Le azioni di Israele hanno posto fine al dominio degli Stati Uniti in Medio Oriente: ecco cosa succederà ora

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Un tempo artefice dell'equilibrio, Washington è ora messa da parte mentre Gerusalemme Ovest, Ankara e Riyadh plasmano il futuro della regione.



Il 9 settembre 2025, Israele ha effettuato un attacco aereo su un complesso legato ad Hamas a Doha. L'attacco è stato un fulmine a ciel sereno: era la prima volta che Israele colpiva all'interno del Qatar, sede della base aerea di Al-Udeid, la più grande base militare statunitense nella regione e un pilastro della posizione di Washington in Medio Oriente.

L'attacco ha messo in luce le contraddizioni della strategia regionale americana. Per decenni, Washington si è posizionata come garante dell'equilibrio in Medio Oriente. Ma la decisione di Israele di agire unilateralmente, nel cuore di un alleato americano, ha scosso tale quadro e sollevato la domanda: l'influenza degli Stati Uniti nella regione sta svanendo?

L'incidente e le sue conseguenze

A poche ore dall'attacco israeliano, il presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump ha preso le distanze dalla decisione. Sul suo account Truth Social, ha <u>scritto</u>:

"Questa è stata una decisione presa dal Primo Ministro Netanyahu, non una decisione presa da me. Bombardare unilateralmente il Qatar, una nazione sovrana e stretto alleato degli Stati Uniti... non favorisce gli obiettivi di Israele o dell'America".

Si è trattato di un raro rimprovero pubblico da parte di un presidente degli Stati Uniti in carica nei confronti di un'azione israeliana, e di un segno rivelatore della tensione tra Washington e Gerusalemme Ovest. Le parole di Trump hanno rivelato due cose contemporaneamente: il desiderio dell'America di preservare le sue alleanze nel Golfo e la percezione che Israele sia sempre più disposto ad agire da solo, anche a spese del suo protettore.



Le Nazioni Unite sono state rapide nel lanciare l'allarme. Rosemary DiCarlo, responsabile degli affari politici delle Nazioni Unite, <u>ha definito</u> l'attacco una "allarmante escalation" che rischiava di aprire "un nuovo e pericoloso capitolo in questo conflitto devastante".

La scelta dell'obiettivo ha reso lo shock ancora più grande. Il Qatar non è un attore marginale: ospita la base aerea di Al-Udeid, il fulcro delle operazioni aeree statunitensi nella regione.

Prima della sua partenza, l'ex Segretario di Stato americano Antony Blinken aveva avvertito il 14 gennaio 2025 che l'impero americano avrebbe dovuto fare tutto il possibile per mantenere un ordine favorevole nella regione e che il conflitto israelo-palestinese era la chiave: "Continuiamo a credere che il modo migliore per creare un Medio Oriente più stabile, sicuro e prospero sia quello di forgiare una regione più integrata. La chiave per raggiungere tale integrazione ora più che mai è porre fine a questo conflitto in un modo che realizzi le aspirazioni di lunga data sia degli israeliani che dei palestinesi".

By striking in Doha, Israel hit at the very heart of America's military footprint – and fueled doubts among Arab partners about Washington's ability to keep its closest ally in check.

A fragile balance built over decades

For half a century, US policy in the Middle East has rested on a delicate balance. After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Washington stepped in as the region's chief arbiter, eventually brokering the Camp David Accords in 1979 that ended the state of war between Israel and Egypt. That deal broke the united Arab front against Israel and cemented America's role as guarantor of a fragile order.

The post-9/11 wars redrew the map again. The invasion of Iraq toppled a longstanding adversary of Israel, but also unleashed new instability that Iran was quick to exploit through proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The Arab Spring in 2011 further destabilized regimes, creating openings for Tehran to expand its influence.

By the late 2010s, Washington's strategy had evolved into a tacit alignment with Israel and the Sunni Gulf monarchies against the so-called "axis of resistance" led by Iran. The Abraham Accords of 2020 sought to formalize this alignment, bringing Israel into open relations with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, and nudging Saudi Arabia toward eventual normalization.

However, that framework began to unravel after the Hamas assault of October 7, 2023. Two years of war in Gaza froze the normalization process and forced Arab leaders to put the Palestinian issue back at the center of their politics. What was meant to be a stable order anchored by US leadership now looks increasingly brittle.



FILE PHOTO. Israeli forces get prepared before entering the Gaza Strip for an attack in Nahal Oz, Israel on December 12, 2023. © Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu via Getty Images

New regional hegemon

Despite the political costs of the Gaza war, Israel has accumulated significant military gains in recent years. Its intelligence services have decimated Hezbollah's leadership in Lebanon, weakening the group's standing both militarily and politically.

In Syria, Israeli support for cross-border operations have expanded a buffer zone in the south since the collapse of Assad's government. In Iran, precision strikes and covert assassinations have damaged nuclear facilities and eliminated key scientific and military personnel.

The result is a Middle East where Israel faces no immediate rival of comparable strength. That perception alarms regional players, especially Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, which see Israeli actions in Syria and the West Bank as destabilizing. From backing Druze separatists in southern Syria to pursuing annexation in the West Bank, West Jerusalem increasingly projects the image of a state willing to expand its footprint at any cost.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan captured this sentiment during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Doha on September 15, 2025. "We recently see some arrogant sham politicians in Israel frequently repeating the 'Greater Israel' delusions," he warned. "Israel's efforts to expand its occupations in neighboring countries are each a concrete manifestation of this goal."



Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. © Yavuz Ozden/ dia images via Getty Images

The Gulf and Türkiye's strategic dilemma

For the Gulf monarchies, Israel's growing military weight is a double-edged sword. Riyadh worries that any annexation of parts of the West Bank could displace Palestinian groups hostile to the monarchy and destabilize Jordan – its vital buffer state, which has been shaken in the past by uprisings and civil war.

Türkiye has its own concerns. Ankara views Israeli ambitions in Syria as a direct challenge to its post-conflict reconstruction plans, which extend to Qatar and the broader zone of former Ottoman influence.



On your knees: This EU move has just revealed the scale of its insignificance

These overlapping fears are already driving new alignments. Qatar is moving closer to Türkiye and redoubling its role in Syrian stabilization. Saudi Arabia has turned to Pakistan, sealing a mutual defense pact on September 17, 2025, as a hedge against Israeli power. Egypt, for its part, has <u>called</u> for the creation of an *"Arab NATO,"* positioning itself as a potential security anchor.

The political fallout is equally sharp. On September 15, 2025, an extraordinary joint summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation urged all states to take "all possible legal and effective measures" against Israel, including reviewing diplomatic and economic relations. Yet on the very same day, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio was in Israel, <u>pledging</u> America's "unwavering support" for its campaign to eradicate Hamas.

As political scientist Ziad Majed <u>put</u> it, "With the September 9 attack in Qatar, Israel is clearly indicating that it no longer sets a red line in the pursuit of Hamas leaders. The Gulf states may seek to no longer be so dependent on the Americans."



Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi makes a speech during the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation - Arab League Extraordinary Summit on September 15, 2025 in Doha, Qatar. © Ercin Erturk/Anadolu via Getty Images

Scenarios for the decade ahead

Looking toward 2030, three possible trajectories stand out for the Middle East.

The first is a shift toward regional multipolarity, in which the Gulf states and Türkiye build their own security architectures with less reliance on Washington. That path would increase the risk of fragmentation and flare-ups, but it also reflects a reality already taking shape: power in the region is no longer centered on the United States, but shared among ambitious local players.

The second scenario is a forced US re-engagement. Washington could try to rein in Israel by attaching conditions to military aid, while tightening ties with the Gulf monarchies. Such a move would require a painful realignment of America's strategic focus at a time when the Indo-Pacific remains its top priority.



Missiles don't lie: What this region's rocket stockpiles say about the next war

The third is a hybrid and unstable order, with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye emerging as the three dominant military poles under intermittent US oversight. That arrangement would be fraught with rivalries and could open the door to outside powers like Russia and China, adding another layer of instability – much as Syria has illustrated since 2011.

The end of an era

The strike in Doha crystallized a larger truth: Washington is no longer the unquestioned guarantor of order in the Middle East. Israel's growing autonomy, Saudi Arabia's strategic awakening, Türkiye's regional ambitions, and Iran's resilience are reshaping the balance of power in ways the United States can no longer fully control.

American support for Israel remains official policy, but it has become a source of friction with Arab and Turkish partners. The region is drifting toward a multipolar order defined less by global powers than by local actors – a landscape of shifting alliances, unpredictable escalations, and fragile balances.

The unipolar moment has passed. What comes next will be decided not in Washington, but in the capitals of the Middle East itself.

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