dialogue, advocacy and campaigning.
c) Responding effectively to specific conflict situations. Local, national and international CSOs have the potential to play effective roles at every point in a conflict cycle. General effectiveness can be enhanced by strengthening partnerships and mechanisms that involve interested governments, multilateral organisations and CSOs with recognised competence to contribute needed resources and support for local peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts and ensure strategic coherence.
Resources and capacities for timely, sustained and effective prevention
a) Creating the social infrastructure for joint action. The effectiveness of individual CSOs can be enhanced by interaction with others in national, regional and global forums. These can provide a wider context for their own work as well as stimulate common initiatives. This potential can be maximised through effective issue-based or situation-specific CSO task groups for enable communication and coordination. They can help to strengthen and support local capacities for peace and responding to conflict.
b) Generating knowledge-based and informational resources. Knowledge is the key to timely and effective prevention strategies. This requires systems for information exchange and efficient use of information technology, as well as forums for joint analysis building consensus on appropriate responses. The overall effectiveness of the field can be improved through systemised learning and assessment of previous and ongoing initiatives to better understand what supported overall change, perhaps through collaborative approaches to evaluation. This is complemented through support for relevant research agendas and the long-term development of the field through professional training and support for conflict prevention studies in educational programmes.
c) Developing sustainable and effective financial resources to support prevention initiatives. Institutionalising conflict prevention will require more resources, more effectively administered. Governments need to recognise and address the paradox of the resources made available for traditional approaches to national security through military defence spending and the relative scarcity of funds for support to promoting human security through funding for conflict prevention initiatives. There is also a need for more effective funding modalities that combine both reliable funding for sustained medium- to long-term initiatives, as well as funding streams that can be quickly administered for flexible rapid response initiatives. In some cases, CSOs can also seek to develop more sustainable and independent funding streams for their prevention activities by developing resources from private donors or by creating membership organisations with independent funding and other support from members.
B: Annotated Agenda
1. A New Partnership for Prevention
1.1 Conflict Prevention Works
Developing effective conflict prevention strategies will save lives, save money, increase security and help to provide an environment in which people are better able to develop their potential.
1.2 Security for the Promotion of Human Life and Dignity
Europe now accepts an expanded concept of peace and security in which the human being is central and states are accountable for their conduct in upholding international norms and commitments.
1.3 Expanded multilateralism: consolidating a new ‘partnership for prevention’
An effective system for conflict prevention can best be undertaken within a strong multilateral framework that enables opportunities for well-informed, coordinated and systematic responses.
1.4 Sustaining Prevention
As the main responsibility for sustaining conflict prevention rests with the parties concerned, local ownership and capacity building is primary.
1.4.1 Roles of West European CSOs in Conflict Prevention
Civil society organisations in Western Europe already engage with peace and security challenges in a myriad of ways.
2. Global and European Context of Conflict
Conflict prevention necessitates understanding and addressing its root causes and those enabling factors that sustain it, through policy and structural changes. We also need to address active and potential conflicts in our own societies and learn from good practice in responding to them.
2.1 Globalisation
Globalisation has brought a number of new security challenges.
2.2 War on Terror and responding to ‘new security threats’
We believe that the overarching frame of the US-led ‘War on Terror’ will ultimately prove ineffective and counter-productive.
2.3 Armed Conflicts in Europe
We can learn from our history and experience.
3. Building capacity in the partnership for prevention
We want to strengthen the institutional capacity for conflict prevention of European governments, the UN and European organisations and in ways that draw on and complements the contributions of CSOs.
3.1 Interaction with Governments
There is a need to explore how we interact with governments. In particular, we should seek to discuss and understand the values and political positioning that characterizes these relationships, so as to engage more effectively, ethically and strategically in responding to conflict.
3.2 United Nations
CSOs have an important role to play both in advocating a strong UN system capacity for conflict prevention and in contributing directly to its implementation through the conflict prevention partnership.
3.2.1 UN System Reform - There are number of barriers within the structure of the UN system that hinder its effectiveness in addressing the challenge of peacebuilding and conflict prevention
3.2.2 UN Security Council - The Security Council could make better use of the knowledge of individuals and organisations in civil society with specialised and localised knowledge and influence.
3.2.3 UN General Assembly – Also the General Assembly could make better use of individuals and organisations in civil society with specialised and localised knowledge and influence.
3.2.4 UN Secretariat and specialised agencies - Mechanisms are needed for interaction at headquarters level and at the regional level where many operations are carried out. We also need to identify ways of interacting with the international financial institutions.
3.2.5 UN operational staff - Enhancing the link with CSOs.
3.3 European Union
This Action Agenda will focus on EU policies and practices and the capacity for political dialogue through: CFSP – including early warning and early response; crisis management – including civilian peace teams; interaction through engagement with other EU mechanisms and instruments.
3.4 Other Regional Organisations
Need for CSO interaction within the framework of other European regional organisations involved in conflict prevention such as the OSCE, Council of Europe, NATO etc.
3.5 Principles for clarifying Civilian-Military relationships
The promotion and reassertion of civilian primacy over peace-building and development aid should be an objective.
4. CSO Strategies for Mobilising Effective Action to Prevent Conflict
4.1 Public campaigns promoting a culture of prevention
Aim to implement campaigns designed to raise general public awareness of conflict prevention and security paradigms focused on promoting human life and dignity.
4.2 Addressing root causes and enabling factors through policy and structural changes
Strategies to address root causes (e.g. economic insecurity or participation in the ‘war economy’) and enabling factors (e.g. small arms and light weapons) of conflict in the global system through policy and structural changes.
4.3 Responding effectively to specific conflict situations
Strengthening partnerships – possibly through the development of ‘group of friends’ mechanisms consisting of interested governments, multilateral organisations and CSOs with recognised competence to contribute needed resources and support for local peacemaking and peace-building efforts.
5. Resources and Capacity Building
Developing the resource base to ensure the capacity for timely, sustained and effective responses to prevent conflict.
5.1 Creating the social infrastructure for effective responses
5.2 Generating the knowledge-based and informational resources for effective action
5.3 Developing sustainable and effective financial / material resources
6. Guiding principles for CSO roles in conflict prevention
6.1 Conflict prevention NGOs: issues in developing the field
To become more effective we need to create mechanisms for exchange of experience and shared reflection on what has worked, what has not worked and why.
6.2 Guiding principles / codes of conduct
Need to stimulate systematic thinking, especially in the Western European context, of proper relations between insider and outsider roles in conflict prevention – especially related to power asymmetries, agenda setting and the meaning of ‘partnership’
6.3 Evaluation and systemised learning within the field
7. Actors and Interventions
C: Full policy document
1. A New Partnership for Prevention
1.1 Conflict prevention works
Developing effective conflict prevention strategies will save lives, save money, increase security and help to provide an environment in which people are better able to develop their potential.
While we still need to learn how to manage crises more effectively, if we are to prevent, or at least reduce the number, of future crises we need to give greater priority to addressing their root causes.
Effective conflict prevention requires that multiple entities and actors – including those close to the primary parties in an armed conflict – are mobilised to develop constructive and non-violent approaches to satisfying conflicting interests and needs.
While the UN Charter provided a strong mandate for preventing conflict, collective security has largely been pursued by reacting to crises rather than preventing them. Because these reactive responses tend to be reliant on military means, this has presented dilemmas about when coercive intervention is legitimate and generated nervousness about undermining state sovereignty. These concerns have too often paralysed the system, leading to the failure to act collectively.
The key to fostering sustainable peace and security is to generate a shift towards a ‘culture of prevention’. This will require governments and IGOs to institutionalize conflict prevention as the underlying rationale behind their security institutions and instruments. Historically, the emphasis has been on strengthening the institutional capacity for military response. Institutionalising conflict prevention is likely to require redirecting this emphasis towards preparedness for prevention and addressing basic human needs – and creating the institutional capacity and human resources to implement it effectively.
This Action Agenda is intended to set forth key principles and recommendations to Western Europe and to consolidate a ‘culture of prevention’ internationally that maximises the effective engagement of civil society organisations (CSOs), as well as governments, intergovernmental organisations and other actors.
1.2 Security for the promotion of human life and dignity
Europe now accepts an expanded concept of peace and security in which the human being is central and states are accountable for their conduct in upholding international norms and commitments. This human security paradigm has been incorporated in multilateral institutions, notably the OSCE and increasingly within the EU. It was also affirmed in the UN system.
Disagreements over how to respond to global security threats, especially the challenge of international terrorism, has recently jeopardised this consensus. Attention and resources are being diverted from addressing the root causes of conflict and redirected toward the new security agenda, based on realpolitik in which military options are pre-eminent, and which also, for example, tolerates human rights violations once more - even when committed by allies.
As civil society actors committed to conflict prevention, we affirm the essential value of the human security paradigm. We are committed to promoting the security of people – their physical safety, their socio-economic well-being, respect for the dignity and identity of people as individuals and as members of communities, and the protection and promotion of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We also believe that a secure people will enhance the security of every state. This belief underpins the significance of democratic government of, by and for the people. The vitality of the diverse elements that compose a country’s civil society is crucial to the exercise of this popular sovereignty. Civil society organisations often serve as the channel for developing and articulating the values and interests of the population and formulating agendas that can be taken up by political representatives and become the basis of responsive government. Importantly, this combination of a strong and effective civil society and a responsive government tends to result in a strong capacity to manage through peaceful means the competing interests and antagonisms that might otherwise develop into conflict. International conflict prevention strategies, therefore, should seek to strengthen these capacities by supporting good government and civil society.
In seeking to promote and protect human security, it is important that governments, international agencies, and CSOs ensure that their actions – either through commission or omission – do not contribute to the systematic exclusion or disadvantage of any set of groups. For instance, they should actively seek to promote the involvement and status of women as well as of men, and include people from diverse cultural, socio-economic and other minority backgrounds.
1.3 Expanded multilateralism: consolidating a new ‘partnership for prevention’
Fulfilling an expanded vision of human security cannot be accomplished by any one actor alone – no matter how powerful. It must be a truly cooperative endeavour. This multilateral approach emerged from the recognition that major global problems can only be addressed effectively through the coordinated efforts and policies developed collectively by many countries through multilateral fora. It is built on the principle that international norms and standards should apply to all and be complied with by all.
Furthermore, multilateralism promotes equal adherence to international norms and standards. It aims to counterbalance the temptation to unilateral action by specific actors in the single-minded pursuit of their own self-interests who judge that they can ‘get away with it’, despite negative consequences for others. This tendency highlights the need for consistency in adherence to internationally agreed norms and standards throughout the international system. Contradictory behaviour and double standards fundamentally undermine the integrity and effectiveness of multilateralism and ultimately weaken the capacity to promote sustainable peace and security.
In an increasingly interdependent world, human security has become indivisible: the breakdown of security in one area has the potential to reverberate throughout the world. Furthermore, policies and practices undertaken by one set of actors can have paradoxical consequences – intentional or inadvertent – on conflict dynamics elsewhere. An effective system for conflict prevention can therefore best be undertaken within a strong multilateral framework that enables opportunities for well-informed, coordinated and systematic responses.
Yet this conception of multilateralism is strongest if it expands beyond state actors to encompass the range of non-state actors with an interest in prevention. The roles and obligations of intergovernmental bodies and of governments in peace and security are defined in international law and customary practice. The roles of non-state actors are less well defined and more diverse. Without attempting artificially to ‘pigeon hole’ non-state actors – in part because this would constrict the freedom and independence that makes them so valuable – it is important to recognise officially the contribution they can make in the conflict prevention partnership with governments.
There is also a need to acknowledge, affirm and build on the principle identified in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, where he recognised that conflict prevention cannot happen without civil society involvement.
CSOs, which operate at all social levels, tend to be well positioned to advocate and consolidate a culture of prevention. This is partly because they tend to be most conscious of the human consequences of conflict, which, in turn, lends them towards adopting people-centric approaches and strategies. They are also well placed to advocate structural and policy changes that address root causes of conflict.
CSOs are also able to make important contributions to crisis management, peacemaking and long-term peacebuilding, thereby supporting the prevention and peaceful resolution of specific conflicts.
CSOs can play a number of unique roles in specific conflict situations. They can typically contribute detailed knowledge, innovative insights, and the potential to build consensus amongst diverse and often contending elements in a society. Furthermore, their independence and status gives them the freedom to act in a range of capacities to address various circumstances.
&Mac183; Because CSOs derive their legitimacy from what they do and not from whom they represent or from any kind of external mandate, they can often act when official actors are immobilised (often related to mandates, lack of political will or the implications of messages conveyed by their official status).
&Mac183; As CSOs tend to be aware of events as they are unfolding they can perform an important early warning role, and are then able to respond swiftly and flexibly as needed - often in innovative and non-coercive ways.
&Mac183; CSOs can play a vital role in fostering interaction between people across conflict divides and generally help to foster engagement around common interests or concerns, creating opportunities and supporting mechanisms for conciliation.
&Mac183; Because CSOs can also be a factor in conflict as well in peace, it is important that they are involved in initiatives to resolve differences and transform relationships. Their successful engagement can help to consolidate such initiatives and ensure that outcomes are considered acceptable and legitimate.
&Mac183; While governmental and inter-governmental actors are often compelled by short-termism, many CSO actors take a longer-term view to peacebuilding and conflict transformation and are usually strong advocates of sustainable prevention.
&Mac183; By mobilising ‘people power’, CSOs can put pressure on decision-makers amongst combatant groups to reach a peaceful settlement. They can also push for policies and practices designed to address root causes of conflict.
Through the effectiveness of their engagement in the intergovernmental arena, CSOs can serve as a counterbalance in deliberative processes and help to ‘mitigate power politics’. This suggests that the establishment of a democratic international network of CSOs to serve as a counterpart to the United Nations and European regional organizations for work on conflict issues would be useful.
Developing constructive partnerships for prevention that include the diverse range of potential official and civil society actors is challenging. In addition to extending official recognition to the role of CSOs in principle, it is also important to develop a range of effective mechanisms – formal and informal, ongoing and ad hoc – that enable effective communication, consultation and coordination. Information sharing, joint analysis and shared strategic goals can help to ensure that strategies do not undermine each other and that short-term objectives do not imperil long-term goals. There will be times when CSOs will need to accept that governments and IGOs will often view them in a purely consultative capacity and also that some forums will be closed to them.
On the other hand, there are also times when CSOs - representing a diversity of perspectives on goals and strategies, and strong defenders of their independence - will disagree with governments and adopt confrontational strategies to achieve their aims.
1.4 Sustaining prevention
As the main responsibility for sustaining conflict prevention rests with the parties concerned, local ownership and capacity building is primary.
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict stressed that the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments and other local actors. This principle strengthens respect for national sovereignty while implicitly acknowledging the importance of partnership. Due respect for sovereignty is key to the political viability of prevention. It is the expanded conception of sovereignty that resides in the people of the country, however, that reveals the strategic importance of ownership of the prevention process. Without a sense of national ownership in each case, prevention is unlikely to succeed.
Democratic government rests on the principle of the consent of the governed; the ‘will of the people’ is the source of legitimacy for the government’s authority. This ‘will’ can, however, only be found if there are effective mechanisms for genuine public participation by all the different elements that exist in the society. The failure to ensure effective political participation is often one of the root causes of conflict because those who feel excluded from the existing system struggle to have their voice ‘heard’ and their interests secured through other means, which all too often are violent ones. One of the difficult challenges for preventing or resolving violent conflict is to generate sufficient confidence and specifically agreed arrangements to ensure that this exclusion does not repeat itself. If the actual strategies and processes used to foster conflict resolution are inclusive, it can help to ensure that this transition occurs.
The international community – foreign governments, multilateral institutions, and international NGOs – should therefore see their primary role as creating spaces and supporting processes necessary to enable those who consider the country as their home to make decisions about the specific arrangements for its future. The importance of local ownership and transparency in the process cannot be underestimated. This is especially urgent in the context of fears about imposition of neo-colonial puppet regimes – which can be a significant barrier to international action to prevent conflict. Instead, for outcomes to be sustainable, the people must feel that the process is ‘theirs’ and that it is not externally imposed.
Civil society actors within the conflict-affected country can play vital roles in this process. They are often motivated to support change for reasons beyond narrow political self-interest and may have high levels of legitimacy and credibility amongst sections of the public, as well as with decision-makers in their government. This can enable them to spearhead initiatives that would be difficult for others. Furthermore, they are typically motivated for sustained engagement in a change process and can strengthen the long-term legitimacy of that process through painstaking consensus-building amongst key social and political actors. They are, therefore, a vital part of any partnership for prevention. International actors, including West European CSOs, can contribute to their effectiveness through support for their initiatives. They can contribute needed resources, capacity building as appropriate, as well as strategic support and solidarity. For this to work effectively, international actors must avoid any actions that displace and undermine these home-grown initiatives.
1.4.1 Roles of West European CSOs in Conflict Prevention
Civil society organisations in Western Europe engage with peace and security challenges in a myriad of ways.
&Mac183; First, many CSOs seek to prevent conflicts within their own societies by addressing the substantive causes and triggers of conflict and through promoting dialogue between antagonists. These roles have been evident both in societies effected by armed conflict and in societies where more generalised social conflict is prevalent.
&Mac183; Second, many West European CSOs have played an active role world-wide in advocating policy and structural changes to address factors that underlie or enable armed conflict. Through advocacy campaigns targeting diverse audiences – including their own governments, transnational corporations and the international community more widely – they have sought to address issues ranging from debt burdens and trade justice, to conflict diamonds, to the arms trade, to banning landmines.
&Mac183; Third, West European CSOs have sought to support the peaceful transformation of specific conflict situations in other parts of the world. They do so through partnership and capacity building with CSOs in the conflict-affected societies, dialogue facilitation between antagonists, situation analysis and policy dialogue - all maximising the attributes of their independence and unofficial status.
2. Global and European Context of Conflict
Key messages: conflict prevention necessitates understanding and addressing its root causes and those enabling factors that sustain it, through policy and structural changes. We also need to address active and potential conflicts in our own societies and learn from good practice in responding to them.
2.1 Globalisation
We need to recognise:
&Mac183; Security has become increasingly indivisible in the 21st century.
&Mac183; There is a connection between structural violence and new security threats.
&Mac183; There are a number of extant conflicts and ‘failing states’.
&Mac183; Transnational crime and trafficking pose particular challenges in that they provide opportunities and incentives for states and non-state actors to take up armed conflict.
&Mac183; Links to policies and practices of European governments and European institutions.
2.2 War on Terror and responding to ‘new security threats’
While recognising that real and immediate threats need to be dealt with, we believe that the overarching frame of the US-led ‘War on Terror’ will ultimately prove ineffective. A failure to address the root causes of conflicts allied to the pursuit of an aggressive military strategy as a means of defeating terrorism is likely to prove counter-productive and, therefore, ultimately risks being self-defeating.
The resurgence of a unilateralist military approach is undermining the international security system developed through the UN. This poses a fundamental challenge to the conflict prevention agenda. The Global Partnership should aim to address this core challenge and promote alternative security paradigms, based around ‘human security’ and structural justice, in order to advance a ‘culture of prevention’ and sustainable peace grounded in a more equitable social order capable of satisfying basic human needs.
The pursuit of the War on Terror has had complex and varied consequences. While there have undoubtedly been gains in preventing specific incidents of violence, we are already witnessing paradoxical outcomes from the policies and practices pursued that seem to undermine conflict prevention initiatives. They include:
&Mac183; Reassertion of the supremacy of militaristic responses to threats and militarism as the dominant security paradigm.
&Mac183; Propensity to ignore the possible causes of terrorism; instead it is portrayed as a struggle against the ‘forces of evil’ where the enemy can be eliminated.
&Mac183; Budgets and priorities have been redirected to implement this new security agenda.
&Mac183; Many other conflicts have been subsumed and political alliances forged or severed though the concept’s all-encompassing logic.
&Mac183; The War on Terror has been used as a rationale to further consolidate the power of a number of existing elites and rulers (often despite their record of gross human rights violations).
&Mac183; Many peace processes have been derailed and conflicts escalated. Barriers have been erected that impede initiatives to engage members of groups labeled as ‘terrorist organizations’ in peace processes even though political dialogue might result in a settlement ending the armed conflict.
&Mac183; Polarization along multiple axes: e.g. the US’s assertion that ‘you are with us or against us’; between the ‘Muslim’ and ‘non-Muslim’ worlds; within societies/ between different segments of societies.
&Mac183; Further violations of human rights and erosions of civil liberties that undermine the rule of law and give rise to a pervasive sense of injustice that may stimulate militancy.
&Mac183; The prevalence of fear and other psycho-effects on many communities.
&Mac183; Mobilization of popular resistance and energized opposition (e.g. peace movement).
In each arena where the War on Terror is being waged, there are specific and often localised causes and dynamics of conflicts now subsumed under this umbrella. In many places, these are linked to persistent marginalization (economic, social, cultural and political), poverty and inequality. Corrupt and undemocratic/unresponsive governments have provoked the emergence and consolidation of militant ideologies as a revolutionary reaction to injustice. Those propagating the War on Terror are now becoming less critical of these governments and their practices.
In many cases, present difficulties with terrorism are a legacy of the past pursuit of unprincipled foreign policy; one rooted in the expediency that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my ally’. This has led previously to support being afforded to Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the jihadis in Afghanistan, for example. It should be evident that ‘more of the same’ – as seen in policies and practices deployed in today’s War on Terror – is likely to generate more conflict and exacerbate the problem still further. In other words, we are in great danger of stoking up more problems for tomorrow.
Instead, we need principled political responses using the full range of instruments available to address the essentially political nature of the causes giving rise to conflict. Crucially, there is a need to reassert and promote the ‘human security’ paradigm as the guiding principle for government policy and practice.
CSOs can contribute to this alternative approach to addressing the new security threats through a conflict prevention approach based in promoting human security. They can:
&Mac183; Conduct research and analysis: (a) A retrospective analysis of past policies / strategies to understand whether and how they contributed to generating the contemporary situation. (b) Analyze current policies and practices of governments from a conflict prevention perspective and make recommendations for good practice. (c) Document and communicate our experience of how the War on Terrorism has affected our work and changed conflict dynamics throughout the world.
&Mac183; Address the ways the new security agenda has shifted attention away from addressing root causes of conflict; for example, the ‘development and security nexus’ whereby development priorities are subsumed and overtaken by security priorities.
&Mac183; Conflict prevention NGOs also need to discuss and seek to understand how their work is positioned within this setting: are we a part of the new security agenda? Can we keep our independence from it while still playing a constructive role?
&Mac183; Initiating and/or engaging in dialogue and cooperation across ‘conflict divides’.
&Mac183; Challenging existing power relationships and through promotion of local ownership / local solutions.
&Mac183; Mobilizing popular support/developing a ‘constituency for peace’ throughout Western Europe – and one that is mobilized in support of agendas that promote the human security paradigm i.e. mobilized FOR promoting human security; not just AGAINST war. Groups that work on conflict issues can explore more direct engagement with the contemporary peace movement.
2.3 Armed Conflicts in Europe
Learning from our history and experience.
&Mac183; European integration manifest in the European Union as a peacebuilding/conflict prevention project after centuries of inter-state war – roles of CSOs within this process (e.g. Franco-German reconciliation and Moral Rearmament’s role in facilitating the process…)
&Mac183; The challenges of armed conflict in Western Europe: e.g. Irish Peace Process, Basque Country, Corsica…
&Mac183; The challenge of minority rights and multiculturalism in Western Europe today: preventing potential armed conflicts of the future?
3. Building capacity in the partnership for prevention
Overarching goals:
Ë To strengthen the institutional capacity for conflict prevention of European governments, the UN and European organisations that draws on and complements the contributions of CSOs.
Ë To formalise the involvement of CSOs in the conflict prevention partnership within each institutional setting through:
&Mac183; formal recognition of the roles and responsibilities of CSOs in peace and security;
&Mac183; formal mechanisms for their involvement in both consultative and implementing capacities in the deliberative functions of government and international organisations on peace and security matters.
Ë We want to both strengthen rapid response capacities through the development of specific mechanisms and to ensure that the policies, practices and operational mandates of official peace operations complement and strengthen long-term conflict transformation efforts, which are often conducted at the initiative of civil society peace-builders.
The following are options that arose from brainstorming meetings and which should now be considered:
[Goal from London Brainstorming meeting: International standards and government requirements: need for codified instruments and mechanisms for conflict prevention. Drawing on experiences from previous UN conferences, should the Global Partnership on Conflict Prevention work towards standard setting that would result in structurally integrated requirements for governments and multilateral agencies to address the causes and dynamics of conflict? (Agenda 21 commitments emerging from the Rio Conference and requirements emerging from the Convention on the Rights of the Child were given as examples.) The goal could be to ensure that governments and multilateral organizations would be required to focus on assessing the likely impact of their activities on conflict and then to use this analysis to make appropriate policy and programmatic responses. This could involve the requirement for a credible and mainstreamed peace policy with targets and/or mechanisms to more effectively prevent and respond to conflict. (For example, mainstreaming conflict prevention / reduction goals into all poverty reduction strategy papers.) ]
[Goal from International Advisory Group Content Meeting: A World Conference on Peace and Security (similar to those on human rights, sustainable development, or women):
&Mac183; The purpose of such a conference would be to focus on developing norms and standards for addressing government obligations in relation to conflict prevention. It could aim to develop an international consensus on responsibilities for addressing armed conflicts occurring within states (based on the recognition that the existing system was created principally to address the threats to international security posed by conflicts between states).
&Mac183; There would be a significant involvement of CSOs and a focus on their roles in conflict prevention and peacebuilding – including strategies for preventing or addressing violence perpetrated by non-state actors. A CSO aim would be to institutionalize recognition of the roles of civil society actors in peace and security issues by the UN and, implicitly, by its member states.
&Mac183; Building on the July 2005 Conference, an official World Conference on Peace and Security could serve as a catalyst both for generating a civil society movement and for raising public awareness of civil society’s roles in promoting peace and security concerns.]
3.1 Interaction with Governments
An analysis of the complex roles of European governments re: conflict prevention and the roles of European CSOs in building domestic constituencies of support for conflict prevention. One question would be how to find the right balance between CSOs cooperating with and/or confronting governments.
[From London Brainstorming Meeting: There is a need to explore how we interact with governments. In particular, we should seek to discuss and understand the values and political positioning that characterizes these relationships, so as to engage more effectively, ethically and strategically in responding to conflict. A number of modalities were identified:
&Mac183; Complicit – as citizens and as organizational groups embedded in a country’s civil society, we are party to the decisions that our governments make in our name.
&Mac183; Contractual – when CSOs implement government policies and programmes through their work, often by receiving funding from governments.
&Mac183; Contributing – through participation in policy dialogue and recommendations for appropriate responses to specific situations or issues.
&Mac183; Complementarity – working in parallel as separate / autonomous entities within the same system of issues and relationships.
&Mac183; Contesting / Confronting – when CSOs challenge government actions, priorities, and behaviour]
Recommendations for facilitating coherent interaction between CSOs and governments
Institutionalising prevention at a national level will require a thorough review of government policies and practices, its institutional arrangements and capacities, and the allocation of budgetary resources to ensure that they are consistent with a prevention ethos.
&Mac183; When governments organise for conflict prevention and peacebuilding within or across relevant government agencies they should include civil society liaison officers.
&Mac183; Develop formal institutional arrangements for cooperation between governments and CSOs in the field of conflict prevention, developing best practice in light of examples already underway in other countries.
&Mac183; Strengthen other channels for policy dialogue on a range of topics that interconnect with the structural causes of conflict.
&Mac183; Develop conflict prevention policies that oblige governments to commit to civil society partnerships. Ensure that monitoring mechanisms are incorporated into these policies, as well as arrangements for funding the partnership and for planning exercises.
&Mac183; Develop civilian rosters / pools of available personnel for peace operations. As appropriate, develop civilian peace services.
3.2 United Nations
As the world’s premier institution for promoting global peace and security, the UN remains the primary source of leadership for multilateral conflict prevention. We recognise, however, that its capacities to do so effectively will be as strong as its Member States enable it to be. CSOs have an important role to play both in advocating a strong UN system capacity for conflict prevention and in contributing directly to its implementation through the conflict prevention partnership.
The Global Partnership emerged in response to a recommendation by the UN Secretary-General in his June 2001 Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Further defining the roles of CSOs in interaction with the UN and governments on conflict prevention is a central goal of the Global Partnership. The UN system is therefore both an arena for engagement and a target for change. This Action Agenda therefore seeks to both advocate reforms to the UN system itself to strengthen its overall conflict prevention capacity and to advocate specific mechanisms and roles that can be played by CSOs within it.
3.2.1 UN System Reform
The UN system for peace and security issues was created on the assumption that the main threats were from wars between states. Although this threat has not disappeared, the predominant trend has been towards conflicts within states or, increasingly, through unconventional transnational militant movements. It appears that the international system has been deficient in its responses to these conflicts.
Currently, the UN’s partnership with CSOs on peace and security matters is not well developed nor strongly integrated – in part because hitherto this field has been seen as the exclusive responsibility of governments. Furthermore, although there are well-developed institutions for responding to some of the humanitarian consequences of conflict – such as emergency relief or support for refugees and internally displaced persons – in most conflict situations, the institutional framework for systematically promoting peacebuilding on the ground is weak.
There are number of barriers within the structure of the UN system that hinder its effectiveness in addressing the challenge of peacebuilding and conflict prevention:
&Mac183; Responsibility for these central tasks is dispersed and there is no ‘lead’ for developing coherent strategies and systematic learning.
&Mac183; The lack of designated leadership can result in fragmented and ad hoc responses by different arms of the system, sometimes leading to counter-productive initiatives and mandates.
&Mac183; Without this strategic leadership, most players in the UN system are continually engaged in crisis responses and management rather than in taking a medium- to longer-term systematic view and implementing strategies and programmes to address challenges.
&Mac183; Under the current arrangements it is difficult for staff to dedicate time, attention and resources to enabling a ‘culture of prevention’ throughout the system.
Institutionalising a lead agency, instrument and / or mechanism with responsibility for preventing conflict and peacebuilding. A number of people believed that our minimum advocacy ‘ask’ should be a mechanism to institutionalise our interaction on peace and security issues. Several options were identified:
&Mac183; Nominating a UN High Commissioner for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.
&Mac183; The creation of a specialized UN agency, department, or a unit within a lead agency that has designated responsibility for taking a lead in developing and coordinating responses for peacebuilding. It would need to be sufficiently powerful to address conflicts systematically at both the political and social levels and include recognition and formal mechanisms for interaction with CSOs.
Develop a UN-civil society mediation / dispute settlement capacity.
&Mac183; Recruit a Professional Mediation Corps - see ‘Global Action to Prevent War’ recommendations and rationale.
&Mac183; Build on the formula derived from a UN General Assembly agenda item for a UN dispute settlement service (which was originally proposed in 1993 by Sierra Leone); or
&Mac183; by taking up the UN Commission on Peace and Crisis Prevention (UNCOPAC) proposal.
The above proposals should be researched and discussed in regard to what is really feasible and acceptable in the International System.
In addition to examining the UN system as a whole, it would be helpful to analyse the UN’s roles in specific conflict situations. In some cases, the mandate for peace operations appears to create constraints for longer-term peacebuilding and the engagement of CSOs in conflict transformation. Instead of creating a positive peace by addressing underlying causes and relationships, some peace operations actually contribute to keeping a conflict frozen by limiting their ambition to the prevention of a recurrence of violence.
3.2.2 UN Security Council
The UN Security Council remains the leading forum in the international system with responsibility for peace and security matters and, as such, has a special obligation for preventing the emergence, escalation or recurrence of armed conflicts. The Security Council could make better use of the knowledge of individuals and organisations in civil society with specialised and localised knowledge and influence.
The Arria formula or other similar arrangements should be developed for informal discussion outside Council chambers to enable an exchange of views on prevention. Fact-finding missions conducted by the Security Council provide an important opportunity to informally and / or formally seek the views of a range of civil society representatives in conflict effected societies and can help to ensure that the Security Council’s analysis takes into account indigenous strategies and initiatives for long-term prevention and peacebuilding.
Creation of a ‘Conflict Watch’ committee of the Security Council, complemented and monitored by an NGO ‘Conflict Watch’ committee (see ‘Global Action to Prevent War’ recommendations and rationale).
3.2.3 UN General Assembly
The General Assembly could also make better use of individuals and organisations in civil society with specialised and localised knowledge and influence. One option to facilitate that could be the creation of a UN Commission on Peace and Crisis Prevention (UNCOPAC) created as a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly in cooperation with CSOs Ë see note above.
3.2.4 UN Secretariat and specialised agencies
There is a need to develop and strengthen mechanisms for interaction between CSOs and the UN specifically on peace and security issues related to conflict prevention and peace-building.
&Mac183; Mechanisms are needed for interaction at headquarters level and at the regional level where many operations are carried out e.g. recommendations for specific mechanisms for interaction with UN Department of Political Affairs, etc…
&Mac183; We also need to identify ways of interacting with the international financial institutions – such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund – whose policies and practices play crucial roles in the potential for generating and for preventing conflict.
3.2.5 UN operational staff
In his 2001 report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, the Secretary-General urged greater awareness amongst UN practitioners, field presences and agencies of the strengths and limitations of civil society actors in the area of conflict prevention and resolution. Ways of enhancing the links between UN operational staff and CSOs include:
&Mac183; UN operational staff in agency headquarters and in field offices should mainstream mechanisms for consultation and cooperation with CSOs in all their conflict prevention activities. These mechanisms are particularly important in places with UN peace operations, where UN mission staff should develop mechanisms for consultation and, where appropriate, formal cooperation with local, national or international CSOs.
&Mac183; UN offices have a uniquely legitimate status to convene task forces or working groups involving a representative cross-section of international agencies, governments and civil society actors with a common interest in specific thematic topics or conflict situations. Establishing such informal fora can help to ensure that the potential of the conflict prevention partnership is maximised.
&Mac183; There are also ways of increasing the capacity of the UN for rapid response to crises drawing on civilian resources existing within CSOs and civil society more widely through the development of civilian standby arrangements for deployment in UN operations.
&Mac183; Specialized conflict prevention and peacebuilding CSOs can play a role in capacity building with staff in the UN system that are not well acquainted with working with conflict and processes or strategies for promoting peacebuilding, particularly at a community and social level. CSOs can develop projects and materials targeting UN audiences to develop their knowledge or ‘literacy’ in conflict transformation and peacebuilding and / or can offer training modules.
3.3 European Union
This Action Agenda will focus on EU policies and practices and the capacity for political dialogue through:
(a) CFSP – including early warning and early response.
(b) Crisis management – including civilian peace teams / civilian peace service.
(c) Interaction through engagement with other EU mechanisms and instruments.
We acknowledge the significance of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts endorsed by the Göteborg European Council of June 2000. This affirmed that the highest political priority will be given to improving the effectiveness and coherence of its external action in the field of conflict prevention, thereby also enhancing the preventive capabilities of the international community at large. The EU’s contribution to conflict prevention has been subsequently developed through the European Commission, with further thinking emerging from the August 2002 Helsingborg Agenda. The Göteborg categories stated the need for the EU to:
&Mac183; Set clear political priorities for preventive actions.
&Mac183; Improve its early warning, action and policy coherence.
&Mac183; Enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention.
&Mac183; Build effective partnerships for prevention.
Within this framework, the EU should give priority to support for development as a foundation for the promotion of human security within its emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
Civil society organisations can and should be viewed as a principle partner in promoting international cooperation in prevention. To do so effectively, a range of formal and informal mechanisms should be established to provide points for communication, consultation and cooperation. CSOs can make valuable contributions to the development and implementation of CFSP arrangements for early warning and early response. They should have an active role in informing the development of country strategy papers. In addition to interaction with CSOs based in EU member states, there is a need to mainstream cooperation with CSOs from conflict-effected societies into EU instruments for conflict prevention so as to benefit from their knowledge and operational capacity. This should help to promote the appropriateness of response and strengthen local ownership of outcomes.
Crisis management should be seen as part of an overall policy of conflict prevention and not as a separate set of activities implemented principally by the military. The foundations for long-term peace and security are laid through effective peace-building initiatives. Civilians and NGO staff should be recognised as playing an important role in bringing communities together, fostering improved communication and common action, and supporting the development of zones of peace.
&Mac183; civilian peace services
&Mac183; rapid reaction funds for small yet timely interventions by CSOs – need for minimum paperwork and administrative requirements to ensure rapid response is not inhibited by onerous bureaucratic requirements.
Ë Development of an EU department / office for conflict prevention and peacebuilding?
3.4 Other Regional Organisations
CSO interaction within the framework of other European regional organisations involved in conflict prevention
(a) OSCE
(b) Council of Europe
(c) NATO (?)
+ consider importance of DAC Task Force and G8 summits…?
3.5 Principles for Clarifying Civilian-Military Relationships
[From Irish Brainstorming Session] An objective of the conference should be to promote the reassertion of civilian primacy over peacebuilding and development aid. The increasing military involvement in these issues – including viewing humanitarian assistance in strategic military terms – can pose a major danger. While military forces acting within the framework of a UN mandate can play a role in peacebuilding through helping to enforce or to secure a peace settlement that is negotiated by governments or international actors, its role should not extend to humanitarian aid distribution, infrastructure development and capacity building. The UN conference in 2005 should develop very clear guidelines as to the role of the military in conflict resolution situations.
4. CSO Strategies for Mobilising Effective Action to Prevent Conflict
4.1 Public campaigns promoting a culture of prevention
Assumption: Recognition that a ‘culture of prevention’ and, indeed, a ‘culture of peace’ is underpinned by a shift in public awareness of the causes of conflict and their understanding of security and the methods to promote it. Fostering this shift is a key Global Partnership goal, albeit one that may take some time to implement.
Aim: to implement campaigns designed to raise general public awareness of conflict prevention and security paradigms focused on promoting human life and dignity (e.g. developing public constituencies for a culture of prevention). To generate greater understanding and support for conflict prevention rooted in a multilateral human security paradigm so as to strengthen the foundations for the ‘political will’ to act effectively.
4.2 Addressing root causes and enabling factors through policy and structural changes
Strategies to address root causes (e.g. economic insecurity or participation in the ‘war economy’) and enabling factors (e.g. small arms and light weapons) of conflict in the global system through policy and structural changes.
Mobilising political support for action: NGOs have a crucial and ever increasing role in contributing information, arguments and energy to influencing the decision-making process. They can directly address policy-makers and address those who, in turn, influence them.
Ë need to understand the creative tension between strategies based on co-operative engagement with governmental and IGO decision-makers versus strategies that deploy confrontation to generate political pressure for change.
Ë importance of working with partners from conflict-effected regions, especially to ensure agendas are appropriate and do not displace / undermine their agendas as well as to forge common causes and effective strategies.
&Mac183; Research and analysis of the systemic causes and enabling factors for conflict as well as strategies for addressing them
&Mac183; Auditing existing and proposed policies and practices to ensure they are conflict sensitive (e.g. trade policy, foreign policy, etc.)
&Mac183; Monitoring implementation of international norms and standards
&Mac183; Lobbying and advocacy campaigns as appropriate
&Mac183; Coalition building
4.3 Responding effectively to specific conflict situations
Strengthening partnerships – possibly through the development of ‘group of friends’ mechanisms consisting of interested governments, multilateral organisations and CSOs with recognised competence to contribute needed resources and support for local peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.
Institutionalising early warning / early response capacity for countries / regions at risk:
&Mac183; Forum for group of experts (civil society and official; local and ‘international’) to meet regularly to exchange information and stimulate thinking on effective strategic response.
&Mac183; Need to develop broad-based fora for deliberating response options amongst CSOs – building the basis of consensus around principles for action and options for policy responses. Global partnership in creating the social infrastructure for such interaction ‡ yet need financial support to enable such meetings to be organised, often at short notice.
&Mac183; Support for campaigning / ‘alert’-based groups to serve as ‘watchdogs’ and to mobilise rapid response (consider, for example, roles of organisations such as Amnesty International that can mobilise a global response to specific violations…)
Developing rapid response mechanisms that complement and strengthen local capacities for peace, as well as contributing foreign resources for physical protection of civilians as necessary.
5. Resources and Capacity Building
Ë Overarching goal: Developing the resource base to ensure the capacity for timely, sustained and effective responses to prevent conflict.
5.1 Creating the social infrastructure for effective responses
&Mac183; improving networking and enhancing the Global Partnership / a civil society movement for peace and security Ë development of a multipolar network capable of linking local and global levels of action and transforming North-South divides; potential for solidarity work and global mobilisation to address at-risk situations.
&Mac183; Linking with related fields (e.g. development, relief, human rights) to enable cross-fertilisation between analyses, strategies, and practices.
&Mac183; stimulating and supporting effective issue-based or situation-specific CSO task groups for effective communication and coordination
&Mac183; supporting local capacities for peace and responding to conflict
&Mac183; capacity building through training individuals and institutions
&Mac183; strengthening institutional capacities for response through civilian peace services / civilian rosters / pools
National civil society forums and networks. A principle goal is to develop and strengthen networks as an important key to generate the ‘social infrastructure’ for conflict prevention, because it can be a forum for identifying underlying structural causes of conflict and developing agendas to address them, as well as mobilising action to effectively address specific conflict situations. In addition to fostering the Global Partnership for Conflict Prevention at the international and regional levels, it is hoped that it will serve as a catalyst for a more permanent national grouping such as a network / forum / platform national councils as a basic rooting structure.
[From International Advisory Group meeting: Conflict prevention advocacy offices. Develop a lobbying office for CSOs working on conflict prevention in New York, Geneva and possibly other key locations where there are significant policy and decision-making fora on conflict issues. Such an office could serve as a network channel for more effective interaction. Civil society groups could both feed in analysis and information useful for early warning and early response or for strategies to address existing conflicts. The office(s) would also be responsible for keeping members and wider civil society informed of new developments in the international and regional systems and elicit their inputs into policy deliberations.]
5.2 Generating the knowledge-based and informational resources for effective action
&Mac183; Systems for information exchange and appropriate use of information technology
&Mac183; Forums / mechanisms for joint analysis and joint strategising
&Mac183; Improving practice through systemised learning and assessment of previous and ongoing initiatives to better understand what supported overall change; developing mechanisms to share these insights, perhaps through collaborative approaches to evaluation.
&Mac183; Developing and supporting relevant research agendas
&Mac183; Long-term development of the field through mainstreaming conflict prevention studies in general and specialised education programmes.
5.3 Developing sustainable and effective financial / material resources
Ë Goal: more resources, more effectively administered.
Recognise the paradox of the resources made available for traditional approaches to national security through military defence spending and the relative scarcity of funds for support to promoting human security through funding for conflict prevention initiatives…
&Mac183; More effective funding modalities – e.g. reliable funding for sustained efforts for medium- to long-term initiatives + funding streams that can be quickly administered for flexible rapid response initiatives through, for example, unrestricted Trust Funds or other mechanisms. (Need to develop specific analysis and suggestions for this!)
&Mac183; More sustainable and independent funding streams for CSO activities. For example, consider developing resources from private donors or by creating membership organisations with independent funding and other support from members (which could parallel the emergence of greater public awareness of the value of conflict prevention and support for CSO roles in promoting it).
&Mac183; Continued / increased governmental and foundation support
6. Guiding principles for CSO roles in conflict prevention
6.1 Conflict prevention NGOs: issues in developing the field
The emergence of West European non-governmental organisations specialising in work on conflict is a comparatively new development. Our legitimacy as a field is based on how effectively we identify needs and opportunities and then address them. The field is, therefore, in a learning phase. To become more effective, we need to create mechanisms for exchange of experience and shared reflection on what has worked, what has not worked and why.
[From the London Meeting: Interaction amongst CSOs engaged in conflict prevention.
&Mac183; Who are ‘we’? How do we explain conceptually who we are to ourselves and to others? What are the boundaries delineating CSOs working on conflict prevention?
&Mac183; How do we communicate with each other? How can we develop effective mechanisms / processes for information sharing?
&Mac183; How can we increase collaboration / cooperation for joint action?
&Mac183; Need for further capacity building.
&Mac183; What is the interface between northern with southern / eastern CSOs? How can we strengthen and better engage in these relationships through networks, alliances, and partnerships?
&Mac183; The primacy and the challenge of enabling inclusively and diversity: how can we encourage dialogue? What are the forums / platforms for this engagement? Ë “agreement is not vital; diversity is welcome”
&Mac183; Challenge of representation / ensuring adequate representation within forums.
&Mac183; Acknowledgement that the way in which interaction is enabled amongst CSOs has significant implications for the ways in which civil society can engage with governments and inter-governmental organisations.]
[From International Advisory Group Meeting:
This group started with the observation that the overall Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict has the potential to create the social infrastructure for a ‘network of networks’ of civil society groups addressing peace and security concerns. They focused on how this networking opportunity could be channelled into the development of a global movement. They noted that it would be important for the network that was the basis of the movement to be as inclusive as possible, drawing members from all related fields (such as human rights or development) and sectors (such as trade unions or faith communities), as long as they are actively seeking to address peacebuilding, conflict resolution or conflict prevention. Membership in a network would not be mutually exclusive, as each member could also be a member in other networks and associations. Indeed, existing issue-based or sectoral networks could collectively become members of this global network. An important outcome of this inclusively would be the greater legitimacy of the movement – particularly in challenging any perceptions that it is a staff-driven initiative from the ‘conflict industry’, which is a cynical view held by some.
Drawing inspiration from how Amnesty International’s ‘mandate’ helped to create the foundations for a global human rights movement, the group sought to develop inspiration for how CSOs working on conflict could lay similar foundations for a movement. One of the challenges is to develop a common ground, given all of our differences in approach and emphases and the different contexts in which we work. While striving to be inclusive, the group argued for the need to develop a set of basic values or principles that all members would need to agree as the basis of the common criteria for membership. These would serve as the basic ‘mandate’ of the network and would articulate a clear statement of the movement’s ethos.
The working group proposed a set of ethical criteria that could be a starting point for discussion:
a) No one will be excluded on the basis of their identity (including, among other dimensions, their nationality, their ethnicity, their gender or their faith). The network also aims to proactively engage with communities often excluded or ignored by mainstream civil society organisations to help ensure there is no ‘exclusion by omission’.
b) Recognising the damage of structural violence, members agree that they will not actively condone or participate in policies and practices that contribute to it. While some members concentrate on eradicating structural violence and building positive peace; others may be focused on addressing direct violence. Nevertheless, all should value the importance of addressing the structural causes of conflict and violence.
c) Members are committed to preventing the harming and killing of non-combatants.
d) Recognising the diversity of views on ‘just war’ and the ‘legitimate uses of violence’, members nevertheless agree that these should be a last resort.
The working group argued that the development of common criteria would help to contribute to the movement’s transparency – especially to external audiences – as well as its legitimacy. It would help to develop thinking on basic codes of conduct for the field. A network mandate, in general, would also help to underpin an ‘authentification scheme’ for the genuineness of its members. This could, in turn, help to bolster their recognition by the UN system, governments and donors.]
6.2 Guiding principles / codes of conduct
Acknowledgement of CSOs as a factor in war as well as a contributor to peace – consider implications…
Need to stimulate systematic thinking, especially in the West European context, of proper relations between insider and outsider roles in conflict prevention – especially related to power asymmetries, agenda setting and the meaning of ‘partnership’
Can draw on existing codes of conduct (e.g. IA’s) and other principles in an effort to stimulate discussion and consensus building…
As civil society organizations working on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, we believe that conflict transformation is a long-term process of social change that necessitates:
&Mac183; a multi-track approach
&Mac183; the importance of local capacities for peace and the primacy of local ownership
&Mac183; long-term engagement
Other points could be gender perspective; empowerment, etc
6.3 Evaluation and systemised learning within the field
7. Actors and Interventions
[Comments are sought on this section]
[In this section key actors and issues that were identified at the European Platform Meeting of October 2003, as important should be described. However, we may also want to avoid a long list, short on content, and focus on articulating key principles and goals relating to this overall theme, focusing on key topics identified by the Platform as priorities. There could then be addendums to the main document – or perhaps an annotated bibliography – by the time we get to the draft International Action Agenda. See, for example, the supplementary volumes of The Responsibility to Protect or the Carnegie Commission…]
- Promoting a culture of peace: long-term prevention should be rooted in transforming militarism and developing alternatives to violence
- Civil society organisations and actors: acknowledging our diversity; identifying our strengths and limitations
&Mac183; Roles of Diaspora
&Mac183; Etc….
- Transforming conflict: civil society involvement at different stages of the conflict cycle: peacebuilding as a long-term process; not a time-tabled event.
&Mac183; Preventing escalation to armed conflict: creating alternatives to violence; peaceful conciliation of opposing interests amongst individuals, social groups, and other conflicting parties.
&Mac183; Resolving / settling violent conflict through engagement in peace processes
&Mac183; Preventing recurrence: peacebuilding, rehabilitation and reconciliation
- Promoting a culture of peace: role of education
- Development and conflict
&Mac183; Mainstreaming interlinkages between development, peace and security
&Mac183; Raising awareness of conflict-sensitive approaches to development cooperation
- Role of media
- Public participation in peacemaking, democratic decision-making and constitutionalism
Bibliography
- “Prevention of Armed Conflict” GA Resolution: A/RES/57/337
- Goteborg document (EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, June 2001, http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF) and Helsingborg Agenda (Partners in Prevention, Regional EU Conference on Conflict Prevention, Helsingborg, Sweden, 29-30 August 2002, Chairman’s conclusions: http://www.ud.se/inenglish/projects/partners_ip/news/chairman_s_conclusions.htm)
- International Alert, Saferworld lobby documents to the EU www.international-alert.org; www.saferworld.co.uk
- The Responsibility to Protect http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/
- the IANSA Policy Framework www.iansa.org
- Global Action to Prevent War http://www.globalactionpw.org/
- Building Peace from the Ground Up: a Call to the UN for Stronger Collaboration with Civil Society http://www.forusa.org/ArticlesandResources/peace-buildingup.pdf
- Responses on the Secretary-General Report on Prevention of Armed Conflict, like from Global Action to Prevent War, Program statement 2003: http://www.globalactionpw.org/
- Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/index.htm
- Hague Appeal for Peace http://www.haguepeace.org/
- FCNL (Friends Committee on National Legislation, Quakers) Report “If war is not the answer then what is? –The Peaceful Prevention of Deadly Conflict, June 2003 http://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/Primer.pdf
- Human Security Now http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html
- John Clark, Worlds Apart: Civil Society and the Battle for Ethnic Globalization, London, May 2003
- UNDP 2002 report on Good Governance http://www.undp.org.np/publications/hdr2002/
- Local Capacities for Peace Project (http://www.cdainc.com/lcp/index.php) and Reflecting on Peace Practice Project (http://www.cdainc.com/rpp/index.php) documents of The Collaborative For Development Action (Mary Anderson)
- Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation http://www.berghof-handbook.net/
- Peacebuilding, a field-guide by Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, September 2000